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In this dissertation, I try to continue the strand of the literature on international trade. Theoretical 
modelling accompanied with econometrics analysis using available data assist this thesis to 
provide explanations on trade policy determinants and its implications. The first chapter 
investigates the impact of corruption on trade protectionism and trade openness as a major 
institutional determinant discussed in the literature. In the second chapter, a theoretical 
framework on welfare analysis of a prohibitive non-tariff measure (NTM) is illustrated. NTMs 
that have attracted global attention after drop of tariffs via international agreements such as 
GATT and WTO regulations are discussed in details with the special focus on technical barriers 
to trade (TBT). In the third chapter, quality of traded products is analyzed through various types 
of NTMs. In the fourth chapter, the trade disputes on TBTs are investigated as major trade 
conflicts in the context of WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, the determinants of 
these trade conflicts are analyzed using appropriate econometrics techniques and applying new 
data on specific trade concerns raise on TBTs. In the fifth chapter, trade frictions in services 
within the European Union (EU) are studied. While EU directives are regulated to provide a 
frictionless environment to smoothen trade between member states, tariff equivalents of trade 
in rail transport services are estimated. Finally, in the sixth chapter of this dissertation, detailed 
effects of four types of NTMs are analyzed. Using an augmented gravity framework, importer-
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What to produce, how to produce, and for whom are the basic questions in economics. In order 
to provide correct answers to these questions, economic science has evolved and improved 
during centuries. Allocation of limited resources has forced societies to understand what to 
produce. Due to the available limited resources, people need to find a way to produce goods 
and services in the most efficient way in order to achieve what they desire to consume. Finally, 
to cover the costs associated with the production, a market mechanism is required to provide 
goods based on peoples’ demand and willingness to pay. 
Imports assisted people to produce more efficiently than before. Exports of goods provided a 
better mechanism for finding consumers. At present, trade in technology intensive goods and 
in know-how helped firms to use resources more efficiently in producing goods. Thus, 
international trade has been playing a significant role during the history at least since the 
creation of Silk Road trade routes across Eurasia. Trade has become an important tool in 
increasing the welfare of societies. However, history showed that the need for resources and 
goods desired by the societies caused many conflicts and wars, which usually destroyed 
peaceful trade. 
The liberalization of trade and free market access to resources and products beyond borders 
became a need for societies. Economists have tried to acknowledge this fact using theoretical 
modeling frameworks. International economic theorists have tried to establish frameworks for 
providing sufficient and logical motivations for international trade. Moreover, they formulated 
policy implications providing benchmarks for exchange of goods, services, resources, and 
commerce that could be beneficial for all economies involved in international trade. Gradually 
during the history, conflicts and wars were replaced by international economic relations and 
trade. Governments have also established a solid framework to negotiate their mutual trade 
concessions within agreements and organizations established after the Second World War. 
 
In this dissertation, I will present specific aspects of trade policy, by studying both the causes 
and effects of them. I will focus my analysis on certain forms of non-tariff protectionism and 
applications of specific trade policy instruments. In particular, I will demonstrate the interplay 
between traditional tariffs and specific forms of non-tariff measures (NTMs) and calculate the 
tariff equivalents of non-tariff measures in both manufacturing and services industries. I will 
also try to explain why some NTMs become an important trade policy instrument and what can 
be the welfare implications.  
* * * 
The welfare increasing effects of trade have been widely studied in the economic literature 
starting by economic pioneers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Smith (1776) was the 
pioneer but David Ricardo improved this concept by demonstrating benefits of free trade from 
the comparative advantage in the production of two products by two trade partners. Even if the 
labor productivity in one country in every good is lower than in another one, there will be a 
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win-win situation in trade where all workers can consume more in all trading countries 
(Ricardo, 1817). The simple assumptions of the Ricardian model have become more realistic, 
taking into consideration many other factors of productions and varieties of products, within 
the strand of the neoclassical literature (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; Oniki and Uzawa, 1965, 
and Vanek 1968).  
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, enhanced by Vanek ((H-OV), has constituted the framework for 
empirical analysis on inter-industry trade flows. Trade based on the factors of production 
abundance has been initially tested by Leontief (1953) leading to the Leontief paradox. Later 
work of Leamer (1980) questioned the Leontief findings, but subsequent studies suggested that 
correct interpretations would not confirm empirical validity of H-O-V theorem.  
Continuous criticisms on neoclassical theories of trade have brought other scholars to the 
concept of New Trade Theory emphasizing on monopolistic competition, increasing returns to 
scale, and firms’ heterogeneity (Armington, 1969; Krugman, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1987; 
Helpman, 1981; Melitz, 2003; and Bernard et al., 2007). This framework explains the expansion 
of intra-industry trade. According to the New Trade Theory, international trade should reduce 
average costs and prices and increase the number of varieties for consumers (“love for variety”). 
Hence, the traditional positive consequence of international trade focusing on lower prices is 
supplemented by addition benefit such as larger number of available varieties of products.  
The “New” New Trade Theory has been enriched mainly by Melitz (2003), by extending 
analysis to the firm level. The new approach explains why and how international trade induces 
relocation of firms within an industry. Intra-industry trade becomes significantly an important 
issue, which then is followed by global value chains. In addition, international trade can 
improve the quality of products. Within this framework the economists are emphasizing the 
role of product quality, in addition to the traditional perspective on comparative advantage 
(Schott, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hallak, 2006; Feenstra & Romalis, 2014). In 
summing up, the new trade theories are becoming more detailed encompassing various 
attributes of trade and supporting consensus on benefits of liberalization in international trade. 
Theories of international trade have been widely tested using various datasets by different 
scholars (Loertscher and Wolte, 1980; Helpman, 1988, and 1998; Evenett and Keller, 1998; 
Bernhofen, 1999; Cieślik, 2005, and 2009; Feenstra & Romalis, 2014).  
 
Despite the fact, the majority of empirical studies, based on the neoclassical and new strand of 
the literature, confirms benefits of trade liberalization, trade policy has been frequently used as 
a means to control or restrict trade flows. Tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs), 
encompassing various instruments such as trade quotas, subsidies, reciprocal dumping, 
antidumping, technical standards, and etc. were frequently used to control trade flows.  
Issues related to trade policy, its determinants and consequences have been discussed in several 
advanced textbooks and economic articles (i.e. Helpman and Krugman, 1989; Francois and 
Reinert, 1997). Grossman and Helpman (1992) in their seminal paper established a framework 
to analyze how governments support special interest groups, in exchange for pecuniary benefits, 
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by imposing protectionist trade policies. Governments are protecting the domestic industry 
against foreign competitors using various policy instruments. This complicated game is called 
“protection for sale” by Grossman and Helpman (1992). The protectionism is restricting trade 
and raising trade conflicts between trade partners. In general, protectionist trade policies 
contradict economic interests of trading partners. In order to meet concerns of partners, 
governments need to provide convincing arguments in the context of international trade 
regulations. Motivations behind different forms of protectionism are described broadly in the 
modern strand of the economic literature.  
By signing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, the Contracting 
Parties decided to liberalize international trade gradually. World Trade Organization (WTO) – 
which was emerged form GATT and established by the end of 1994 – provides detailed 
international regulations on various trade aspects. The ultimate aim of GATT/WTO members 
was to create the organization regulating and monitoring the multilateral trading system. 
WTO’s “main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as 
possible.” WTO also provides the litigation mechanism at the time of trade conflicts between 
the member states. 
Trade policies reflect various motivations and goals of governments. Their implications can 
also be very different. The liberalization of trade policy and regulations improving market 
efficiency are in line with international regulations of the WTO. In contrast, some other policy 
measures can create unnecessary obstacles to trade, usually serving as a form of protectionism 
benefitting domestic industries. These protectionist measures and prohibitive obstacles are 
considered as violations of international trade agreements, causing trade disputes and conflicts. 
Studying the determining factors behind impositions of trade policies can help better 
understanding of the main motivations of governments. On the other hand, the analysis of 
consequences and effects of trade policies can demonstrate the significance of trade 
protectionism. Moreover, the analysis of various policy instruments can provide better insights 
for understanding true nature of protectionist policies. 
* *  * 
In this dissertation, I am shedding light on some aspects of trade policy by studying both the 
causes and effects of them. I will follow the mainstream literature on international trade policy 
by focusing on some specific cases and trade policy instruments. In the beginning of XXI 
century, the level of tariffs is fairly low, and majority of them is bound by the WTO schedules 
of concessions, which leaves not much room for traditional trade policy. Most of tariff 
schedules are set in favor of developing economies, in order to provide a better access to 
international markets.  
However, non-tariff measures (NTMs) with complex natures, motivations, and implications 
have become the most frequent trade policy instruments in the past two decades, which gives 
“legitimate motives” to governments to pursue their domestic interests. While governments 
provide various reasoning behind their policy instruments, they rarely reveal true motivations 
of their policies and our knowledge on the role of special interest groups in shaping their policy 
measures, is still limited.  
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In my dissertation, I will demonstrate the relationship between traditional tariffs and modern 
NTMs and calculate the tariff equivalents of non-tariff measures in both manufacturing and 
services industries. I also try to reveal the true nature of some NTMs, explain why some of them 
became an important trade policy instrument, and analyze their welfare implications. Moreover, 
I analyze the impact of some NTMs on the quality of imported products. Finally, I try to explain 
when the introduction of some NTMs (technical regulations) can lead to trade disputes among 
WTO members.  
* ** 
1. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I analyze the aspect of traditional trade policy, by 
studying the determinants of customs duties, which are treated as the main conventional trade 
policy instrument. I focus on the role of the corruption in the “sale of protection” to the domestic 
industries. Corruption is a common phenomenon in developing countries that can affect the 
manipulation of customs tariffs. The range of bound tariffs by the WTO commitments in the 
developing countries is smaller in comparison to those of the developed countries. Thus, the 
impact of corruption on tariffs can be more pronounced in the developing countries. I 
investigate the impact of corruption on the level of trade protectionism, trade openness, and 
imports for the period 1996-2008. It is commonly argued in the literature that special interest 
groups, who are lobbying with governments for pursuing protection, can be more successful 
within a more corrupted society. 
In the analysis, average customs and other import duties of a given country are treated as one 
of the protectionist measures and the average taxes on trade are considered as another proxy for 
trade restriction. Moreover, total trade-GDP ratio and total imports are also treated as proxies 
for the trade openness of a given country in this chapter. In addition, I included some specific 
imports subgroups to analyze how corruption can affect these various types of goods and 
services. The main independent variables are Control of Corruption from World Governance 
Indicator (WGI) and Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International website. 
Both proxies of corruption are analyzed separately. Unfortunately, despite application of 
appropriate econometrics techniques, in order for controlling problematic issues in the 
regressions, the results on the effects of corruption on protectionism and/or trade are statistically 
inconclusive.  
On the other hand, the analysis presented in the first chapter demonstrates the importance of 
the WTO membership. The results of panel estimations reveal that the accession to the WTO 
decreases the level of taxes on trade and increases trade openness and total imports. However, 
GMM estimations, controlling for dynamic settings, do not show significant impact of WTO 
membership on trade. In fact, after becoming a WTO member, trade liberalization does not 
change the dynamics of trade significantly. The likely reason is that after the accession, 
countries are bound not to increase tariffs, meaning they cannot implement protectionist tariffs. 
However, they can use various non-tariff measures (NTMs).  
The analysis of tariffs is relatively simple. The imposition of tariff is usually reducing the 
amount of products imports, by increasing the final price for consumers. By imposing tariffs, 
the governments can determine which domestic producers will benefit from higher prices of 
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imported goods. In fact, high tariffs can distort the free market system and consumers’ behavior 
will be affected dramatically. On the other hand, the exporting producer can also change its 
strategy in response to import tariffs affecting the behavior of consumer and new market 
disturbances. The consequences of these issues can be evaluated relatively easily due to the 
transparent nature of tariffs. Consequently, the motivation and reasoning of the government 
manipulating tariffs can be clear. However, these statements cannot be repeated in the case of 
NTMs. 
The analysis of NTMS is much more complicated. Non-tariff measures are specific policy 
instruments with opaque implications and unclear reasoning. Bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and international regulations within the WTO framework are set to liberalize 
international trade. The levels of tariffs have been dramatically reduced due to these regulations. 
However, technical challenges and new standards being set in order to reduce market 
imperfections and to increase consumers’ welfare, and global safety and health, can have 
important trade implications. Governments – in accordance with international rules and 
regulations – can impose restrictions on imports for technical reasons. However, the imposition 
of NTMs needs to have justifiable and/or scientific reasoning. Otherwise, the NTMs are 
considered as unnecessary obstacles to trade and should be abolished as soon as trading partners 
are concerned. When trading partners cannot get to mutual agreement, they may refer to the 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO. These potential reasons of conflicts have 
motivated the next two chapters of this dissertation.  
2. In the second chapter of the thesis, a theoretical framework is established on “Welfare 
Analysis of a Prohibitive NTM in a Society with a Proportion of Concerned Consumers.” The 
text is available among the working paper ‘No. 12/2013 (97)’ series of the Faculty of Economic 
Sciences of Warsaw University. Following the standard analysis of benefits of liberalization, 
the second chapter establishes a theoretical framework to study these benefits, when a 
prohibitive NTM halts the importation of a specific product that is believed to be harmful for a 
group of concerned consumers in a society. The ongoing negotiations on Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its public debates are showing the importance of 
consumers in defining the legitimacy of trade policies. Consumers are the main voters accepting 
or rejecting such trade agreements and being aware of their preferences and concerns.  
The specific aim of this contribution is to provide a cost- benefit analysis in a partial equilibrium 
framework to investigate the welfare consequences of an NTM, such as a technical barrier 
restricting the importation of a potentially harmful product. The original contribution of this 
text is the analysis of two groups of indifferent and concerned consumers. The ultimate aim of 
the study is to investigate whether or not the paternalistic behavior of government is in line with 
the willingness of the consumers for demand. The existence of information about the origin of 
goods is the key issue of the analysis that provides two different scenarios. The model is then 
calibrated with data on consumption and importation of shrimps into the EU. The findings 
suggest that in the case of existence of such information, NTM leads to the lowest international 
losses and highest domestic gains. The conclusion of this analysis suggests that governments 
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should try to increase the information in the market, when they are acting in good faith when 
imposing this type of NTM. 
The second chapter builds a theoretical framework for the analysis of the losses and benefits of 
a prohibitive trade instrument. The findings of the chapter can help governments, trade partners, 
and WTO Secretariat to provide guidelines on the imposition of these policy measures by other 
governments. However, due to very opaque nature of NTMs, it will be very difficult to figure 
out the true motivation of governments. Thus, in some cases they can lead to disputes and trade 
conflicts between trade partners. This aspect of trade policy is studied in chapter 4. The 
empirical analysis of trade implications of TBTs and other NTMs is presented in the subsequent 
chapter.  
3. The third chapter of my dissertation, coauthored with Simona Jokubauskaite and Robert 
Stehrer, has been presented at the annual 2015 ETSG conference in Paris (10-12 September 
2015). We focus the analysis on six types of NTMs: 1- Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); 2- 
and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS); 3- Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) raised on 
TBT; 4- STCs raised on SPS; 5- Anti-dumping measures (ADP); and 6- other quantitative 
NTMS (QNTM) that allow countries to impose restrictions on the imports of low-quality 
products, being suspected to harm the domestic consumers’ health or the ecological 
environment. Such trade policy instruments might induce higher standards in the import market, 
in addition to improving the market efficiency by information requirements such as mandatory 
labelling. In this chapter, I analyze whether the imposition of NTMs leads to quality 
improvement of the traded products. The analysis is based on a model matching both supply 
and demand sides of trade. The paper assesses the impact of different types of NTMs on the 
quality of the imported products. The analysis modifies and uses the existing information on 
the NTM notifications to the WTO from the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) during 
1995-2011. 
Using a rich database on NTM notifications of the WTO members, we studied the diverse 
impact of four types of NTMs on traded values, quantities, quality, and prices. ADP, TBT, TBT 
STC, SPS, SPS STC, and other quantitative NTMs (QNTMs) are the main variables of the 
analysis. Applying a demand-supply theoretical framework proposed by Feenstra and Romalis 
(2014) for the measurement of quality of traded goods, we distinguished the impact of NTMs 
on traded qualities and prices net of quality. In a gravity framework, we observed the diverse 
role of NTM in trade components.  
The outcomes of the analysis points at quality improvement of traded products affected by the 
TBTs Moreover, TBTs are enhancing trade values, trade quantities, and prices, which might 
refer to a higher demand for standardized products. However, TBT STCs enhance trade flows 
while the results in the third chapter refer to low quality products on which TBT STCs are 
raised. While the general impact of TBTs on trade flows is positive, traded values and quantities 
are affected differently by each product category, which gives insights on the diverse 
characteristics of products and their final use.  
In contrast to these results, SPS imposition influences the product quality in the opposite way. 
Our results suggest that SPS have restricting impact on quality of products and trade. Thus, 
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these trade policy instruments can – surprisingly – induce lower quality of products. The similar 
trends are observed in the case of quantitative NTMs, which also significantly downgrade the 
quality of traded products. 
Finally, the analysis shows that Anti-dumping measures (ADP) enhance trade values and 
quantities. The ADP is imposed to restrict the low pricing of the imported product under 
dumping. When the exporter is obliged to export with higher price after the imposition of ADP, 
reducing the quality of the exported product can be a good strategy to excuse the low dumping 
price. This strategy increases the demand and finally the import values of the product under the 
ADP, which makes the ADP a trade enhancing policy instrument rather than a restrictive one. 
4. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, co-authored with Jan Michalek, and edited as a 
working paper ‘No. 22/2014 (139)’ series of the Faculty of Economic Sciences in Warsaw 
University, we study the likelihood of future trade conflicts. Even if in some cases, a policy 
instrument such as TBT does not explicitly limit international trade it can distort it or affect 
total international trade, which might involve many trade partners in the world. This situation 
can lead to potential conflicts and levy costs to producers and consumers. 
Economic science not only tries to find out the most efficient way to produce, but also needs to 
establish frameworks in which positive externalities of production are encouraged and negative 
externalities are gradually reduced or eliminated. These frameworks can be established within 
new standards and regulations, which can be imposed via technical barriers to trade. A 
restrictive trade policy measure that hampers trade liberalization or distorts trade flows can be 
consulted and analyzed within the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO. The 
Agreements on NTMs have been cited in many trade disputes within the DSM. If, after 
consultations, a verdict of the DSM panel indicates that the analyzed measure violates a specific 
WTO agreement, then it is understood that it creates an unnecessary restriction to trade. These 
consultations and DSM proceedings identify most important restrictions on trade among WTO 
members. To be precise, the analysis is devoted to trade conflicts and disputes within WTO, 
with special focus on cases in which TBT Agreement has been cited.  
The analysis in this chapter of this dissertation is aimed at verifying to what extent and in which 
circumstances the TBT notifications can serve as a system of early warning for future disputes 
in the areas of TBTs. During 1995-2011, there have been 45 requests for consultations for the 
DSB of the WTO in order to identify the violations in TBT agreement. The possible 
explanations and violations of TBT Agreement analyzed by the DS bodies are discussed in this 
chapter.  
The WTO provided a TBT dataset covering Specific Trade Concerns (STC) raised by its 
members. In this chapter, we look for the linkages between DS cases citing TBT agreement and 
the TBT STC notifications. In an econometric analysis, using data for bilateral trade of products 
at two-digit level of Harmonized System (HS), a positive relationship between raising TBT 
STCs and DS cases on TBT is found. In other words, it is acknowledged that a rise in the 
number of STC on TBT would increase the probability of trade conflicts on TBT. Thus, some 
new TBT regulations, in principle aimed at protection of consumers, hamper trade flows, 
causing disputes and conflicts within the WTO. In order to decrease the number of these 
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conflicts, a new set of regulations should be set to increase the transparency of NTMs. The new 
rules should allow only legitimate NTMs to be imposed with clear reasoning far from trade 
protectionism, and genuinely requested to pursue “good faith” objectives, such as protection of 
consumers’ health. 
The benefits of trade liberalization and implications of trade restrictions are the main issues 
discussed in this dissertation. Promotion of technological progress, improvement in resource 
allocation and economic growth are facilitated by globalization. Globalization, like 
regionalization, creates some benefits and costs. For example, the advantages of pooling labor 
and information sharing due to regionalization are also associated with the costs of congestion 
(Shujiro, 2004). Since the late twentieth century, the world economy has experienced a 
considerable intensification of economic and financial integration. Gradual trade, capital and 
services liberalization, progress in telecommunication and rapid technological improvement in 
transport, have increased the demand and supply for international flow of services and goods. 
The process of globalization is the strengthening financial and economic links within and 
between geographic regions. Multilateral trade liberalization under the GATT has accelerated 
the speed of postwar globalization. Deregulation and privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
unilateral liberalization of trade and investment, and the lower cost of foreign transactions 
resulting from technological progress in telecommunications and transportation, deepened the 
process of globalization. Creation of the WTO and establishment of GATS (General Agreement 
on Trade in Services) in 1994 were the first steps towards worldwide liberalization of trade in 
services. In addition to WTO agreements facilitating trade liberalization, creation of free trade 
areas and customs unions, have increased the regional liberalization of trade more than before. 
The European Union is the best and biggest example of regionalization covering free trade of 
goods and services, and free mobility of factors of production. In the next chapter of this 
dissertation, I study the scope of services’ liberalization and trade frictions within the EU. 
5. The fifth chapter of this dissertation, co-authored with Jan Hagemejer and Aneta Mach, is 
entitled “Services trade liberalization in the transport sector.” This text has been published as 
the chapter in the book entitled: Liberalization of Transportation Services in the EU: the Polish 
Perspective, published in 2015 by Peter Lang GmbH. 
The restrictive effect of trade policy measures studied in the earlier chapters of this dissertation 
is measurable in terms of simple tariffs or possible tariff equivalents, since these instruments 
are applied to trade in goods. However, there are no tariffs imposed on services’ trade; but there 
are many other institutional or informal measures restricting the access to local markets. Thus, 
it is relatively difficult to measure the level of protectionism observed in the case of trade in 
services.  
Services are playing an important role in economies, either as a final consumption product or 
more importantly as an intermediate in the production of goods. Despite its crucial role, 
international trade in services is still small. In other words, services share in advanced 
economies is around 70% of the GDP, while services trade in total trade amounts to around 
35% in these economies. Low trade in services can result from trade frictions and barriers to 
trade. Despite existing obstacles and barriers in services trade, it is not possible to conduct 
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similar analyzes as in previous chapters to investigate the role of protectionism in services. 
Hence, there is a necessity to apply other approaches such as quantification of trade restrictions 
using econometric techniques. In the fifth chapter of this dissertation, we try to quantify 
protectionism in services, expressed in terms of tariff equivalents. The focus of the analysis will 
be aimed at rail transportation services, as it is an old mean of transportation of goods, which 
as an important intermediate essentially facilitates international trade in goods.  
The aim of the fifth chapter is to assess the degree of the trade liberalization and its impact on 
bilateral trade in rail transportation services. In spite of the endeavors of EU directives and 
regulations to provide free liberalized trade of goods and services between member states, trade 
barriers in services are still observed. A gravity equation using bilateral trade data was estimated 
similar to those used in the analysis of merchandise trade to assess the role of the EU regulatory 
frameworks on the services trade flows across EU members. Liberalization indexes provided 
by IBM Consulting Services (IBM, 2007 and 2011) were treated as proxies of facilitation of 
services’ trade. The estimated gravity model is used to compute time varying tariff equivalents. 
In the absence of duties or tariffs imposed on services trade, computation of tariff equivalents 
proposed in the study can shed light on the level of trade liberalization. The quantification of 
trade effects resulting from existing NTMs applied to the rail services is another major outcome 
of the last chapter of my dissertation. 
6. The last chapter of this dissertation, co-authored with Julia Grübler and Robert Stehrer, is 
entitled “The Bilateral Impact of NTMs in Global Value Chains.” This paper has been presented 
at the annual 2015 ETSG conference in Paris (10-12 September 2015).   
In the fifth chapter, tariff equivalents of trade barriers in rail transportation services were 
calculated. As mentioned earlier, no tariffs are levied on services trade, while trade in goods is 
controlled by both tariffs and non-tariff measures. Tariffs are mostly ad-valorem taxes levied 
on imports of goods. Moreover, non-ad-valorem tariffs can be easily transformed into the ad-
valorem taxes using import prices and quantities (UNCTAD/WTO, 2012). However, NTMs 
and their implications are not easily quantifiable. In order to quantify the effects of NTMs on 
trade flows of each product, we can estimate the ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs using 
a gravity framework. Then, using the import demand elasticities, we calculate the impact of an 
NTM on the price of the imported product, which is equivalent to ad-valorem tariffs. 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on trade between 
countries at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) over the period 2002-2011. We 
draw on existing information on NTM notifications to the WTO from the Integrated Trade 
Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) distinguishing various types of NTMs. Following existing literature 
(e.g. Kee et al., 2009) a gravity approach is chosen to assess whether NTMs facilitate or impede 
trade across countries. 
Previous estimations of AVE of NTMs (Kee et al., 2009; Bratt, 2014; and Beghin et al., 2014) 
were calculated on a cross sectional data – and only for average 2001 to 2003 – due to lack of 
information on NTMs. In our study, we use a rich database on NTM obtained from WTO I-TIP 
and improved methodology by Ghodsi, Reiter, and Stehrer (2015) we extend their contributions 
to a panel analysis, which provides estimators that are more efficient. Previous calculations 
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were not distinguishing NTM types whose diverse attributes by motives would bring various 
trade consequences. In this chapter, we differentiate NTMs within four major categories ADP, 
TBT, SPS, and QNTM, which provide insights on the implications of different types of NTMs. 
In addition, in previous studies, intensity of NTMs was not considered and existence of NTMs 
was mainly analyzed as a dummy variable. In our analysis, we show the intensity of NTM types 
by counting the number of NTMs in force from the beginning of the period of analysis. Another 
contribution is the new estimation methodology that increases the efficiency and the number of 
non-zero AVE outcomes by using the importer factor NTMs in pooled estimations over all 
countries, rather than by single importer-product estimations. Hence, the prominent 
contribution of this study relies on the variation of NTM effects by importer countries. In 
previous studies, the empirical approach gave an average impact of NTM on the import of 
products to all importers. The variation in the calculated AVEs thus, depended mainly on the 
variations in the import demand elasticities, which by construction depended only on variation 
of product imports share to GDP across all importers. However, the novelty of this contribution 
is highlighted by both variations of import demand elasticities across importers and variations 
of NTM effects using the interaction approach. 
Earlier chapters of this dissertation pointed to possible positive externalities and a trade-
enhancing effect of some NTMs. Complexity of NTMs is due to their various causes and diverse 
impacts. By calculating AVE for NTMs in this chapter, we distinguish the trade enhancing 
NTMs that might be imposed in good faith from the prohibitive NTMs that might be caused by 
protectionist motives of the governments. While Kee et al. (2009) assumed that NTMs were 
only impeding trade, our results identify whether each NTM imposed by a WTO member had 
a positive or a negative impact on trade. Controlling for the sample selection bias, we run 5224 
regressions using Heckman procedure and FE Estimator with a robust variance-covariance 
matrix, clustering for country-pairs. Estimations by product at 6-digit level of the HS results in 
AVEs for four types of NTMs imposed by 149 WTO members (that gives around 780,000 AVE 
for each type of NTM). Somewhat surprisingly, in the case of about 52% of cases, the tariff 
equivalents display a negative sign.  
Summing up, my dissertation is focused on various aspects of contemporary protectionism. In 
fact, it is providing a laboratory for analyzing international trade policy and various trade 
instruments. Firstly, I studied the determinants of tariff policies in a number of countries, with 
a special focus on the role of corruption. Next, I analyzed – in a theoretical framework – the 
rationale for NTMs in a society of developed country, with a large share of concerned 
consumers. I concluded that the introduction of prohibitive NTMs requires a high level of 
transparency in implementing trade policies. Afterwards I analyzed empirically the implications 
of TBTs and other NTTMs on trade flows. In particular, I studied the implications of NTMs for 
prices and quality of traded goods. The introduction of non-tariff measures can restrict 
international trade and lead to trade conflicts. In the fourth chapter, I demonstrated that 
notifications of specific trade concerns on the TBT and SPS measures could be treated as a 
predictor of future trade disputes among WTO member states. In the fifth chapter, I analyzed 
empirically the tariff equivalents of barriers existing in rail transportation services. I also 
estimated the possible impact of trade liberalization of this sector of services. Finally, in the last 
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chapter, I quantified the tariff-equivalents for six types of NTMs imposed on all 6-digit products 
of the HS rev.2 by all WTO members. The generated database for the importer-specific AVE 
for NTMs is the rich outcome identifying the trade implications of the different types of these 
policy instruments worldwide. Our results help to identify whether each NTM imposed by a 
WTO member had a positive or a negative impact on trade flows. I believe that my dissertation 
sheds light on some aspect of contemporary protectionism in the societies with a high 
proportion of concerned consumers such as the European Union, in which governments apply 
various forms of non-tariff measures. 
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1. Corruption and the Level of Trade Protectionism 
Abstract: In this chapter, impacts of corruption on the level of trade protectionism, trade 
openness, and imports are analyzed. It is argued that special interest groups who are lobbying 
with corrupted governments might seek more benefits in some special subgroups of imports. 
Possible country and time specific fixed effects, endogeneity and some other problems in the 
regressions are controlled to achieve results that are more robust. Corruption measures from 
two different sources of Worldwide Governance Indicator and Transparency International 
website are analyzed in two separate similar approaches. It is finally concluded that both 
measures of corruption implicate negative influence on only one import subgroup, while there 
is no significant impact on protectionism measures. 
1.1. Introduction 
Impact of corruption on different aspects of economics has been studied widely in the literature. 
Corruption is one of the institutional qualities that have a negative effect on economic measures 
like growth and trade. Policy makers in corrupted governments and societies do not maximize 
total national welfare of the economy. In fact, they are selling their beneficial power to enhance 
the opportunities for special interest groups who are lobbying, in order to stay longer in power. 
In this study, I am using corruption as a measure of authorities’ misuse of power for special 
interest groups, which leads to the government’s policies alterations and can affect trade 
patterns of a country. The main hypothesis of this study is that higher level of corruption causes 
higher levels of trade protection. Similar studies have been done previously over other samples 
of data. Bandyopadhyay and Roy (2007) analyzed this effect for 88 countries over the period 
1982-97. In this analysis, I have relatively a similar analysis over a newer period. There are 
some differences between this study and previous studies. Firstly, I am analyzing various 
models whose dependent variables are different from each other. Secondly, I want to figure out 
that which trade subgroup is mostly affected by corruption. In other words, I will check impacts 
of corruption on some Import subgroups and conclude that some of them are more affected by 
corruption, which shows higher benefits of those types of imports for the special interest groups 
who are lobbying with corrupted governments. I will also address heterogeneity and 
endogeneity problems of regression and will provide a suitable approach in order to control 
them. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 presents the literature review. In section 
3, hypotheses of the study and the expected impacts of variables are elaborated. I specify the 
estimation in section 4. In section 5, data specifications are presented. Section 6 represents the 
results of the estimations and finally in section 7 some conclusions are elaborated. 
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1.2. Literature Review 
Role of corruption on bad economic conditions have been studied widely in the literature. Dietz 
et al (2007) continued a typical issue about the effects of institutional qualities on positive 
genuine saving (GS), which is a necessary condition for sustainable development. In fact, 
according to the definitions, GS is a net saving rate in a national accounting framework 
encompassing resources depletion and environmental degradation. In their analysis, they found 
that low corruption has a positive impact on genuine saving in interaction with resource 
abundance of countries. Corruption is an important factor in the alteration of both political and 
economic decision-makings. While this institutional quality is not affecting the growth of 
economic directly, high levels of corruption lead to some biased and wrong decisions of 
officials in the governments that are not maximizing national welfare of the society and finally 
because of creating some disorders in the economy they lead to lower growth.  
Grossman and Helpman (1994) constructed a model that shows that special interest groups are 
seeking for government’s choice of trade policy by making political contributions. Politicians 
are maximizing their welfare that is strongly affected by the contributions they have received. 
Therefore, policies are influenced by the different lobbies that construct a protection for the 
government’s voters and those special interest groups. In this manner, the fundamental role of 
the government that is taking care of its own society will be bounded to some special limited 
groups of people. 
Some researchers studied the effect of corruption on different aspects of economy and found 
endogeneity of corruption in their models. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2007) proved that 
resource abundance has a positive impact on growth and a negative impact on institutional 
qualities, which means resource abundance countries, can have higher rates of corruption. 
Besides high level of institutional quality has a positive impact on growth which both lead to 
endogeneity of corruption and other institutional qualities. In order to solve the endogeneity 
problem they used 3SLS estimation method.  
Dutt and Traca (2010) claimed that corruption could have two different effects on trade relating 
the level of protectionism. If the level of protectionism, taxes, and duties on trade are not so 
high, corruption leads to extortion. This means that corrupt customs officials extort bribes from 
exporters and importers, which causes lower level of trade (the extortion effect). Nevertheless, 
if we are confronting a very high tariff environment the corrupt officials allow exporters and 
importers to avoid tariff barriers (the evasion effect). These findings suggested that in the 
empirical analysis of corruption and trade, causality of the variables should be carefully 
considered, as it might cause endogeneity of corruption in the regression. Gatti (2004) studied 
whether barriers on international trade and capital flows are directly related to the higher level 
of corruption. He found evidences that collusive behaviors between individuals and customs 
officials are the main reasons of corruption and incentives of corruption are not mainly those 
of trade restrictions. 
Treisman (2000) analyzed several measures of perceived corruption and found out some more 
developed countries with protestant traditions, histories of British rules, and higher imports 
were less corrupted. His findings have been useful for other scholars like Bandyopadhyay and 
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Roy (2007) to find good instruments of corruption in their empirical analyzes. They studied the 
effects of corruption on trade. They analyzed impact of corruption on three different measures 
of import duty, trade tax, and total trade-GDP ratio in a simple gravity model. Their analysis 
was over 88 countries in a panel data over the period 1982-1997. They controlled for 
unobserved heterogeneity among countries with application of Fixed Effect estimator. In 
addition, they used instrumental variable regression to control for the endogenous 
characteristics of corruption in their analysis. Eventually, they proved that corruption has a 
significant positive impact on the protectionism and trade barriers and has significant negative 
influence on the trade openness.  
Thede and Gustafson (2012) in a working paper studied multifaceted corruption impact on trade 
on a cross section estimation for 1999. Five different characteristics of corruption that they 
analyzed were level, prevalence, customs location, function, and predictability of corruption. 
In corruption-augmented gravity equation, which was estimated by Heckman version of a 
GMM instrumental variable method, they found evidences that these characteristics of 
corruption have significant negative influence on bilateral trade. 
1.3. General Hypotheses of the study 
I am analyzing the impact of corruption on different dependent variables. Firstly, I investigate 
this effect on two models with protectionism measures as dependent variable. “Customs and 
other import duties” holds one of the protectionism measures, and “taxes on international trade” 
is the other one. According to the World Development Indicators definitions, the first one 
defines as “customs and other import duties are all levies collected on goods that are entering 
the country or services delivered by nonresidents to residents. They include levies imposed for 
revenue or protection purposes and determined on a specific or ad valorem basis as long as they 
are restricted to imported goods or services.1” While the latter describes as, “Taxes on 
international trade include import duties, export duties, profits of export or import monopolies, 
exchange profits, and exchange taxes.2” Secondly, I analyze the impact of corruption on trade 
openness measures, which are “total trade GDP ratio”, “total imports”, “goods imports”, and 
“services imports” on four different models. Finally, I estimate some models whose dependent 
variables are different types of import subgroups to check which types of import are highly 
affected by corruption. This shows the beneficial aspects of those types of imports for special 
interest groups who are lobbying with corrupted government. Note that the selection of these 
import subgroups is mainly based on the availability of data. Six subgroups of imports are as 
follows: “computer and communications services”, “food”, “fuel”, “information and 
communication technology goods (ICT)”, “manufactures”, and “ores and metals”. 
According to the existing literature, corruption is expected to increase the level of trade 
protectionism, and decrease the level of imports and in general trade openness. However, since 
higher corruption of a country is represented by a lower value of corruption in the data, negative 





sign of coefficients are expected for trade protectionism models, and positive signs for trade 
openness and imports. 
I am using some factors that were used previously in different studies as control variables. Real 
GDP per capita, real GDP, government expenditure, current account balance, and WTO 
membership are the control variables, which have different impacts on the dependent variable.  
Countries with higher real GDP per capita that are more developed, can afford policies that are 
more liberal. In other words, developing countries with lower GDP per capita may impose 
higher level of tariffs and duties in order to protect domestic market and industries. GDP is a 
proxy for country size that can show the measure of market size in a country. Hence, a country 
with bigger GDP is willing to trade more. However, there can be another hypothesis that bigger 
countries avoid openness of trade since they can supply their own domestic markets. 
Nevertheless, these two opposite hypotheses can be tested in the regressions. 
It was stated in the literature that government expenditure has a positive relation with 
international trade, Rodrik (1996). He explained that, when terms-of-trade risk is very high, 
government spending reduces the risk of exposure to international trade by inclusion of some 
effective controls. Therefore, according to his analysis, there is a positive correlation between 
openness and the government size. Meanwhile, we can declare that countries with bigger 
governments might be less liberal, and consequently have higher imposition of trade barriers. 
However, we can conclude the exact impact after obtaining the results of regressions. 
Table 1.1 - Expected signs of coefficients according to hypotheses 




Corruption Negative Negative Positive Positive 
Real GDP Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Government 
Expenditure 




Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
GDP per Capita Negative Negative Positive Positive 
WTO 
Membership 
Negative Negative Positive Positive 
Note: Corruption is expected to increase trade protectionism and decrease level of trade. However, signs of 
corruption coefficients in models are expected as in the table, because the corruption indices show higher 
corruption with lower values. Next section describes the corruption indices. 
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Governments with higher current account deficits seem to impose higher trade tariffs and 
taxations on imports in order to generate revenues. However, they might impose export taxes 
when they encounter surplus. Therefore, current account balances seem to have negative impact 
on import protectionism and positive impact on imports, while the impact on total trade and 
taxes over that is unknown. On the other hand, current account balances are mainly the results 
of imports and exports. When the imports are increasing, current account balances decrease. 
This reverse causality will make us to conclude after estimations. 
Members of World Trade Organization (WTO) have regulatory limitations in imposition of 
protection on imports. Hence, countries that became members of WTO may impose high tariffs 
and taxes on trade less frequently. Giving these hypotheses, I expect coefficient results for 
variables that are indicated in Table 1.1. 
1.4. Estimation specification 
Since this study is based on a panel data, OLS regression seems to be inconsistent as we might 
have country specifics and time fixed effects (FE). I control for fixed effects of time and country 
specifics in the regressions using fixed effect estimators. However, in this study, I apply 
Haussmann test to check for significance of random effects (RE) in each equation; thus, some 
equations are estimated via random effect estimator instead of fixed effects. A general model 
can be constructed as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (1.1) 
Yit is the dependent variable for country i at time t, which will be different in the models of 
estimation. In fact, I estimate 12 equations whose dependent variables are different. 𝛽0 is the 
constant term, Xit is a vector of control variables, 𝛾𝑡 indicates time specific effects and 𝜑𝑖 
indicates country specific effects, and eit is a vector of error terms.  
In the simplest model, equation (1.1) is estimated using FE and RE estimators that can control 
for time and country specific effects. In order to control for the existing heteroskedasticity in 
the regressions, robust estimators are used.  
As it was mentioned earlier, different studies observed endogeneity of corruption in trade and 
economic models (Treisman 2000, Bandyopadhyay and Roy 2007, and Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2007). When there is an improvement of institutional qualities, there must be less 
bureaucracy in countries, which will increase the level of trade and will decrease the level of 
corruption. Moreover, other explanatory variables in the model can also have endogeneity and 
reverse causalities with the dependent variables. Current account balance is highly affected by 
the trade flows, which seem to be result rather than cause of the dependent variables. Besides, 
even though high government expenditures can stabilize the risk of trade by implementation of 
various trade controls, they can be highly affected by the revenues gained on trade.  
To reduce the endogeneity bias in the estimations one can use instrumental variables. According 
to Hausman tests, using FE and RE estimator with instruments for corruption was not consistent 
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in comparison with FE and RE estimators without any instruments. Moreover, for complete 
control over the model various instruments are needed for each independent variable. Thus, I 
use system GMM to achieve the most consistent unbiased outcomes. Augmented version of 
difference GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), which is an improved version of 
GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This augmented version was developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and it is a system GMM that has a two-step standard error correction 
mechanism. This estimator provided by Roodman (2006) in Stata is suitable for panel datasets 
with short periods and many groups that contain fixed effects and heteroskedastic idiosyncratic 
errors, which are similar to the data in this study. Lags of levels and lags of differences of 
variables are used in differenced and level versions of the system GMM such that the outcome 
is highly consistent and unbiased. The estimations are compatible with tests of the estimation 
as shown in the Table 1.3 and Table 1.5.  
In addition to the lags and differences of variables, some instruments are included in the GMM 
estimation. OECD countries that are more developed have some anti-corruption legislation; 
therefore, they seem to be less corrupted. It was mentioned in the literature that countries with 
British colonial heritage are less corrupted. However, I add colonial heritage of some other 
developed countries that have significant correlation with corruption. It means that the countries 
with colonial past are less corrupted. Colonies of the United States of America, United 
Kingdom, France, German, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands are included in one 
variable as an instrument. In the literature, countries with protestant regulations are proved to 
be less corrupted. However, there were no official data for this variable. Year dummies are also 
included in the instrument covariates to decrease the heterogeneity problem in the data. 
1.5. Data Specification 
This analysis is over an unbalanced panel data consisting of around 200 countries between the 
period of 1996 and 2011. The main independent variable in this study is from two different 
sources. One is Control of Corruption (CC) from Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 
published by the World Bank website3, which exactly defines as “perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.4” In this dataset, 
lower scores of index, which can be also negative, shows the higher level of corruption. For 
example, in 2011, Somalia had the highest corruption with the score of -1.72 and Denmark had 
the lowest level of corruption with the score of 2.42. This indicator includes indexes of 212 
countries in the period between 1996 and 2011 but it does not have any data for any country in 
1997, 1999, and 2001. 
The second source of data for corruption is Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International website5, which provides similar data to the previous one but includes the indexes 
                                                 
3 This data is available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
4 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm 
5 This data is available at:  http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
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for about 182 countries in the period between 1998 and 2011. This index like previous one is 
compiled from different surveys carried out by various organizations, but it is only positive. 
Similarly, the score with lower value shows higher level of corruption. For example, in 2011, 
Somalia and North Korea had the highest corruption with the score of “1” and New Zealand 
had the lowest level of corruption with the score of 9.5. There is a significant positive 
correlation between variables of both sources. 
The WTO variable is a dummy variable that gets value of “1” if at the time “t” the country is a 
member of WTO and gets value of “0” if at that time the country is not a member. This data 
was taken from the WTO website6. For corruption instruments, OECD is a dummy variable that 
gets value of “1” if the country is part of OECD and gets value of “0” if it is not7. Colonies 
variable is constructed in a way that receives value of “1, 0.75, 0.5, and 0” if respectively the 
country is currently a colony, was a colony after 1945, had been a colony before 1945, and has 
never been a colony of above mentioned countries. Giving a unique value to all colonies makes 
them exactly similar to each other; while some countries with a long history of independency 
like Egypt do not have anything in common with Britain right now. Data on colonial heritage 
was compiled from the CEPII database8 and was completed for those missing in CEPII data by 
own research.  
The data for all other variables in the model are taken from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank9. Dependent variables, current account balance, and general 
government final consumption expenditure variables are all described as percentages to GDP. 
If the raw data was not in terms of percentages of GDP, own calculations were done considering 
current and constant prices, local currency, and US Dollar units of both variables and GDP. 
Total GDP and GDP per capita that were in US Dollar units are logged in the estimations. 
Dummy variables and corruption indices are in the regressions as explained above without any 
changes. 
1.6. Results 
Two categories are estimated, one with the CPI and the other with CC from WGI. In each of 
them, I estimate 12 equations in two parts using two different estimation methods as explained 
before. 
1.6.1. CPI category 
1.6.1.a. Regression using FE and RE estimators 
Table 1.2 shows the estimation results of the CPI category using FE and RE estimators. 
Hausman test for consistency of FE suggests that the first column should be estimated using 
                                                 
6 This data is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
7 This data is available at: 
 http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm 
8 This data is available at: http://www.cepii.com/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
9 This data is available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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RE and the rest of the equations should be estimated using FE estimators. R-squared and 
Adjusted R-squared are very close to each other in all equations. However, they are very small 
that show the explanatory power of the independent variables. 
Between two trade protectionism measures, only the second one shows a statistically significant 
negative coefficient for CPI. Corruption increases tax on trade as expected. CPI also gets 
expected significant positive signs for three of the openness measures. Corruption decreases 
trade GDP ratio, total imports, and goods imports. Among import subgroups, corruption 
decreases ICT goods and manufacture imports. These results conclude that CPI has a 
statistically significant impact on the imports of goods. Thus, tax on trade, total imports, and 
trade GDP ratio are mainly affected by corruption through imports of goods. It is observed that 
services imports and services import subgroups are not affected by corruption. Special interest 
groups are mainly interested in the import of goods and they put their efforts with the corrupted 
government to achieve their goals via these imports. 
GDP per capita coefficient is statistically significant only in two of the models. It shows positive 
impact on both taxes on trade and ICT goods imports. Developed countries with higher GDP 
per capita seem to impose more taxes on trade, while they import higher levels of ICT goods. 
Government expenditure statistically significantly increases customs and import duties and 
decreases trade GDP ratio, ICT goods imports, and manufacturing goods imports. This is in 
opposition with one of the hypotheses that were mentioned earlier about this variable. However, 
if we think of the reverse causality of government expenditure and the dependent variables, 
these results seem to be appropriate. Thus, countries with bigger governments are less liberal 
in trade. 
GDP coefficient is statistically significant for four models. GDP decreases trade protectionism 
measures, and increases total imports and fuel imports. It means that countries with bigger 
market and higher capacities put less restriction for trade. Big markets need big supply side or 
even more differentiated products from many suppliers. Moreover, bigger countries impose less 
tax on total trade, which can be also on exports. This can suggest that big domestic industries 
of such countries will be flown to foreign markets easily. 
Current account balance shows statistically significant coefficients in seven equations. The 
results for this variable show again the reverse causality with the dependent variables. In other 
words, imports decrease current account balances effectively, while it can be incorrectly 
perceived in the table of estimations that this variable has a negative impact on imports. WTO 
coefficients show that being a member of WTO would decrease taxes on trade and would 
increase trade GDP ratio and total imports for the members significantly, which seems in line 
with the hypotheses. 
1.6.1.b. GMM regression 
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results of the system GMM over the data sample of CPI and 
also the post estimation tests for autocorrelation in differences, and Hansen over-identification 
tests for the instruments. According to these test statistics, best combinations of lags and lags 
of differences of variables were used for all models. Two lags of the dependent variable, all 
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explanatory variables in levels, year dummies, and first lags of the explanatory variables except 
the WTO variable were included in each equation. As it was mentioned earlier, some 
instruments were also used as standard instruments of the regressions. Given Arellano-Bond 
Autoregressive tests approve the usage of differences and lag of differences for all models. 
Instruments for total trade model are not exogenous in both GMM and IV equations according 
to the Difference-in-Hansen tests. In addition to that, these tests show similar issues for the 
GMM differences equations, and IV excluding groups in services import model. Other 
possibilities were checked for those models, but these combinations of variables are the most 
suitable ones. All other models have suitable test statistics of the post estimation. 
As observed in Table 1.3, current value of CPI has statistically significant coefficient in only 
food import model. This shows that corruption decreases only the current level of food imports 
that seem to be very attracted by special interest groups lobbying with corrupted government. 
However, lag of this variable in this equation is negative, which might suggest that previous 
level of corruption in a country might even increase the level of current food import. This result 
might be interpreted that special interest groups, especially in poor countries with a high level 
of corruption, try to change the pattern of trade in food according to their interests. Food import 
decreases and then when they find a good chance to import, the food import in the next year 
(long run) will be increased through their channels. This can be a single interpretation while 
other dependent variables such as trade protectionisms are unaffected. 
There are two other statistically significant coefficients for the lag of corruption in tax on trade 
and services imports models, which are both positive. These two outcomes respectively can be 
interpreted as the negative impact of past corruption on the current level of tax on trade and 
services imports. However, the p values of both coefficients are very close to 10% level of 
significance, which might be negligible.  
Log of GDP per capita has statistically significant positive coefficients for the two trade 
protectionism models and six of other models. Thus, it means that more developed countries 
not only impose higher protectionism measures against trade, but also have more trade openness 
and imports. Lag of log of GDP per capita has very close coefficients to the current log of GDP 
per capita in all models, but with negative signs. Since this variable is in logs, the coefficients 
show the impact on the dependent variables marginally. Because of linear relation between 
them, the marginal effects are similar all the times but with reverse impacts, which prevents 
divergence of the model in the long run.  
Similar situation to the previous variable is observed for the log of GDP in all models. 
Nevertheless, this variable does not have any significant impact on trade protectionism models, 
and it has negative statistically significant impact on seven other models. Current values of 
GDP decrease trade openness and some imports, while the past values of it have the reverse 
impact with the same magnitudes. 
Current value of government expenditure has statistically significant positive impact on only 
customs and import duties. Similar to results of Table 1.2, this result also shows that countries 
with bigger government expenditures are less liberal and they impose protectionism on trade to 
reduce the trade openness and imports. 
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Current account balance variable has significant negative impacts on all trade openness and 
imports, except computer services imports. This result is similar to the outcomes of Table 1.2 
Even though usage of first differences and instruments decrease the dual causalities of 
variables; it is observed that current account balances decrease level of trade and imports. A 
country with higher current account balances has excessive exports in the current period. It 
brings a situation that in the next year imports increase and the account balances decrease in 
the next period, as the lag of this variable has positive statistically significant coefficients. 
WTO members seem to have less import of services, food, and computer services with respect 
to non-members according to the results of Table 1.3, which is against the hypotheses. 
1.6.2. CC Category 
1.6.2.a. Regression using FE and RE estimators 
Table 1.4 shows the estimation results of the CC category without application of instruments. 
Hausman test proves that all equations should be estimated using FE estimators due to 
consistency and efficiency of the regressions. Robust estimators were estimated due to the 
existence of heteroskedasticity in error terms. R-squared and Adjusted R-squared have similar 
situations to previous category. Corruption perceived as CC in this table decreases import of 
services and computer services significantly. The coefficient of this variable is not statistically 
significant for any other models. 
Control variables have almost similar results and interpretations to the previous category 
estimated by FE and RE estimators. Statistically significant coefficients for log of GDP per 
capita show that more developed countries impose higher trade protectionism measures with 
respect to less developed countries. Besides, this variable increases computer services imports 
and decreases fuel imports significantly. Government expenditure increases the customs and 
import duties and food imports, and decreases the import of ICT goods. In addition to similar 
results of log of GDP in this category with results of the CPI category, this variable increases 
trade GDP ratio and imports of goods, while it decreases the level of computer services imports. 
Coefficients of current account balances and WTO in this category are almost similar to the 
results of CPI category and they have the same interpretations. 
1.6.2.b. GMM regression 
Specifications of the GMM regression of this category are chosen similarly to the category of 
CPI. Table 1.5 represents the outcomes of the GMM regressions of CC category and their post 
estimation tests. The latter suggests that the specifications and inclusion of instruments and lags 
for all models in the former table are appropriate. Except in the last column of Table 1.5, all 
coefficients of corruption are statistically insignificant. This result states that corruption 
perceived by the WGI surveys increases the current level of metal imports, and decreases the 
next levels of this import subgroup. In other words, special interest groups are attracted to the 
import of metal and they pursue high level of metal imports for the current period. When they 




Table 1.2 – FE and RE estimation of CPI 















CPI -0.00085 -0.0037*** 2.25* 0.013* 0.014** -0.0050 -0.12 0.069 0.11 0.44* 1.36** 0.058 
 (0.00082) (0.0013) (1.32) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.22) (0.10) (0.29) (0.25) (0.66) (0.053) 
log of GDP per Cap. -0.0021 0.053*** -2.58 -0.034 0.027 0.031 13.8 -0.99 -4.70 7.11* 7.75 0.36 
 (0.0022) (0.017) (15.2) (0.082) (0.080) (0.052) (8.82) (1.58) (5.07) (4.07) (7.46) (0.88) 
Gov. Exp. 0.00081*** 0.00038 -0.80** -0.0019 -0.0013 0.00089 0.28 0.033 -0.072 -0.12** -0.33** -0.014 
 (0.00031) (0.00027) (0.36) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.20) (0.029) (0.073) (0.053) (0.16) (0.013) 
log of GDP -0.0063*** -0.049*** 20.0 0.11* 0.076 -0.038 -9.82 1.25 9.67** -5.50 -0.025 0.70 
 (0.0018) (0.012) (12.4) (0.063) (0.067) (0.051) (8.57) (1.16) (4.25) (3.51) (5.81) (0.65) 
Cur. Acc. 0.000084 0.000049 0.020 -0.0037*** -0.0043*** -0.0009*** 0.018 -0.035*** -0.058* -0.029** -0.27*** -0.0033 
 (0.000096) (0.00011) (0.14) (0.00095) (0.00066) (0.00034) (0.12) (0.0079) (0.033) (0.014) (0.050) (0.0086) 
WTO mem. -0.0023 -0.0075*** 9.89* 0.067** 0.045 0.0098 -0.97 0.33 -0.54 0.22 3.10 0.23 
 (0.0030) (0.0021) (5.22) (0.028) (0.027) (0.0092) (0.62) (0.52) (0.89) (0.66) (2.02) (0.21) 
Constant 0.18*** 0.79*** -380.7* -1.93* -1.79 0.77 128.9 -19.5 -191.6*** 79.9 -40.4 -19.3** 
 (0.038) (0.17) (199.1) (0.99) (1.08) (0.85) (141.0) (16.2) (65.1) (55.6) (90.3) (9.51) 
Observations 900 960 1599 1599 1606 1606 638 1467 1466 1219 1467 1467 
R2  0.108 0.099 0.148 0.195 0.028 0.075 0.058 0.184 0.033 0.136 0.149 
Adjusted R2  0.102 0.096 0.145 0.192 0.024 0.066 0.054 0.181 0.028 0.132 0.145 
Hausman test 
Prob>chi2 
0.1098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Breusch Pagan Test 
Prob>chibar2 
0.0000            
Wald Test of FE 
Prob>chi2 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Shaded column estimated with RE estimator due to Hausman consistency test 






















L.Dep. Var. 0.81*** 0.73*** 0.95*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.91*** 1.10*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 1.00*** 0.89*** 0.81*** 
 (0.072) (0.082) (0.041) (0.050) (0.074) (0.14) (0.089) (0.050) (0.052) (0.19) (0.046) (0.062) 
L2. Dep. Var. 0.23** 0.29*** 0.051 0.087* 0.13* -0.042 -0.24*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.020 0.11*** 0.19*** 
 (0.094) (0.097) (0.041) (0.046) (0.073) (0.098) (0.070) (0.049) (0.075) (0.17) (0.036) (0.057) 
CPI -0.0014 -0.0022 0.62 0.0026 -0.0046 -0.0054 -0.18 0.31** 0.060 0.15 -0.59 -0.039 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (1.41) (0.0081) (0.0064) (0.0049) (0.24) (0.12) (0.28) (0.24) (0.51) (0.046) 
L.CPI 0.0016 0.0023* 0.34 0.0024 0.0080 0.0088* 0.29 -0.26** 0.025 -0.18 0.81 0.069 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (1.31) (0.0075) (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.25) (0.12) (0.28) (0.23) (0.53) (0.043) 
log of GDP per Cap. 0.054** 0.066* 136.3*** 0.87*** 0.49** 0.11 0.70 3.91 16.4* 15.5 53.2** 2.33** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (35.1) (0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (8.35) (4.13) (9.54) (11.3) (21.3) (1.10) 
L.log of GDP per Cap. -0.055** -0.067* -136.5*** -0.87*** -0.49** -0.10 -0.30 -3.87 -16.4* -15.5 -53.4** -2.40** 
 (0.028) (0.034) (35.3) (0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (8.44) (4.14) (9.54) (11.3) (21.4) (1.10) 
log of GDP -0.049 -0.060 -135.3*** -0.89*** -0.49** -0.18 6.36 -8.18* -24.7*** -15.1 -45.4** -2.49** 
 (0.030) (0.038) (38.4) (0.25) (0.21) (0.14) (11.1) (4.18) (9.17) (11.2) (20.7) (1.19) 
L.log of GDP 0.049 0.061 134.7*** 0.89*** 0.48** 0.18 -6.63 7.96* 24.6*** 15.1 45.2** 2.50** 
 (0.030) (0.038) (38.3) (0.25) (0.21) (0.14) (11.1) (4.16) (9.16) (11.2) (20.6) (1.18) 
Gov. Exp. 0.00081** 0.00031 -0.25 0.0015 -0.00030 0.0014 0.0090 0.013 0.080 0.0042 -0.14 -0.016 
 (0.00039) (0.00045) (0.26) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.057) (0.052) (0.075) (0.028) (0.19) (0.014) 
L.Gov. Exp. -0.00067 -0.000033 0.0063 -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0029* -0.093 -0.035 -0.13* -0.041 0.028 0.016 
 (0.00044) (0.00048) (0.29) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.069) (0.052) (0.079) (0.031) (0.20) (0.014) 
Cur. Acc. 0.00015 0.00013 -0.21** -0.0046*** -0.0054*** -0.0016*** 0.0082 -0.030*** -0.071*** -0.044*** -0.31*** -0.010*** 
 (0.00010) (0.00013) (0.10) (0.00072) (0.00088) (0.00047) (0.086) (0.0086) (0.024) (0.015) (0.033) (0.0035) 
L.Cur. Acc. -0.000070 0.00000074 0.30*** 0.0053*** 0.0052*** 0.0019*** -0.017 0.026*** 0.075*** 0.036*** 0.34*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000080) (0.00012) (0.11) (0.00078) (0.00068) (0.00053) (0.067) (0.0093) (0.028) (0.0099) (0.033) (0.0039) 
WTO mem. 0.00084 0.0011 -0.26 -0.00030 -0.0041 -0.012** -0.87** -0.30** -0.32 0.074 -0.077 0.017 
 (0.00099) (0.0015) (0.84) (0.0049) (0.0070) (0.0056) (0.39) (0.15) (0.25) (0.12) (0.40) (0.034) 
Constant -0.0067* -0.010** 23.9*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 5.08** 6.80*** 6.30*** 0.72 8.30*** 0.40* 
 (0.0036) (0.0052) (8.34) (0.044) (0.035) (0.048) (2.18) (1.28) (1.78) (0.94) (3.16) (0.22) 
Observations 706 778 1424 1424 1423 1423 497 1284 1281 975 1284 1284 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arellano_Bond AR(1) 
test in first differences 
Pr>z 
 
0.078 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.062 0.000 0.000 
Arellano_Bond AR(2) 
test in first differences 
Pr>z  
 
0.293 0.211 0.104 0.101 0.648 0.387 0.195 0.221 0.342 0.229 0.569 0.718 
Hansen overid. Test 
Prob>chi2 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.958 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 





















1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IV Excluding group 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IV Difference 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.552 
Standard errors in parentheses 






















CC 0.000008 0.0017 0.74 0.0027 0.00030 -0.0096* -0.69* -0.24 -0.69 0.92 1.62 -0.023 
 (0.0021) (0.0034) (2.61) (0.014) (0.0076) (0.0053) (0.40) (0.21) (0.51) (0.58) (1.13) (0.094) 
log of GDP per Cap. 0.018* 0.038** -5.87 -0.048 -0.037 0.024 11.9*** -0.45 -6.10** 5.23 6.97 0.75 
 (0.0095) (0.017) (11.2) (0.066) (0.031) (0.032) (3.70) (1.39) (2.58) (3.29) (5.56) (0.54) 
Gov. Exp. 0.0011*** 0.00062 -0.50 -0.00067 -0.00049 0.00077 0.11 0.053* -0.093 -0.083** -0.038 -0.0056 
 (0.00021) (0.00092) (0.35) (0.0018) (0.00068) (0.0011) (0.095) (0.029) (0.062) (0.036) (0.12) (0.0071) 
log of GDP -0.025*** -0.035*** 21.0** 0.11** 0.11*** -0.030 -7.33** 0.071 10.3*** -4.13 -0.45 0.16 
 (0.0075) (0.012) (8.24) (0.047) (0.024) (0.034) (2.81) (1.07) (2.23) (2.90) (4.29) (0.35) 
Cur. Acc. 0.00014* 0.00018 0.069 -0.0035*** -0.0038*** -0.00052 -0.037 -0.036*** -0.075*** -0.029*** -0.24*** -0.0048 
 (0.000077) (0.00015) (0.11) (0.00072) (0.00026) (0.00041) (0.046) (0.0076) (0.022) (0.011) (0.034) (0.0056) 
WTO mem. -0.0024 -0.0059* 6.86* 0.049** 0.036*** 0.014* -0.79* 0.56 -0.46 0.45 3.70*** 0.19 
 (0.0025) (0.0033) (3.81) (0.020) (0.010) (0.0080) (0.46) (0.36) (0.70) (0.41) (1.30) (0.14) 
Constant 0.45*** 0.55*** -358.3*** -1.76** -1.89*** 0.60 82.7* 5.30 -190.4*** 61.1 -22.6 -8.96* 
 (0.11) (0.16) (124.0) (0.69) (0.35) (0.59) (43.6) (15.1) (34.5) (45.3) (65.0) (4.80) 
Observations 980 1041 1878 1878 1885 1885 809 1646 1645 1319 1646 1646 
R2 0.075 0.045 0.089 0.128 0.168 0.014 0.079 0.047 0.183 0.029 0.115 0.118 
Adjusted R2 -0.066 0.040 0.086 0.125 0.085 0.010 0.072 0.043 0.180 0.025 0.112 0.115 
Hausman test 
Prob>chi2 
0.0021 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald Test of FE 
Prob>chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 























L.Dep. Var. 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.96*** 0.90*** 0.92*** 0.83*** 0.54 0.68*** 0.72*** 1.01*** 0.90*** 0.80*** 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.046) (0.052) (0.079) (0.094) (0.39) (0.046) (0.054) (0.20) (0.048) (0.066) 
L2. Dep. Var. 0.18* 0.26*** 0.041 0.094** 0.091 0.080 0.070 0.16*** 0.25*** 0.012 0.10*** 0.20*** 
 (0.10) (0.088) (0.045) (0.046) (0.076) (0.086) (0.25) (0.054) (0.077) (0.17) (0.037) (0.061) 
CC -0.00016 0.0063 0.68 0.0076 -0.0025 0.027 2.16 0.093 -0.94 0.72 1.16 -0.18* 
 (0.0021) (0.0042) (3.68) (0.028) (0.016) (0.021) (1.94) (0.27) (0.64) (0.56) (1.11) (0.10) 
L.CC 0.00076 -0.0056 -0.38 -0.0044 0.011 -0.023 0.46 -0.14 0.91 -0.72 -0.97 0.20** 
 (0.0021) (0.0038) (3.76) (0.029) (0.015) (0.021) (1.10) (0.26) (0.63) (0.50) (1.18) (0.10) 
log of GDP per Cap. 0.0057 0.012 60.6* 0.32* 0.36 0.076 61.5 1.01 16.1* 15.3 32.9 2.91* 
 (0.024) (0.042) (35.7) (0.19) (0.23) (0.15) (59.9) (4.83) (9.05) (12.3) (21.3) (1.71) 
L.log of GDP per Cap. -0.0069 -0.013 -59.9* -0.32* -0.36 -0.072 -62.2 -0.86 -16.2* -15.4 -32.8 -2.96* 
 (0.024) (0.042) (35.9) (0.19) (0.23) (0.15) (60.6) (4.87) (9.02) (12.3) (21.4) (1.72) 
log of GDP 0.0032 -0.0053 -56.4 -0.33* -0.33 -0.19 -53.3 -4.85 -25.0*** -14.4 -21.5 -2.67 
 (0.024) (0.039) (38.5) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (58.7) (5.08) (8.72) (11.6) (21.5) (1.72) 
L.log of GDP -0.0026 0.0057 56.2 0.33 0.33 0.18 52.9 4.62 25.0*** 14.4 21.5 2.70 
 (0.023) (0.039) (38.5) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (58.6) (5.08) (8.71) (11.6) (21.5) (1.72) 
Gov. Exp. 0.00083** 0.00023 -0.43* -0.00031 -0.0013 -0.00057 -0.20 0.011 0.10 -0.033 -0.27 -0.026* 
 (0.00038) (0.00053) (0.24) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.00053) (0.22) (0.051) (0.087) (0.040) (0.16) (0.014) 
L.Gov. Exp. -0.00057 0.00015 0.36 -0.00032 0.00032 -0.00088 -0.087 -0.028 -0.11 0.0080 0.20 0.025* 
 (0.00050) (0.00062) (0.24) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.00057) (0.17) (0.045) (0.082) (0.041) (0.17) (0.014) 
Cur. Acc. 0.00019* 0.00013 -0.25** -0.0048*** -0.0053*** -0.0014*** 0.065 -0.034*** -0.077*** -0.054*** -0.34*** -0.011*** 
 (0.00011) (0.00016) (0.11) (0.00073) (0.00079) (0.00029) (0.12) (0.0084) (0.026) (0.016) (0.037) (0.0033) 
L.Cur. Acc. -0.000078 0.0000036 0.25** 0.0048*** 0.0052*** 0.0015*** -0.081 0.021*** 0.081*** 0.044*** 0.31*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000090) (0.00015) (0.11) (0.00068) (0.00077) (0.00030) (0.097) (0.0077) (0.030) (0.011) (0.035) (0.0041) 
WTO mem. 0.00082 0.00089 -0.21 -0.0011 -0.0056 -0.0064 -2.13* -0.18 -0.11 -0.0065 -0.19 0.036 
 (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.78) (0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0043) (1.09) (0.15) (0.20) (0.12) (0.31) (0.033) 
Constant -0.0082 -0.0059 8.06 0.079** 0.11** 0.071*** 21.2 5.78*** 5.17*** -0.19 1.78 -0.058 
 (0.0065) (0.0080) (7.49) (0.040) (0.048) (0.027) (14.1) (1.34) (1.59) (1.29) (3.41) (0.31) 
Observations 627 683 1282 1282 1278 1278 243 1099 1096 1006 1099 1099 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arellano_Bond AR(1) 
test in first differences 
Pr>z 
 
0.082 0.079 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.059 0.000 0.000 
Arellano_Bond AR(2) 
test in first differences 
Pr>z  
 
0.986 0.609 0.249 0.318 0.389 0.262 . 0.631 0.192 0.242 0.620 0.643 
Hansen overid. Test 
Prob>chi2 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.957 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 





















1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.797 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IV Excluding group 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.923 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IV Difference 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.828 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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According to Table 1.5, the following results are suggested while they have similar 
interpretations with the CPI category. Coefficients of log of GDP per capita are statistically 
significant in trade GDP ratio, total imports, fuel imports, and metal imports. Log of GDP has 
statistically significant negative impact on total imports and fuel imports. Government 
expenditures increase customs and import duties significantly, while they decrease trade GDP 
ratio and metal imports. Current account balance variable has statistically significantly negative 
coefficient in the first protectionism measure. This variable has statistically significantly 
positive coefficients for all of trade openness and imports equations except for the computer 
services imports. Being a WTO member does not statistically affect any of the dependent 
variables, except a decrease in the computer services imports. 
1.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I study the impact of corruption on international trade and the level of trade 
protectionism. Two sets of data for corruption from two different sources were used. The 
impacts of corruption on two measures of trade protectionism, total trade, total imports, imports 
of goods, imports of services, and some subgroups of imports were analyzed. Because of 
endogeneity, country specifics effects, time fixed effect, and heteroskedasticity problems in the 
estimations, methods other than normal OLS were applied to achieve robust and consistent 
results. Fixed effect and random effect estimators were used in the first step neglecting the 
endogeneity problems. In the second step, GMM was used to control for most of the regression 
problems. Endogeneity problem in the regressions of corruption seems to be very significant 
because of a huge difference between the outcomes of GMM and panel estimations of FE and 
RE. Therefore, results of the regressions with usage of instrumental variables are preferred to 
the ones without instruments.  
The results of the GMM regressions of both categories of data show that corruption has no 
impact on trade protectionism. Corruption surveyed by Transparency International website has 
a negative impact on current food imports. On the other hand, corruption measured by World 
Governance Indicators has a positive current effect on metal imports. Special interest groups 
are attracted to food according to CPI and they are attracted to metal products according to CC.  
Another interesting conclusion can be related to the trustworthiness of sources of corruption 
data. The data for corruption of the two sources are compiled by the surveys among some 
organizations in the world. The most important outcome is that the estimation results over these 
two databases are not equivalent. This mainly suggests that assigning corruption levels and 
rankings for the countries in the world are not equivalently surveyed by the two sources. It can 
be even a matter of taste for those organizations measuring the data. Their accountabilities are 
not questioned with the results of this study; nevertheless, they seem to observe corruption from 
different aspects. Perhaps the aspects of WGI surveyors are different from those of 
Transparency International. Because of differences in the results of the two sources, either both 
of the two sources are not showing the real situations of corruption or one of them at least is 
29 
 
not. However, this research is not aimed to judge the sources of corruption data but this was a 
slight comparison of the two sources. 
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2. Welfare Analysis of a Prohibitive NTM in a Society with a 
Proportion of Concerned Consumers 
Abstract: The aim of this contribution is to provide a cost-benefit analysis in a partial 
equilibrium framework to investigate the welfare consequences of a non-tariff measure (NTM). 
The important issue of the analysis is having two groups of indifferent and concerned 
consumers. The ultimate aim of the research is to investigate whether or not the paternalistic 
behavior of government is in line with the willingness of the consumers for demand. The 
existence of information about the origin of goods is the leading issue of the analysis that 
provides two different scenarios. The model is calibrated with data on consumption of shrimps. 
The findings suggest that in the existence of such information, NTM policy has the lowest 
international losses and highest domestic gains. The policy implication of these results suggests 
that governments should try to increase the information in the market when they are following 
good faith for imposition of NTM. 
2.1. Introduction 
Since General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, tariffs on trade between the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) members have fallen. However, non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
have received worldwide/global attention. Multi- Agency Support Team (MAST)10 described 
NTMs as follows: 
“Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, that 
can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities 
traded, or prices or both.” (MAST, 2008) 
According to the classification of World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) in February 2012, 
NTMs include 16 categories of which the first and second are most frequently used for 
notification by WTO members. The Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) are respectively the first and second categories described in WITS. 
According to WITS, SPSs are measures that are applied for the aim of: protecting human or 
animal life from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms 
in their food; protecting human life from plant- or animal-carried diseases; protecting animal 
or plant life from pests, diseases, or disease-causing organisms; preventing or limiting other 
damage to a country from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; and protecting bio-
diversity. These include measures taken to protect the health of fish and wild fauna, as well as 
health of forests and wild flora. According to the same source, TBTs are “measures referring to 
                                                 
10 (MAST) as of July 2008 comprise institutional members: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/TAD), United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), World Bank 
(WB), World Trade Organization (WTO). Observers: European Commission (EC), and United States International 
Trade Commission (USITC), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). UNCTAD and World Bank 
jointly coordinate MAST. MAST reports to the Group of Eminent Persons, which is convened by the director 
general of UNCTAD. 
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technical regulations, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations 
and standards, excluding measures covered by the SPS Agreement.” 
These measures have attracted worldwide/global attention: The World Trade Report (2012) 
specifically discusses them and analyzes their impact on the international trade. They have been 
very effective instruments for the governments to follow different motivations. There can be 
three reasons for imposition of these regulatory measures. Firstly, NTM can serve as a public 
policy and not as an economic issue, which concerns protection of human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment. For instance, within a TBT or SPS measure, 
a foreign product with negative effects on the consumers is restricted from importation because 
consumers are not well informed about the harmful attributes of that product. Thus, the NTM 
policy mainly should increase consumer welfare of the domestic society. 
Secondly, from economical aspect of view, NTM might focus on the increase of social welfare 
to correct market failures without implementation of discrimination in trade. It can be a case 
that both producer and consumer welfare will be improved by the imposition of new 
regulations. Since the government does not introduce import tariffs, there is no revenue for the 
government. However, WTO allows such NTM that also fulfills the first reasoning. 
Thirdly, it can be caused by a pure political economy that aims to intervene free trade to support 
special interest groups without even increasing consumer welfare, which leads to the 
protectionism of the domestic industry. This motivation is addressed as protection for sale in 
the literature (Grossman and Helpman, 1992; Goldbe and Maggi, 1997). In fact, social welfare 
is changed by the summation of domestic producer surplus increase and government utility 
improvement induced by the support of lobbying industry.  
The first two reasons show good faith by the governments is supported in the agreements of 
WTO. However, the last one can unnecessarily hamper trade and violate the articles related to 
NTMs. In other words, special interest groups who are lobbying with corrupted governments 
might persuade them to break international rules and provide some protectionism measures for 
them. However, in the first chapter of this thesis, I found no statistically significant linkages 
between corruption and level of protectionism or level of trade. TBT, SPS, and other 
agreements of WTO cover logical frameworks for impositions of NTMs. They give justifiable 
authority to members for implementation of their own standards that are not discriminatory. 
Governments might claim protection of their population using NTM while they might truly 
protecting their own economy or industry at the expense of economies and trade of other 
countries.  
In general, new standards and new regulations that are imposed in the context of NTMs have 
quite effective impacts on international trade. When a government imposes a new standard, 
foreign industries should adopt themselves to these standards in order to get permission to 
export to that country. However, the new standards are mostly in line with the domestic 
industries’ productions. In the beginning, if the standards are not in line with foreign industries, 
their export will be halted until they comply themselves to these new regulations. If the 
modification of production procedure is not affordable by those foreign industries, they will 
simply lose one of their markets and they often ask their own governments to take the legitimate 
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actions within international regulations and WTO agreements. Sometimes, it takes a long time 
to convince the imposing government to eliminate the policy or even comply with the current 
agreements if violated. 
Governments pursuing good faith mostly provide scientific and justifiable reasons for the 
implementation of TBTs and SPSs. Paternalistic behavior of the governments consider the 
protection of their own nation against outdated standards that allowed importation of some 
products with negative characteristics. The new standards and regulations in the focus of the 
NTMs try to faithfully increase the quality of life of the consumers. However, it is very rare 
that governments follow the true requests from their own consumers. In fact, the paternalistic 
attitude does not allow consumers to intentionally choose their own characteristics of the 
product while decisions are made on their behalf. Some consumers do not care about bad 
properties of products and some are not even informed about them. Nevertheless, governments 
take the decisions of imposition of new standards for higher qualities whether or not the policy 
is in line with international agreements. 
When the new NTMs are imposed to increase the safety of products, pattern of trade and 
importation will dramatically change. Foreign competitive rivals that could not afford the new 
standards are then out of the domestic market, and only those firms producing in line with new 
regulations remain in the market. It takes a definite period of time that foreign industries keep 
up with new standards and modify their own production procedures. During this period, the 
market structure becomes less competitive and consumers indifferent or unaware of negative 
characteristics of products in line with outdated standards will bear a cost. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework to analyze and quantify the welfare 
changes in a country imposing prohibitive NTMs, when consumers classified into indifferent 
and concerned ones. Paternalistic behavior of the government can be better judged after such 
analysis. Moreover, when majority of domestic consumers are concerned about the negative 
properties of the foreign product, government policies seem to be more justifiable in the context 
of international regulations and WTO agreements. In itself, it can be good technical evidence 
in addition to scientific proof behind imposition of NTMs. In the next section, a brief literature 
review on the issue accompanying an anecdotal fact will be provided. In the third section, the 
basic analysis of the theoretical model will be done. The effective welfare changes of the 
country imposing NTM will be elaborated in the fourth section. Fifth section will present the 
application and calibration of data. Finally, conclusions and the possible extensions of the 
model will be discussed in the sixth section. 
2.2. Anecdotal fact and literature review 
In September 1998, Canada requested for consultation (DS144) with the United States within 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) with respect to certain measures, imposed by the US 
state of South Dakota and other states, prohibiting entry or transit to Canadian trucks carrying 
cattle, swine, and grain. Since then, this Dispute Settlement (DS) case had been pending 
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according to the WTO website11. Canada and Mexico requested consultation with the United 
States of America concerning the mandatory Country Of Origin Labelling (COOL) within cases 
DS384 and DS386 respectively in December 2008. These two cases seem to be similar to the 
complaint by Canada in DS144. European Union countries (27 member states) with 12 other 
countries reserved their third party rights in these disputes. COOL was believed to be 
discriminatory within the framework of WTO agreements. After some years of analyzes and 
investigation in the DSM, the Appellate body issued its findings in June 2012. The USA was 
proved to violate Article 2.112 of TBT agreement and promised to implement the rulings and 
recommendations of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) until May 2013. Figure 2-1 can show the 
changes of swine export from Canada to the USA. 
Figure 2-1 – Export of swine from Canada to the USA during 1996-2012 
 
Figure 2-1 shows the export trends of “live swine, purebred and breeding” with Harmonized 
System (HS) code (revision 1996) 010310 in the right vertical axis (dashed line with round 
nodes); and “meat of swine, fresh or chilled” with HS-1996 020311 in the left vertical axis 
(solid line with triangular nodes) from Canada to the USA. As it is observed in the above 
example, export of meat of swine has dropped dramatically in 1999 (after DS144). Then in 
2001 export of live swine has jumped dramatically, which seems to be a substitute for meat of 
swine. However, export of live swine dropped after one year and gradually decreased until 
2012. After 2001 export of meat of swine has been gradually increased but in 2007 (before 
                                                 
11 Can be found at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds144_e.htm 
12Article 2.1 of the TBT agreement is “Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.” 
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DS384) it dropped dramatically. As it is observed, the main reason for the decrease of swine 
export from Canada can be the prohibitive NTM imposed by US. 
To the date of the writing of this research, it will take two more months for the rulings of DSB 
to be implemented by the US. The first significant effect of this policy was prohibition of the 
importation of some products from Canada. Even if the industries of Canada had tried to 
implement the regulations of the USA, it would have taken a long time to comply with them.  
In order to quantify welfare implications of NTM policies, cost and benefit analysis are 
conducted within the framework of partial equilibrium. Paarlberg and Lee (1998) used a 
numerical partial equilibrium approach to find the linkages between the Foot-and-Mouth 
Disease (FMD) risky products imported to the US and the level of protectionism. They simply 
modeled the surplus changes of consumers and producers, and a government maximizing 
welfare by assigning the optimal tariff. Then they calculated the output losses after the outbreak 
by assigning a probability to its risk. 
Maskus et al. (2000) described briefly DS requests during 1995-2000 citing TBT and SPS 
agreements. They shortly reviewed the literature on the role and effects of standards on trade. 
They stated that surveys, econometric studies, partial equilibrium studies, and computable 
general equilibrium studies are the general frameworks of the research on the issue. 
Thilmany and Barret (1997) studied the effects of technical regulations on the export of food 
products from US to other North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. They 
assumed in their model that both demand and supply curves are shifting upwards after the 
imposition of new standards. In fact, the costs of producers increase to comply with new 
standards and supply curve shifts up. Moreover, new standards increase the quality of the 
products, and all consumers become more certain about the new good characteristics of the 
product. Therefore, consumers’ utility increases and the demand curve shifts up. This 
assumption is simply on the basis of homogenous consumers that are all concerned about the 
negative characteristics of products. 
Van Tongeren et al. (2009) conduct a modular partial equilibrium model that focuses on 
demand and supply relationships. Changes in social welfare were analyzed in three different 
scenarios; Prohibitive standard that completely brings the market into autarky (NTM), free 
trade, and mandatory labeling that provides complete information of the goods to the 
consumers. These three scenarios were considered for the effects on consumers, producers, and 
for global commons externalities. Although, they stated that they also modeled the externalities 
of the products, it seems that they only modeled negative direct characteristics of the product, 
and not the indirect externalities. 
Aisbett and Pearson (2013) suggested that governments are following good motivations for 
imposition of SPS and it is mainly due to the importance of healthcare and environmental 
qualities in those imposing countries. However, it is still necessary to analyze if the 
governments are pursuing the requests of their nations and not their own paternalistic decisions. 
Beghin et al. (2012) provided a framework similar to van Tongeren et al. (2009). They 
considered only two scenarios of informed consumers and uninformed consumers about the 
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negative characteristics of foreign products. They assumed that informed consumers are also 
concerned consumers. They found that the prohibitive standards increase the international 
welfare. When consumers are unaware of negative attributes of products, only foreign 
producer’s welfare decreases slightly, while domestic producer and consumers gain from the 
regulation. When consumers are completely informed, all of these agents gain from the new 
standards. The important weaknesses about their theoretical approach are: Firstly, addressing 
informed consumers as also concerned ones because preferences do not imply information; 
Secondly, negative externalities of consumption are not clearly identified, and only negative 
direct characteristics of the foreign product are introduced in their model. Negative externalities 
can be discussed when consumption or production of a product by an agent that gives her 
positive utility or profit decreases utility or profit of another agent indirectly; Thirdly, they 
assumed that consumers could not distinguish between foreign and domestic products, yet they 
are assumed to consider a share of foreign products on total products of the market in their 
utility functions; Fourthly, when they cannot distinguish between the two products, consumers 
can rationally assign probabilities to the share of foreign products in the market and then make 
decisions. 
This study is a similar contribution to Beghin et al. (2012) and van Tongeren et al. (2009) with 
some modifications. Here, it is assumed that consumers are aware of negative characteristics of 
the products but they can be indifferent or concerned about them. However, in two different 
scenarios existence of the information for consumers to distinguish the origin of products will 
be altered. NTM policies are strictly prohibitive and they halt the import of foreign products 
with damaging attributes, which is the situation before the improvement of foreign production 
procedures. The market structure in this model differs from those two references, meaning that 
here under free trade the home country has an oligopolistic market. Oligopolistic competition 
instead of perfect competition can provide a clearer situation in which the government uses 
consumers’ safety as an excuse to impose NTM even though the real reason is to increase 
domestic industry’s welfare. The findings of this study can clarify the motivation of the 
government behind the imposition of NTMs. In fact, the analytical framework discussed in the 
following can show whether the government is actually increasing consumers’ welfare by the 
restrictive measure. 
2.3. Basic analyzes of the model 
For simplicity, I assume there are two countries, Home country (H) and Foreign country (F). 
Domestic consumers and producers and foreign producers are addressed as the main agents of 
this model. It is assumed that the foreign product contains some negative characteristics that 
might cause damages to human health, animal life, and environmental qualities. Some domestic 
consumers might be concerned about these negative attributes and internalize them in their 
preferences. A domestic government that tries to protect its own population against the harms 
of foreign product imposes a prohibitive NTM that increases the standard of the product. 
Domestic industry has been producing in line with new standards. Foreign producers need to 
comply with the new regulations, in order to be able to export to the home market, and it takes 
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a period of time. In this model, it is tried to analyze the domestic welfare changes after 
imposition of an NTM during the time that the foreign product is not imported to the home 
market because of lower qualities before the foreign industry complies with the new standards. 
The domestic country has a population of NH. Demand of each consumer, 𝑖 = {1,… ,𝑁}, from 
a quasi-linear utility function of a good can be easily derived. Considering quadratic preferences 
of the good and an additive numeraire, the utility function of each domestic consumer for a 
product is as follows: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑤𝑖) = 𝑎𝑞𝑖 − 𝑏 𝑞𝑖
2 2⁄ − 𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖 (2.1) 
Where 𝑤𝑖 is the utility of the numeraire good, term 𝑎𝑞𝑖 − 𝑏 𝑞𝑖
2 2⁄  is the satisfaction of consumer 
i from consuming quantity 𝑞𝑖 of a good. 𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑖 is the supposed damage of the product, which 
might be focused by the technical policy or new regulations. In order for concerned consumers 
to demand the product with negative characteristics, it is simply assumed that 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑎. Term I 
represents the concerned knowledge of the consumer regarding the damage of the product. 
Therefore, if the good is not accounted harmful for the consumer, this term will equal to zero. 
Conversely, if  𝐼 = 1, it will mean that the consumer will be concerned about the negative 
properties of the good. Overall, term 𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑖 captures the impacts of concerned harm about a good 
for the representative consumer. Even if the product is potentially harmful for human 
consumption, it is assumed for indifferent consumers that the internalized positive satisfaction 
of that product compensates for the expected potential harm in the future completely. Cigarette 
smoking can be an example of that. Therefore, preferences are only subjective and they are 
capturing only the perception of satisfaction. A concerned consumer (decision maker or social 
planner) might think that indifferent consumer’s preferences are subjective, but indifferent 
people themselves think of it as an objective utility function. Harm of a person in the society is 
unrelated to others (no indirect externalities of products assumed), and only satisfaction of 
consumption is the only factor in preferences of indifferent consumers. They simply do not 
think about harm, diseases, or death; and that is why they are labeled indifferent. 
There are two types of people in the society. 𝜂 = 𝑁1 𝑁⁄  is the proportion of the population who 
are indifferent to the negative characteristics of the good. It means that 𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁1. The rest of the society is concerned about the damaging effect of the product, which 
comprises 1 − 𝜂 = 1 − (𝑁1 𝑁⁄ ) proportion of the population. Thus, for = 𝑁1, … , 𝑁 , 𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑞𝑖 =
𝐼𝑟𝑞𝑖 > 0, where “r” is the average of “ri” in the group of concerned consumers. 
Demand functions can easily be derived after maximizing the above utility function with respect 
to a budget constraint: 𝑝𝑞𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖. Where p presents the price of the respected good, 𝑦𝑖 
stands for the income of the representative agent i, and price of the numeraire is equal to 
1.Consumers do not know the true (subjective) probability of getting the product with bad 
characteristics; they simply act as if the probability of consuming foreign good is equal to 1. 
Therefore, the demand function for the consumer is: 𝑞𝑖(𝑝) = (𝑎 − 𝑝 − 𝐼𝑟𝑖) 𝑏⁄ . Considering 
aggregate demand of all consumers as 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑝), and assuming 𝑏 = 𝑏 𝑁⁄ , the inverse 




𝐷(𝑄) = 𝑎 − (𝑏 𝜂⁄ )𝑄 indifferent consumers 
(2.2) 
𝑝2
𝐷(𝑄, 𝐼) = 𝑎 − 𝐼𝑟 − [𝑏 (1 − 𝜂)⁄ ]𝑄 concerned consumers 
Equation (2.2) suggests that when these two groups of society are equally distributed (𝜂 = 0.5) 
and they demand and consume the same amount of products, concerned consumers are willing 
to pay a lower price than indifferent consumers. The disutility from the harmful attributes in 
the products induces a lower willingness to pay for the second group of consumers than for the 
indifferent ones. In other words, when the market has only one segment for both groups with a 
unique price, concerned consumers demand and consume less products than indifferent ones. 
The supply side of the market is an oligopolistic competition between the two industries of both 
countries13. It is assumed that the foreign industry produces a product with lower quality and 
less costs than the domestic firm does. However, since there are transportation costs for the 
exportation of foreign products, it is simply assumed that each firm has similar cost functions. 
In other words, cost of transportation is included in the cost of the final good imported from the 
foreign supplier. Industries are maximizing their outputs with respect to a quadratic cost 
function in output. Considering 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑝), the profit for each industry is: 




2 − 𝐾, for 𝑗 = {𝐻, 𝐹} (2.3) 
Where 𝑐 is the variable cost parameter, and 𝐾 is the sunk cost related to the market entry. Since 
symmetry in both countries is assumed, this equation is equivalent for both. Considering 
Cournot oligopoly game, production strategies of the producers can be calculated in two 
scenarios. The difference between the two scenarios is the existence of information. In the first 
scenario, it is assumed that consumers have incomplete information about the origin of the 
products, while in the second scenario consumers can distinguish the origin of the products. In 
fact, in the first scenario government does not try to provide a situation in which consumers can 
distinguish the two products. Even after imposition of the NTM government does not inform 
them about the new regulations. In the second scenario, government tries to implement a policy 
like mandatory labeling of products, which is assumed to be costless for industries, in order to 
induce consumers to choose the products rationally. However, in both scenarios the media and 
scientists inform all people that the foreign product has some negative characteristics. 
2.3.1. Scenario 1 
2.3.1.a. Benchmark 
In the beginning, there is free trade in the market. Products are not differentiated and consumers 
have incomplete information, thus they cannot recognize the origin of the product in order to 
figure out which of the products have the damaging effect. Besides, as explained earlier they 
                                                 
13It is simply assumed that there exists one industry in each country; each industry acts as a monopoly in autarky even if it 
comprises various firms (think of a cartel). 
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assign probability 1 for getting products with negative characteristics. Total demand of the 




(𝑎 − 𝑝), 𝑎 − 𝑟 < 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎





𝑝, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎 − 𝑟
 (2.4) 
When damaging effect of the good perceived by the concerned individual is so big such that 
𝑟 ≥ 𝑎, then only 𝜂 of the total population demand for goods. This means that concerned 
consumers do not risk themselves by buying the goods that are mixed with the harmful products. 
If we assume that 𝑟 < 𝑎, then concerned consumers also demand products even with negative 
characteristics; thus the producers maximize their profits with respect to (2.4). After calculating 
their best strategies for production and Nash equilibrium strategies in this game, total output of 
this oligopoly with price 𝑝𝑂1𝐴








, 𝑎 − 𝑟 < 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎
2(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)
3𝑏 + 𝑐
, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎 − 𝑟
 (2.5) 
Now consider an NTM policy that prohibits the import of goods from abroad. Simply assume 
that it as a high sunk cost imposed to the foreign firm that induces exit from the home market. 
The market goes to autarky and a single monopoly supplies the product domestically14. In this 
case, it is assumed that consumers are not informed about the imposition of NTMs and the new 
standards, and they still think that there exists one product from two different producers. The 
reason behind this is that from the beginning they did not have complete information to even 
distinguish between the two products’ origins15. Hence, after maximization of profit, the output 
of the monopolist with price 𝑝𝑀1𝐴





, 𝑎 − 𝑟 < 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎
𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟
2𝑏 + 𝑐
, 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎 − 𝑟
 (2.6) 
Figure 2-2 shows this case using demand and supply curves. D1 shows the demand curve for 
indifferent individuals and D2 represents the demand curve for concerned consumers. Here it is 
assumed that 𝜂 < 0.5 and D1 has a sharper slope, meaning that concerned consumers are 
majorities. However, the opposite situation does not alter/affect the outcomes of the analysis. 
This simply means that indifferent consumers’ demand is less elastic in changes of prices in 
                                                 
14Previously there has been an example that led to the dispute settlement in the WTO. 
15However, we can in addition think of an NTM in addition to mandatory labeling of the product, then, consumers will get the 
complete information and they exclude the disutility from their preferences. They simply know that there will be no more 
foreign product and this case will change to a new case. 
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comparison with concerned consumers’ demand. The only winner with such policy is the 
domestic producer and government does not gain any revenue from such policy. 
Figure 2-2 - Equilibrium in Scenario 1 
 
2.3.1.b. Extreme case A 
Assume that all consumers of the home country are indifferent about the negative characteristics 
of the product, thus, 𝜂 = 1, 𝐼𝑟 = 0. Therefore, industries face the inverse demand function 
𝑝𝐷(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄. After profit maximization and considering best response functions for the 
industries, Nash equilibrium solution to this strategic game is 𝑞𝐻 = 𝑞𝐹 = 𝑎 (3𝑏 + 𝑐)⁄ . Total 
supply of the two industries will be𝑄𝑂1𝐵
𝑆 = 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐹 with 𝑝𝑂1𝐵 as the equilibrium price. 
Now consider a new regulation imposed as an NTM to trade that halts the import from the 
foreign producer completely. In this case, domestic firm acts as a monopoly and maximization 
of its profit yields new output𝑄𝑀1𝐵
𝑆 = 𝑞𝐻 = 𝑎 (2𝑏 + 𝑐)⁄  and price 𝑝𝑀1𝐵. Points A and B are 
showing the equilibrium prices and quantities for, respectively, oligopoly before imposition of 
NTM and monopoly after imposition of NTM. 
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Figure 2-3 – Equilibrium in Scenario 1, extreme case A 
 
2.3.1.c. Extreme case B 
In this case assume that all consumers of the home country are concerned about the negative 
characteristics of the product, thus, 𝜂 = 0;  𝐼𝑟 > 0. Domestic consumers know that the foreign 
product has the damaging effect while the domestic product is not harmful at all. Products are 
not differentiated and consumers think that the products with different characteristics are mixed. 
Hence, they demand both products, but not at the same level as the previous case. The total 
demand from the previous case is decreased and the demand schedule is shifted downward by 
𝑟. If consumers are very concerned and consider a huge amount of disutility from the 
consumption of the good, meaning that 𝑟 ≥ 𝑎, then the shift of the curve is so big that they do 
not demand anything. Nevertheless, here it is assumed that in spite of the disutility endured by 
consumers, there is still demand for the product in the market (a > 𝑟). 
Therefore, industries face the inverse demand function 𝑝𝐷(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑟 − 𝑏𝑄. After profit 
maximization and considering the best response functions for the industries, the Nash 
equilibrium solution of this strategic game is 𝑞𝐻 = 𝑞𝐹 = (𝑎 − 𝑟) (3𝑏 + 𝑐)⁄ . Total supply of the 
two firms will be 𝑄𝑂1𝐶
𝑆 = 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐹 with equilibrium price 𝑝𝑂1𝐶. 
Now consider a new regulation imposed as a non-tariff measure to trade that halts importation 
from the foreign producer completely. If the government informs them about the new 
regulations, this case after imposition of NTM will become equivalent to the previous case of 
this scenario, where 𝐼𝑟 = 0. Since the consumers are not informed about this new policy, the 
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demand function schedule will not change. Hence, the domestic firm acts as a monopoly and 
maximization of its profit yields a new output, 𝑄𝑀1𝐶
𝑆 = 𝑞𝐻 = (𝑎 − 𝑟) (2𝑏 + 𝑐)⁄  with 
price𝑝𝑀1𝐶. 
Figure 2-4 – Equilibrium in scenario 1, extreme case B 
 
Figure 2-4 depicts the new curves and points for this scenario with index 2, while the ones 
related to the previous case are with subscript 1 and they are in gray color. The demand curve 
D2 has shifted downward from D1 by the amount r. The oligopoly supply in this case is more 
than the oligopoly supply in the first extreme case, but less than the oligopoly in the benchmark 
of this scenario. However, the rest of the explanations are similar to those mentioned for the 
first scenario.  
It is crucial to pay attention to the changes of social welfare in this case and compare it to the 
ones obtained in previous case. The increased profit of the domestic producer after imposition 
of NTM here is smaller than the one in Figure 2-3. Volatilities of the social welfare are 
decreased because: Firstly, consumers do not have complete information about the product 
supplied in the market; Secondly, they have fear for being affected by the foreign product that 
is mixed with the safe product in their bundle of goods. Welfare in this extreme case is 
decreased from the previous case before imposition of the NTM because the whole demand has 
been decreased due to lack of information, which is a market imperfection. As it was mentioned 
earlier, this case happens when consumers cannot distinguish between the two products. If they 
are informed about this, they will assuredly demand only the domestic product in a monopolistic 
market while their demand will be similar to the one in the previous case. 
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2.3.2. Scenario 2 
2.3.2.a. Benchmark 
There are both types of individuals in this scenario; a proportion of people that are indifferent 
about the negative characteristics of the foreign good and the rest of the population that are 
concerned about that (𝜂 ∈ (0,1)). Since the demand is segmented as shown in equation (2.2), it 
is important to know which of the two types of population is larger. 
There is free trade in the market and people have complete information about the characteristics 
of the goods including the place of origin. In this case, concerned people that include “1 − 𝜂” 
share of the population consume and demand only domestic products. Indifferent individuals 
demand goods with any characteristics. As mentioned earlier, for simplicity it was assumed that 
the two industries have similar costs (𝑐𝐻 = 𝑐𝐹), and there is no cost of transportation. Therefore, 
if both industries want to compete in the market, they should have the same prices for both 
segments. Domestic producer will act as a monopoly in response to the demand of concerned 
consumers in equation (2.2). On the other hand, the demand of indifferent consumers is 
responded to by a supply from both industries. Since monopoly imposes higher prices than 
oligopoly, the concerned consumers should pay more as they want to reject negative 
characteristics of foreign product.  





It might seem impractical that a firm supplies the exact same product with two different prices 
within one market. Nevertheless, this happens in reality as a marketing strategy of a firm. For 
instance, a dairy producer sells its own products in its own shops while selling its products 
under the marketing brand of a wholesaler or retailer in another big shop, in which different 
brands of dairy are also sold. In order to compete with other firms, the company does not like 
to lose the market share in huge international retailers and it is forced to show its existence. 
This may suggest that this marketing strategy might result in lower profits but greater turnover 
and customer satisfactions. Since it was mentioned that there is complete information of the 
product, it can be assumed that this information is delivered to consumers via a mandatory 
labeling of the good’s characteristics. However, industries are not obliged to mention positive 
characteristics of their products but negative properties. They can even describe the properties 
of the product including the place of origin, but within a new trademark. For further simplicity, 
it is assumed that the home producer has the same cost function for both marketing strategies 
and bears no cost for creating a new trademark for concerned consumers. 
Domestic industry’s profit is the summation of profit from both segments of the market. 
Assume that; 𝑝𝑂21 is the price of good for indifferent consumers, 𝑝𝑂22 is the price of good for 
concerned consumers, 𝑞𝐻1 is the supply of good of the home producers for the indifferent 
individuals, 𝑞𝐻2 represents the supply of good of the domestic firm for concerned consumers, 
and 𝑞𝐹1 indicates the supply of good for indifferent consumers imported from abroad. Since 
concerned consumers have perfect information due to the labeling of the product, they feel no 
disutility in consuming the domestic product. Thus, damaging characteristics from equation 
(2.1) can be excluded and 𝐼𝑟 = 0. For simplicity in the calculations, it is assumed that both 
groups have the same population (𝜂 = 0.5). After calculation of best strategies of both 




3𝑏2 + 2𝑐2𝜂2 + 4𝑏𝑐𝜂
 
(2.7) 𝑞𝐹1 =
2𝜂𝑎𝑏2 + 2𝑎𝑐2𝜂3 + 4𝑎𝑏𝑐𝜂2
(2𝑏 + 𝑐𝜂)(3𝑏2 + 2𝑐2𝜂2 + 4𝑏𝑐𝜂)
 
𝑞𝐻2 =
3𝜂𝑎𝑏2 + 2𝑎𝑐2𝜂3 + 3𝑎𝑏𝑐𝜂2
(2𝑏 + 𝑐𝜂)(3𝑏2 + 2𝑐2𝜂2 + 4𝑏𝑐𝜂)
 
As it is observed in equations (2.7), quantities supplied by the two industries are different from 
each other. The total supply for indifferent consumers is 𝑞𝑂21 =  𝑞𝐻1 + 𝑞𝐹1. 
Now consider an NTM that prohibits the import of goods from the industry abroad. Again, the 
home country acts as a monopolist in response to total demand of the consumers. As mentioned 
earlier, since consumers have complete information, they will also be informed about the exit 
of the foreign firm from the domestic market (think of the lack of foreign labels of products). 
Consequently, individuals are not exposed to the negative characteristics of foreign goods and 
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, with price, 𝑝𝑀2
𝑆 . 
Figure 2-5 illustrates this case with demand curves. In this figure, it is assumed that the 
population of concerned consumers is higher than that of the indifferent consumers, in order 
that their demands do not coincide for better observation. As depicted, E1, E2 are the equilibrium 
for, respectively, the indifferent individuals and the concerned consumers before policy 
implementation. E1+2 is the equilibrium point after the imposition of NTM. It is observed that 
consumer surplus for the first group of people was very big before policy and after that, total 
consumer surplus of the population seems to be relatively smaller. Detailed changes of welfare 
will be studied in the next section. 
2.3.2.b. Extreme case A 
When all consumers are indifferent about the negative characteristics of the foreign product, 
this scenario is simply reduced to a one demand function where 𝐼𝑟 = 0, similar to the extreme 
case A of the first scenario. 
2.3.2.c. Extreme case B 
Since consumers know that the foreign product is harmful and they are all concerned about the 
negative impacts of that good, they simply do not buy the foreign product because they can 
easily distinguish the origin of products. In other words, there is no demand for the good 
produced abroad. The foreign firm cannot compete in the home market. The home industry acts 
as a monopolist in the market and chooses point B in Figure 2-3 as the equilibrium price and 
output. However, in this case there is no difference between the time before the imposition of 
new regulations and after it. Because all of the domestic consumers prefer only the product 
produced domestically and this policy cannot change their behavior. It can be assumed that 
preferences for the domestic good is presented by equation (2.1) when 𝐼𝑟 = 0. 
2.4. Welfare changes analysis 
In this section, I will investigate detailed changes of welfare for each case and scenario 
described above. Assuming that the consumers own the domestic industry, total social welfare 
is the sum of individuals’ utilities and firms’ profits. Consumer welfare is actually defined by 
an individual’s assessment of her own satisfaction given prices and income. Since the demand 
curve captures such assessment, with quasi-linear utility, consumer welfare can be calculated 
as consumer surplus, which is the area below the demand curve and above the price. 
For Producer Surplus (PS), the famous definition in the literature is focused here, which is the 
excess of gross receipt (total revenue) over total variable costs. This is the area between price 
and the supply of the producer. Since I want to observe changes of Consumer Surplus (CS) and 
firm’s surplus, I will analyze them separately and then study the total welfare changes. In fact, 
I want to study relative changes between the two sides of market and in proportion of the total 
welfare variations. For the next section, it is important to see if the imposition of NTM policy 
by the government was mostly in favor of consumers or the producer. This issue is very related 
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to the share of concerned consumers of the population and the damaging properties of the 
foreign product. 
It is quite important to mention that NTMs carry a higher dead-weight loss than tariffs do. Since 
government receives no taxes or tariffs from the policy, there is no gain for the government 
after NTM. In the following subsections, calculation of PS and CS will be discussed. 
Summation of producer and consumer surpluses is the total welfare change of the domestic 
society, which will be calibrated in the next section. Besides, PS, before imposition of NTM is 
equal to the foreign producer surplus in scenario 1, because two industries are symmetric. 
Therefore, the international welfare changes will simply be a deduction of the initial producer 
surplus in oligopoly from the total domestic welfare changes. In the second scenario, the two 
industries do not have the same surplus for the first segmentation of the market because their 
productions are different from each other. Hence, the international welfare changes will be a 
deduction of foreign industry surplus from the total domestic welfare changes. 
2.4.1. Scenario 1 
2.4.1.a. Benchmark 
Consumer welfare changes: 
Consumers’ welfares before the imposition of NTM (𝐶𝑆𝑂1𝐴) and after new regulations (𝐶𝑆𝑀1𝐴) 
are respectively the area p01A Aa’a and pM1 Ba’a in Figure 2-2 (for simplicity it was assumed 
that 𝑝 ≤ 𝑎 − 𝑟, i.e. what is depicted in that figure). Total consumer welfare changes in this case 
are as follows:  
∆𝐶𝑆1𝐴 = 𝐶𝑆𝑀1𝐴 − 𝐶𝑆𝑂1𝐴 = [(













Equation (2.8) is always negative as the first term in the square brackets is always smaller than 
the second term. To check the effective changes of surplus in percentages it is better to calculate 
policy elasticity of CS. Policy elasticity of consumer surplus simply defines percentage changes 
in consumer surplus with respect to percentage changes of policy, in which the latter equals to 
one (imposition of a policy means changes from no policy to action, zero to one). For the rest 
of this study, the equivalent definition holds for consumer and producer surplus. Policy 







=   
(3𝑏 + 𝑐)2 [𝑏(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)2 + 2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)2(1 − 𝜂)
𝜂𝑟2
2𝑏 ]







It is not easy to simplify equation (2.9). However, extreme cases can simplify it, which will be 
discussed in next cases. Moreover, the calibrated value will determine the value of (2.9) in the 
next section of this chapter. 
Producer welfare changes: 
Total producer welfare changes will simply be a deduction of PS before imposition of the 
regulations (𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐴) from the new PS after NTM (𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐴), which is as follows: 
∆𝑃𝑆1𝐴 = 𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐴 − 𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐴 =
(5𝑏2 + 2𝑏𝑐)(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)2
2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)(3𝑏 + 𝑐)2
 (2.10) 
This value is positive if 𝑎 > (1 − 𝜂)𝑟. According to the assumptions of this scenario (for 
calculation of eq. (2.5), if we want to have concerned consumers in the market, “a” should be 
strictly greater than “r”. Since 𝑟 > (1 − 𝜂)𝑟; therefore, 𝑎 > (1 − 𝜂)𝑟 holds as long as 
concerned consumers have positive demand of products, and eq. (2.10) is positive. 











− 1 (2.11) 
As it is observed, there is neither “𝜂” nor “r” in the calculation of eq. (2.11), which suggests 
that policy elasticity of domestic producer depends neither on the negative characteristic of 
foreign product nor on the consumers concerns about that. Therefore, this equation also holds 
for extreme cases A and B. 
2.4.1.b. Extreme case A 
Consumer welfare changes: 
Consumers’ welfares before and after the imposition of NTM are, respectively, “𝐶𝑆𝑂1𝐵” and 
“𝐶𝑆𝑀1𝐵”equivalent with areas p01BAa and pM1B Ba in Figure 2-2. Total consumer welfare 
changes will be: 














Similarly to equation (2.8), equation (2.12) is always negative. Policy elasticity of consumer 







9𝑏2 + 𝑐2 + 6𝑏𝑐
16𝑏2 + 4𝑐2 + 16𝑏𝑐
− 1 (2.13) 
Consumer surplus deviation to the initial consumer welfare ratio in (2.13) shows the 
percentages change of consumer surplus in response to the policy; and it is the simplified 
version of equation (2.9), in which 𝜂 = 1. It is easily observable that this ratio is negative, and 
furthermore, it is perceived that the new regulations that prohibit the import of goods from 
47 
 
abroad decrease the consumer welfare. This is mainly due to the change of the market structure 
from oligopoly to monopoly, where fewer quantities of the good are supplied with a higher 
price to the people who are indifferent about the characteristics of this good. In other words, in 
an oligopoly with two firms, the average variable cost is lower than in a monopoly with one 
firm. 
Producer welfare changes: 
Total producer welfare changes are simply the PS before the new regulations (𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐵) 
subtracted from the PS after these NTMs (𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐵): 
∆𝑃𝑆1𝐵 = 𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐵 − 𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐵 =
5𝑎2𝑏2 + 2𝑎2𝑏𝑐
2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)(3𝑏 + 𝑐)2
 (2.14) 
This is simplified version of equation (2.10) with 𝜂 = 1 and is positive. As explained in the 
benchmark policy, elasticity of producer surplus is similar in all three cases of this scenario. 
2.4.1.c. Extreme case B 
Consumer welfare changes: 
CSs before the imposition of NTM (𝐶𝑆𝑂1𝐶) and after NTM (𝐶𝑆𝑀1𝐶) are respectively the area 
p01C A2a-r and pM1C B2a-r in Figure 2-4. Total changes of CS are as follows: 
 














Similar to equation (2.8), equation (2.15) is always negative. CS changes in this case (eq. (2.15)) 
are smaller than the changes in the previous case (eq. (2.12)), but smaller than the change in the 
benchmark (eq. (2.8)). Policy elasticity of consumer surplus in this case is exactly equal to the 
one in the previous case (eq. (2.13)). This means that consumer surplus variations have 
decreased from the previous case at the same level as the initial CS (before NTM) and final CS 
(after NTM) have decreased from the previous scenario. This shows that imposition of new 
regulations will change the consumer surplus of the two extreme cases with the same elasticity. 
In other words, incomplete information of consumer does not change the situation for the 
government to impose new regulations for two cases. All consumers’ concerns about the 
product cannot alter the consequences of welfare changes after the government interventions 
from the situation that all consumers are indifferent. In fact, when the whole society is 
concerned about the negative properties of the foreign product, imposition of new regulations 
changes their welfare relative to their initial situation at the same level as if they were indifferent 
about the foreign product. This finding is closely equivalent to the benchmark (eq. (2.9)). 
Therefore, in this scenario policy elasticity is equal in all cases for any values of 𝜂. 
The reason behind this finding is mainly that they have incomplete information and are ignorant 
about the prohibitive regulation by the government. Their preferences will not change after the 
new regulations because they still believe that there exists foreign product in the market. 
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However, if they become informed about the policy, they will remove the negative effects of 
bad products from their preferences; then, the policy elasticity will differ in two extreme cases. 
 
Producer welfare changes: 
Total producer welfare changes are simply PS before imposition of the regulations (𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐶) 
subtracted from PS after the NTMs (𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐶), which is as follows: 
∆𝑃𝑆1𝐶 = 𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐶 − 𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐶 =
(5𝑏2 + 2𝑏𝑐)(𝑎 − 𝑟)2
2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)(3𝑏 + 𝑐)2
 (2.16) 
Eq. (2.16) is positive if 𝑎 > 𝑟, which was assumed from the beginning to imply that concerned 
consumers wanted to stay in the market. Policy elasticity of producer surplus in this case is 
exactly equal to the respective value in previous case and the benchmark (eq. (2.10)) 
2.4.2. Scenario 2 
2.4.2.a. Benchmark 
Consumer welfare changes: 
Since the market is segmented between the two groups of consumers, total consumer welfare 
should be the sum of the CS from the two segments (𝐶𝑆𝑂2 = 𝐶𝑆𝑂21+𝐶𝑆𝑂22). First segment is 
for the indifferent consumers while the second segment is for the concerned consumers. Total 
CS changes will be calculated separately for each segment; then their summation will show the 
total CS changes. In other words, subtracting total CS before regulations (𝐶𝑆𝑂2) from new CS 
after NTM (𝐶𝑆𝑀2) will give the total CS changes. First line of the following equations (∆𝐶𝑆21) 
refers to the variations of CS for the indifferent consumers and the second line (∆𝐶𝑆22) refers 
to the changes of welfare for the concerned consumers:  























Because of the complexity of the second terms in both lines of equation (2.17), it is not easy to 
see the signs of the changes of consumer welfare. Thus, calibration of data can better determine 
them. 


































Producer welfare changes: 
Total producer welfare changes are simply the subtraction of PS before NTM (𝑃𝑆𝑂2) for both 
segments from the PS after the new regulations (𝑃𝑆𝑀2), which will be the changes of domestic 
producer profit after NTM, which will be as follows: 
∆𝑃𝑆2 = 𝑃𝑆𝑀2 − 𝑃𝑆𝑂2
















Equation (2.19) and the policy elasticity of domestic consumer will be calibrated in the next 
section to see the exact effect of NTM on the producer welfare changes. The foreign industry 
simply loses its surplus after imposition of new regulations, which will be as follows: 




2 −  𝑎𝑞𝐹1 (2.20) 
2.4.2.b. Extreme case A 
When all consumers are indifferent about the negative characteristics of the foreign product, 
this scenario is simply reduced to a one demand function where 𝐼𝑟 = 0, similar to the extreme 
case A of the first scenario. 
2.4.2.c. Extreme case B 
All of the consumers are concerned about the damaging characteristics of the foreign product 
and they only use the domestic good since they have complete information about it. Thus, there 
is no change in the welfare of consumers before and after imposition of new regulations. 
Changes in consumer and producer surplus are equal to zero in this case. 
2.5. Application and calibration of data 
Beghin et al. (2012) calibrated data for consumption of shrimps in France. Their data for 
demand and supply of shrimps in 2006 for European Union will be used in the calibration. They 
also conducted a consumer choice experiment in December 2009 in Paris, France. Their random 
survey sample included 160 participants for the consumption of shrimps including the imported 
shrimps with antibiotics treatment that can have health hazards. They finally found that the 
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average per-unit damage perceived by the participants “r” is equal to 47 percent of the price of 
the product16. The summary of the data they provided is presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 – Data on consumption of shrimps in 2006 
Variable Description Data for EU-15 
Q Consumption (in thousands of tons) 523.166 
P Price per kg (US$) 6.29 
𝜀𝐷 Own-price elasticity of demand -0.67 
𝑟% Per-unit damage of product (in percentages) 47% 
Source: Beghin et al. (2012), Table 1, page 369 
To simply calculate parameters, extreme case A of the first scenario will be the standard for 
calibration. In fact, it is assumed that the data presented in Table 2.1 capturing the real world is 
equivalent to that case. Therefore, it is simply assumed that the real market in European Union 
is a duopolistic competition between domestic producers and non-EU industries that are 
symmetric. Moreover, it is assumed that EU citizens are all indifferent about negative 
characteristics of shrimps produced out of EU (treated with antibiotics) at the time data was 
collected. Thus, other scenarios are alterations to this case and changes of parameters will be 
considered afterwards. Table 2.2 presents the calculation of parameters of the model, using the 
data provided by Beghin et al. (2012). Calculations of parameters are also shown in this table. 
Since there was no data on the cost function of shrimps suppliers, marginal costs are simply 
calculated such that there is duopolistic market clearing in the benchmark model. 
Table 2.2 – Calculated parameters of the model on consumption of shrimps in 2006 
Variable Calculation Description Value for EU-15 
b 𝑏 = 𝑃 (𝜀𝐷 ∗ 𝑄)⁄  Slope of demand 0.018 
a 𝑎 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑄 + 𝑃 Demand intercept 15.68 
𝑐 𝑐 = (2𝑎 𝑄⁄ ) − 3𝑏 Marginal cost of production in duopolistic 
market clearing 
0.006 
r 𝑟 = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑟% Valuation of the damage (US$) 2.96 
Source: own calculations according to the data by Beghin et al. (2012) 
                                                 
16Their survey is biased because they did not consider those consumers indifferent about the damaging 
characteristics of the shrimps treated with antibiotics. They simply made an average on the total willingness to pay 
(WTP) of the consumers, if the prices varying from €0.25 to €4. The WTP before revelation of information 
regarding the damaging attributes of product was in average 2.14, and after revelation of information was 1.13. 




Table 2.3 – Calibration Results 
Welfare 
Scenario 1, (𝜂 =
0.5) 
Scenario 1, (𝜼 = 1) Scenario 1, (𝜼 = 0) Scenario 2, (𝜂 = 0.5) 
𝐶𝑆𝑂21    1253.74 
𝐶𝑆𝑂22    662.58 
𝐶𝑆𝑂 2075.40 2455.76 1616.94 1916.33 
𝐶𝑆𝑀 1086.94 1250.80 823.56 1250.8 
∆𝐶𝑆21    -628.35 
∆𝐶𝑆22    -37.18 
∆𝐶𝑆 -988.46 -1204.96 -793.38 -665.53 
∆𝐶𝑆21
𝐶𝑆𝑂21
    -0.50 
∆𝐶𝑆22
𝐶𝑆𝑂22
    -0.6 
∆𝐶𝑆
𝐶𝑆𝑂
 -0.48 -0.49 -0.49 -0.35 
𝑃𝑆𝑂  1178.50 1436.62 945.91 1828.43 
𝑃𝑆𝑀 2400.98 2926.86 1927.14 2926.86 
∆𝑃𝑆 1222.49 1490.25 981.22 1098.43 
∆𝑃𝑆
𝑃𝑆𝑂
 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.60 
∆𝑊 234.03 285.29 187.84 432.9 
∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑊 -944.47 -1151.33 -758.07 -413.74 
Source: own calculation 
Table 2.3 shows the calibration results for the two scenarios. As shown, changes of CS and 
international welfare are negative in all scenarios and cases. The magnitude of these changes is 
highest in extreme case A of first scenario, and lowest in scenario 2. It would be wiser to 
compare the two benchmark cases and then the interpretation of extreme cases can be derived 
from them. 
When consumers have enough information to freely make their own decision on choosing the 
product that maximizes their own utility (scenario 2.2), their initial welfare is lower than the 
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corresponding welfare for the situation in which they cannot identify the origin of products so 
as to choose what they want (𝐶𝑆𝑂2 < 𝐶𝑆𝑂1𝐴). However, after imposing new restrictions on the 
import, the welfare in scenario 2 is higher than the first scenario, which is equal to the extreme 
case 1 of first scenario (𝐶𝑆𝑀2 = 𝐶𝑆𝑀1𝐵 > 𝐶𝑆𝑀1𝐴). As it is observed both groups of consumers 
are losing after imposition of NTM in the second scenario. Nevertheless, total consumer welfare 
losses in the second scenario are less than corresponding changes in the first scenario. Even the 
policy elasticity of consumer surplus is better for the second scenario. 
With respect to the initial and final PS, the domestic producer has also a better situation in the 
second scenario relative to the first scenario. Policy elasticity of PS shows that producers are 
enjoying new regulations in the second scenario less than in the first scenario. Total welfare 
increase and total international welfare decrease present a better situation when the information 
about the origin of the products is available for consumers. Calibration of the model suggests 
that informing consumers puts the international welfare changes in a better situation than not 
informing them. Foreign industry’s losses in the second scenario (-846) are lower than the best 
situation in the extreme case B of first scenario (-945). Lack of information is one of the market 
failures and the findings therefore suggest that an increase of information assuredly improves 
the market behavior in response to a trade policy. 
In general, it can be concluded that when market efficiencies are improved and there is available 
information for consumers, their welfare has a better situation than when there is not enough 
information. Even after a prohibitive NTM that decreases the competitiveness within the 
market, when there is complete information for consumers, there are fewer losses than when 
consumers cannot identify the origins of the products. Knowledge on the origins of the products 
can inform them (consumers) about the characteristics of the product which can be internalized 
in their preferences. In all cases studied in this chapter, total social welfare of the society has 
increased while the consumers made losses. Domestic producer’s gains relative to its initial 
surplus in scenario 2 are much lower than in scenario 1 (60% relative to 104%). In both cases, 
government might have imposed NTMs to support the domestic industry instead of protecting 
consumers. However, when government tries to inform consumers about the characteristics of 
products (scenario 2) from the beginning, it can suggest that officials are actually pursuing 
safety of society. In other words, by not informing the society and only by providing scientific 
evidences about harmful effects of foreign products for the imposition of NTMs governments 
are relatively seeking to maximize domestic industry’s profits. Observing transparent and 
enough information in the market of a country can be a good but not sufficient proof that the 
government is trying to protect public safety. Hence, before acceptance of an NTM by 
international organizations or by other countries, efforts of the government to provide 
transparency in its domestic market should first be observed. Nevertheless, special interest 
groups lobbying with governments prefer a lower increase in their profits with monopolistic 




In this chapter, I provide a partial equilibrium framework to analyze the welfare consequences 
in a country imposing NTM on a specific product produced abroad with negative characteristics 
that effects only concerned consumers directly. The intuition behind was mainly to show 
whether the paternalistic behavior of governments is in line with the willingness of the 
consumers. To support the idea of the possibility to protect the domestic industry that is 
lobbying the government, oligopolistic market was studied before imposition of NTM rather 
than a perfect competition. Two scenarios were the focus of analysis, which are mainly differing 
in the existence of information in the market. It was assumed in both scenarios that awareness 
of consumers about negative characteristics of foreign products is informed through media and 
scientific channels. However, existence of information means that they can distinguish between 
the origins of the goods, which is provided by the government only in the second scenario. 
Changes in the welfare after imposition of a prohibitive NTM that restrict the foreign product 
with negative characteristics have been analyzed in this chapter. Calibration of the data 
simplified the analysis and provided interesting outcomes that are in line with the assumptions 
of the model. It was proved that when consumers have enough information about the origin of 
products, a prohibitive NTM decreases their surplus less than when they cannot distinguish 
between products with bad and good attributes. Moreover, in the case of complete information 
producers are gaining less than when there is incomplete information in the market. This 
suggests that when government tries to increase efficiencies of the market by spreading the 
information to consumers, the officials are seeking for the public safety more than seeking for 
protection of the domestic industry. In a scenario when there is not complete information, 
increase in the producer’s profits is greater than the scenario when there is complete 
information. However, findings from this study cannot evidently define the motivations behind 
imposition of NTMs. Because in none of the scenarios studied here, government increases 
domestic welfare of consumers. Hence, they cannot state it as their own motivations. 
Possible extensions to this model can be done by: Firstly assigning probabilities for the 
consumption of two types of products in preferences of concerned consumers when there is 
incomplete information about the products; Secondly, externalities can be added to the 
preferences instead of direct negative effects of the products, which can be used to analyze the 
welfare implications of NTM focusing on products with negative indirect externalities; Thirdly, 
conducting a similar analysis on welfare changes after the foreign industry endured some costs 
to comply with new regulations and entered the home market; Fourthly, undertaking a suitable 
experimental survey that captures assumptions of the model and provides a good data for 




2.7. Appendix for Calculations 
2.7.1. Scenario 1, Benchmark 
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 (2.24) 
Consumers’ welfare before the imposition of NTM: 
𝐶𝑆𝑂1𝐴 =
2𝑏(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)2
(3𝑏 + 𝑐)2








𝑏(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)2
2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)2




Producer welfare before imposition of the regulations: 
𝑃𝑆𝑂1𝐴 =
(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)
2(3𝑏 + 𝑐)2
 (2.27) 
Producer surplus in the prohibitive regulation: 
𝑃𝑆𝑀1𝐴 =
(𝑎 − (1 − 𝜂)𝑟)2
2(2𝑏 + 𝑐)
 (2.28) 
Calculations of extreme case A and B are simplifications of above calculations. 
2.7.2. Scenario 2 
Profit of the home industry is different because of segmentations of the market, while the 
foreign industry has similar profit the same as previous scenario (equation (2.3) in the main 
text). Therefore, profit of home industry is: 




2 − 𝐾 (2.29) 
Maximization of domestic industry’s profit with respect to 𝑞2: 
𝜕𝜋𝐻
𝜕𝑞2
= 0 ⟺ 𝑞2 =
𝑎(1 − 𝜂)
2𝑏 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜂)
−
𝑐(1 − 𝜂)
2𝑏 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜂)
𝑞𝐻1 (2.30) 







= 0 ⟺ 𝑞𝐻1
= 
𝑎𝜂(2𝑏 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜂)) + 𝑎𝑐𝜂(1 − 𝜂)
(2𝑏 + 𝑐𝜂)(2𝑏 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜂)) + 𝑐2(1 − 𝜂)
− 
𝑏(2𝑏 + 𝑐(1 − 𝜂))
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Abstract: Eight Multilateral Rounds of negotiations under GATT and international agreements 
under WTO have contributed significantly to the reduction of tariffs among WTO members. 
However, legitimate reasons for the imposition of non-tariff measures (NTMs) within 
regulations have triggered their extensive use over the years. Among these measures, Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) allow countries to 
impose restrictions on the imports of low-quality products suspected to harm the domestic 
consumers’ health or the global environment. Such trade policy instruments might induce 
higher standards in the import market, in addition to improving the market efficiency by 
information requirements such as mandatory labelling. In this paper, quality improvement of 
the traded products are analyzed which can provide a guideline for the motives behind different 
types of NTMs. Based on a model framework involving both supply and demand sides of trade, 
the paper assesses the impact of different types of NTMs on the quality of the imported 
products. The analysis modifies and uses the existing information on the NTM notifications to 
the WTO from the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) during 1995-2011. 
3.1. Introduction 
Eight Multilateral Rounds of negotiations under GATT and international agreements under 
WTO have contributed significantly to the reduction of tariffs among WTO members. However, 
legitimate reasons for the imposition of non-tariff measures (NTMs) within regulations have 
triggered their extensive use over the years. Aiming at trade liberalization, protectionist and 
discriminatory motives for trade policy measures are not permitted by the regulations, while 
some specific motives are endorsed in good faith behind NTMs. Among these measures, 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) allow 
countries to impose restrictions on the imports of low-quality products suspected to harm the 
domestic consumers’ health, global environment, safety, etc. Such trade policy instruments 
might induce higher standards in the import market, in addition to improving the market 
efficiency by information requirements such as mandatory labelling. In this paper, we analyze 
the quality improvement of the imported products. This provides a guideline for the motives 
behind different types of NTMs. Applying a monopolistic competition framework involving 
both supply and demand sides of trade; we will assess the impact of different types of NTMs 
on the quality of the traded products at 4-digit level of Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) rev. 2. The analysis modifies and uses the existing information on the 
NTM notifications to the WTO from the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) during 
1995-2011.  
According to the MAST17 classification, “Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are policy measures, 
other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect on 
                                                 
17 (MAST) as of July 2008 comprise institutional members: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/TAD), United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), World Bank 
(WB), World Trade Organization (WTO). Observers: European Commission (EC), and United States International 
Trade Commission (USITC), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). UNCTAD and World Bank 
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international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both.” Classifications of 
NTMs are mostly based on legal international regulations mandated by the WTO and other 
organizations, scholars have additionally identified NTMs based on their nature and 
implications into two broad categories. One category includes quantitative NTMs such as anti-
dumping (AD), quantitative restrictions (QR), safeguard measures (SG), etc. In spite of having 
quantitative implications, this broad category of NTMs can be also grounded on some 
qualitative nature (e.g. national legal bases, national security, health and environment issues, 
market adjustments, etc.). Second category refers to NTMs with qualitative nature and 
implications. TBT and SPS are usually indicated in the core NTM category, which are mostly 
restrictions for regulations and higher standards. Irrespective of complex motives behind such 
trade policy measures – i.e. following good faith and legitimate motives unlike discriminative 
motives – they are basically caused by technology, domestic standards and innovations, and 
qualitative, health, and environment issues (Ghodsi, 2015a). Therefore, core NTMs are 
considered to have also non-quantitative effects on trade flows rooting from production 
procedures and quality improvement.  
Core NTMs can be aimed at improving the quality of the imported products in order to 
harmonize the domestic market standards. Standard-based regulations can potentially improve 
the production procedures or quality of products (Wilson and Otsuki, 2004; Trienekens and 
Zuurbier, 2008). Using imports unit-values as a proxy for quality of the imported products, 
Ghodsi (2015c) found evidences of diverse quality improvement of TBT Specific Trade 
Concerns (STC) imposed by the EU, USA, and China. 
Impact of NTMs on trade flows has been studied in the literature. For instance, using a gravity 
model on traded HS 6-digit products, Essaji (2008) found that the technical regulations imposed 
by the US, incur a huge cost on poor exporting countries with lower capacities. Using the data 
on TBT notifications to the WTO, Bao and Qiu (2012) found that these regulations reduce the 
export extensive margins while increasing the intensive margins. In a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) framework, Francois et al. (2011) analyzed trade liberalization gains of 
preferential trade agreements. They found that reduction in NTMs would have much larger 
impact than the reduction in tariffs. Disdier et al. (2010), Li and Beghin (2012), Yousefi and 
Liu (2013), and Ghodsi (2015c) have also found negative impact of core NTMs on trade flows.  
This contribution extends the literature by having a special focus on the role of different NTM 
types on the quality of traded products. In addition to unit-value of traded products as a simple 
proxy for quality, the quality – measured by the recent frameworks in the literature (Hallak and 
Schott, 2008; Khandelwal, 2010; and Feenstra and Romalis, 2014) – will be used in our 
analysis. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we summarize the 
model by Feenstra and Romalis (2014) which provides a framework to disentangle quantity, 
price, and quality effects of bilateral trade flows. Section 3 discusses data issues and the 
methodology; and in Section 4, the results of the gravity model are presented. Section 5 
concludes. 
                                                 
jointly coordinate MAST. MAST reports to the Group of Eminent Persons, which is convened by the director 
general of UNCTAD. 
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3.2. Methodological framework 
The starting point of the analysis is the model presented in Feenstra and Romalis (2014) – 
referred to as F&R (2014) – providing a framework to disentangle quantity, quality and price 
effects of exports and imports. Here the intuition of the model is presented allowing for a proper 
interpretation of results concerning the econometric outcomes of the effects of non-tariff 
measures (NTMs).18 
The model starts from an expenditure function given by 






























(with 𝜎 > 1) implying non-homothetic demand for quality for 𝛼𝑘(𝑈𝑘) ≥ 1. The price 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 of 
good 𝑖 sold in market 𝑘 is divided by quality 𝑧𝑖
𝑘  which allows one to model the consumer 




𝛼𝑘  where for brevity one sets (𝑧𝑖
𝑘)
𝛼𝑘
: =  𝑧𝑖
𝛼𝑘 .  Note that the quality-adjusted price 
depends on both the level of quality 𝑧𝑖
𝑘 and how consumers evaluate quality 𝛼𝑘. Both lead to 




𝑘. The validity of the expenditure function is shown in F&R (2014). From above one can 
also see that quality-adjusted demand increases with quality.  
At the firm side it is assumed that firms can produce multiple products (one for each market), 
and firm ℎ in country 𝑟 simultaneously choose quality 𝑧𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘 and the f.o.b. price 𝑝𝑖ℎ
fob,𝑟𝑘
 to sell in 
market 𝑘. Further, the production function for quality 𝑧𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘 is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas given 
by productivity of labor 𝜑𝑖ℎ






 with 0 < 𝜃 < 1 
reflecting diminishing returns to quality. The wage rate for (the composite) input 𝑙𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘 is given 











𝑟𝑘. Further, firms pay fixed costs of exporting given by 𝑓𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘(𝜑𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘), i.e. 
depending on productivity. Productivity levels are assumed to be Pareto-distributed with 
𝐺𝑖





 where 𝜑𝑖 < 𝜑𝑖
𝑟 (𝜑𝑖 is the lower bound of productivities in country 𝑟).
19 
Concerning trade costs, the assumption is that there are both specific (per unit) trade costs 
denoted by 𝑇𝑖
𝑟𝑘 and ad valorem trade costs 𝜏𝑖
𝑟𝑘. Tariffs might be included and considered 
similarly denoted by 𝑡𝑖
𝑟𝑘. Similarly other ad valorem costs (e.g. AVEs of NTMs) might be part 
                                                 
18 The section summarises the model in F&R (2014) with some small changes in notation. 
19 The lower bound 𝜑𝑖




of the specific trade costs or assumed to be tariff-equivalents. These trade costs are applied to 
the value including the specific trade costs giving the c.i.f. price (including tariffs) as 20 
𝑝𝑖ℎ









𝑟𝑘, 𝑤𝑟) =  𝑤𝑟𝑙𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘 = 𝑤𝑟(𝑧𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘)1/𝜃/𝜑𝑖ℎ
𝑟 . These are thus increasing in the wage rate 𝑤𝑟 
and the quality 𝑧𝑖
𝑟𝑘, and decreasing in 𝜑𝑖ℎ















This can be reformulated in quality-adjusted terms and to tariff-exclusive c.i.f. prices which can 






































The assumption of the Cobb-Douglas production function and the resulting cost function give 











Thus, quality is increasing with higher specific trade costs (Washington apples effect), higher 
productivity and higher parameter values 𝛼𝑘𝜃 21. If 𝛼𝑘 is increasing with income, richer 
countries import higher qualities. If 𝜃 (depending on the exporter r) is larger, the returns to 
quality diminish less quickly and thus quality is increasing. Oppositely, quality is decreasing 
with higher wages, i.e. higher costs of production.  
The marginal costs become proportional to the specific trade costs 
𝑐𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘(𝑧𝑖ℎ





These are increasing in 𝛼𝑘 (as quality increases and therefore marginal costs increase) and the 
specific trade costs.  
                                                 
20 The c.i.f. price exclusive of tariffs would then be 𝑝𝑖
cif,𝑟𝑘/(1 + 𝑡𝑖
𝑟𝑘) = (1 + 𝜏𝑟𝑘)(𝑝𝑖
fob,𝑟𝑘 + 𝑇𝑖
𝑟𝑘). 
21 It is assumed that 0 < 𝛼𝑘𝜃 < 1. 
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The assumption of the CES expenditure function and the optimal choice of the f.o.b. price yield 
the familiar mark-up equation 
(𝑝𝑖𝑗
fob,𝑟 𝑘 + 𝑇𝑖
𝑟𝑘) = [𝑐𝑖ℎ
𝑟𝑘(𝑧𝑖ℎ





Using the proportionality of marginal costs and specific trade costs gives f.o.b. and c.i.f. 
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Thus, the prices do not depend on firm productivity as more efficient firms sell higher quality 
products.22 Thus, all firms selling to market 𝑘 charge the same price, but only differ with respect 
to quality.  































. Thus, quality is increasing with the specific trade costs and productivity.  
Let ?̂?𝑖
𝑟𝑘 denote the cutoff-productivity of the marginal exporter (i.e. the firm just covering the 
fixed costs of exporting). The c.i.f. (including tariffs) quality-adjusted price for the marginal 







































which includes tariffs. ?̂?𝑖
𝑟𝑘 = ?̂?𝑖
cif,𝑟𝑘?̂?𝑖
𝑟𝑘 is the (tariff-inclusive) export revenue. Firm profits 










                                                 
22 As F&R (2014) describe, this is a razor-edge case.  
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which covers fixed costs. Assuming a special function for fixed costs as argued in F&R (2014) 
𝑓𝑖
𝑟𝑘(?̂?𝑖










(with 𝛽0 > 0) allows one to derive the quality-adjusted c.i.f. price (tariff-inclusive) (under the 
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The quality-adjusted price is decreasing with 𝜅1
𝑘 (which is increasing in its arguments), a larger 
f.o.b. price and increasing with a larger c.i.f. price. In the second term it is decreasing with 
tariffs 𝜎, and the number of exporters. It is further decreasing with the size of the market and 
the fix costs. The value of exports 𝑋𝑖
𝑟𝑘 and the quality-adjusted price ?̂?𝑖
cif,𝑟𝑘
 are positively 
related – contrary to the demand side interpretation. A similar equation holds in the case of 
heterogeneous firms (see Appendix) 













i.e. a higher quality-adjusted price results in lower export values. Using supply side information 


























F&R (2014) used equation (3.10) for two representative countries i and j exporting to market 
k, which could be equivalently used for two different markets k and l as destinations of export 
for a representative country i. Therefore, equation (3.10) is modified to be estimated using 
GMM to calculate the unknown parameters of the model. For simplicity, preference parameter 
for quality of the USA is assumed to be equal to 1, and other countries’ preferences are then 
calculated relative to the US with iterated estimations. The quality framework presented above 
considers both demand and supply sides of the markets, which improves the former frameworks 
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proposed by Hallak and Schott (2008) and Khandelwal (2010). The following analysis is based 
on the quality of traded products measured by the discussed framework above. 
3.3. Data and specification 
The analysis is conducted for a sample of countries during 1995-2011. The sample includes all 
WTO members as importing countries, mainly because the NTM database includes the 
notifications of the WTO members against the imports of all other countries in the world. 
Moreover, due to harmonization of trade policy measures, regulations, and standards within the 
European Union, all intra-EU trade flows are excluded from the sample of analysis. The primary 
data source is the results derived in F&R (2014) which are downloadable from the website.23 
These data provide information for each four-digit SITC Rev. 2 good (about 712 products) for 
all bilateral trade flows between country pairs over the period 1984-2011. These data – which 
have undergone a data cleaning process - include exports in f.o.b. and imports in c.i.f. prices in 
values, bilateral flows in quantity terms, and unit values. Based on the theoretical framework 
outlined in F&R (2014) discussed above, GMM estimations are performed for each of the 712 
products to estimate the relevant elasticities with other parameters partly taken from the 
literature. Using these indexes, quality, quality-adjusted prices, and quality-adjusted quantities 
traded are derived. Thus, the dataset includes the following eleven variables for bilateral trade 
relations: 
 Traded values:  
o Value of trade for exports (v_fob) 
o Value of trade for imports (v_cif) 
 Traded quantities (Q) 
 Unit values 
o Unit values for exports (uv_fob) 
o Unit values for imports (uv_cif) 
 Quality 
o Quality of exports (q_fob) 
o Quality of imports (q_cif) 
 Quality-adjusted prices 
o Quality-adjusted export prices (qa_p_fob) 
o Quality adjusted import prices (qa_p_cif) 
 Quality-adjusted quantities 
o Quality-adjusted export quantities (qa_Q_fob) 
o Quality-adjusted import quantities (qa_Q_cif) 
 
According to the theoretical settings, these variables are closely linked to each other: For 
example, the value of exports equals the traded quantity times the export unit values, and the 
                                                 
23 See http://www.robertfeenstra.info/data/ 
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export unit values equal the export quality times the quality-adjusted export prices. Similarly, 
quality-adjusted export quantities divided by the quality of exports equals the quantity of 
exports. Analogously, this holds for the imports.  
In the econometric part, we estimate these bilateral trade variables in a simple gravity model 
that is given by: 
ln 𝑥𝑡














 denotes one of the eleven variables mentioned above in natural logarithm. For 
instance, 𝑣_𝑓𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝑗𝑘𝑠
 indicates logarithm of export values (f.o.b. trade) of sector s from country j 
to country k at time t. Explanatory variables included in vector Ft are exporter and importer 
characteristics like population and GDP per capita, Distances in factor endowments (i.e. capital 
and land); variables included in Gravity are geographic distance, contiguity, common language, 
same country, and colony. Dummies included are for WTO membership and for preferential 
trade agreement PTAs. A set of trade policy variables is included in TPt. These variables are 
tariffs and measures of NTMs described below. Finally, 𝜖 refers to fixed effect dummies that 
are time, sector, exporter, and importer specific; and 𝜀𝑡
𝑗𝑘𝑠
 is the error term.  
The data from explanatory variables are collected from various sources. Concerning trade 
policy measures both variables for tariff and non-tariff measures are included. The data on 
tariffs are again taken from the F&R (2014) which includes preferential rates and MFN 
wherever applicable. 
With respect to non-tariff measures, six different types of NTMs are included: (i) Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and (ii) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) are included which 
can allow countries to impose restrictions on the imports of low-quality products suspected to 
harm domestic consumers’ health, environment, etc. It is expected that these core NTMs induce 
higher standards in the import market, in addition to improving the market efficiency by 
information requirements such as mandatory labelling. TBT and SPS measures are usually 
imposed against the imports from all other countries in the world. In addition, WTO allows 
countries to consult other members’ regulations within the minutes recording. This provides a 
reverse notification system to raise Specific Trade Concerns (STC) on these regulations. 
Therefore, TBT STCs and SPS STCs are raised by partners facing TBT and SPS measures. 
STCs are specific cases of TBT and SPS having specific trade disturbances. Some of STCs can 
be found in the direct notifications on TBT and SPS, therefore they have overlaps with the set 
of TBT and SPS. However, there are many STC notifications that are not notified by the 
imposing members directly to the WTO. Hence, we include (iii) TBT STCs and (iv) SPS STCs 
in addition to the direct notifications. 
In the specification also other measures are investigated, notably (v) anti-dumping measures 
(ADP) and (vi) a set of other quantitative restrictions including safeguard measures (SG), 
special safeguards (SSG), countervailing duties (CV) and quantitative restrictions (QR). These 
64 
 
are combined into one group labelled QNTM. All these NTMs are count variables indicating 
the number of a given type of NTM imposed (going in force) at time t on sector s by the importer 
country k against trade partner j. Whether the NTM is still in force in the next period is not 
considered in the analysis, since there is no evident information regarding their withdrawal. 
Hence, NTMs are counts or hits of measures at the time of imposition. The data on NTMs are 
collected from the WTO I-TIP database which are compiled and harmonized and matched to 
the trade data (see Ghodsi et al., 2015, for details). Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics on 
different NTM types used in the analysis. TBT is the most important NTM covering 2.23 
Million affected products with 36069 billion USD (28.95% of all imports) during the period. 
Next major NTM is STCs affecting 1.08 Million 4-digit SITC products with 21858 billion USD 
value (17.55% of all imports). TBT STC, QNTM, ADP, and SPS STCs are the next NTMs in 
terms of traded values in the world. 
Table 3.1 – Statistics on imposed NTM Types - Period 1995-2011 
SITC NTM Products Product % Imports Bil. $ Import% NTM Products Product% Imports Bil. $ Import% 
0 
ADP 
1573 7.8% 42.9238 0.64% 
QNTM 
14446 12.6% 194.8425 2.90% 
1 73 0.4% 0.174563 0.02% 1719 1.5% 42.41775 4.19% 
2 380 1.9% 11.27397 0.20% 4320 3.8% 73.33449 1.29% 
3 91 0.5% 2.921905 0.02% 954 0.8% 196.5416 1.24% 
4 369 1.8% 3.825225 0.59% 754 0.7% 4.487601 0.69% 
5 5718 28.3% 178.3092 1.65% 33479 29.2% 298.1974 2.76% 
6 6499 32.2% 185.516 1.09% 16288 14.2% 148.0525 0.87% 
7 3345 16.6% 229.9319 0.46% 26917 23.5% 508.9229 1.03% 
8 2146 10.6% 166.2538 1.05% 15300 13.3% 167.7766 1.06% 
9 5 0.0% 0.000454 0.00% 486 0.4% 1.862533 0.13% 
All 20199 100.0% 821.1309 0.66% 114663 100.0% 1636.436 1.31% 
0 
TBT 
393908 17.6% 2941.978 43.80% 
SPS 
415637 38.2% 3470.792 51.67% 
1 45483 2.0% 405.8401 40.12% 33670 3.1% 391.3468 38.69% 
2 80089 3.6% 864.9362 15.20% 76887 7.1% 932.6742 16.39% 
3 14295 0.6% 2233.979 14.09% 7049 0.6% 1958.501 12.35% 
4 33688 1.5% 238.0025 36.85% 35426 3.3% 265.9301 41.17% 
5 413113 18.5% 4865.054 45.04% 246505 22.7% 3742.776 34.65% 
6 301307 13.5% 2120.758 12.44% 83625 7.7% 1677.85 9.84% 
7 599567 26.8% 17401.9 35.12% 85004 7.8% 6553.895 13.23% 
8 346589 15.5% 4911.849 31.13% 97999 9.0% 2795.494 17.72% 
9 7040 0.3% 85.59396 5.77% 6017 0.6% 69.22874 4.67% 
All 2235079 100.0% 36069.9 28.95% 1087819 100.0% 21858.49 17.55% 
0 
TBTSTC 
8637 13.8% 99.48851 1.48% 
SPSSTC 
8018 55.0% 103.8406 1.55% 
1 1215 1.9% 21.94421 2.17% 543 3.7% 6.409045 0.63% 
2 1870 3.0% 27.76536 0.49% 1485 10.2% 16.23904 0.29% 
3 415 0.7% 9.956304 0.06% 50 0.3% 0.219222 0.00% 
4 985 1.6% 4.206423 0.65% 466 3.2% 1.223548 0.19% 
5 12315 19.7% 217.489 2.01% 2297 15.8% 34.92761 0.32% 
6 7313 11.7% 64.75047 0.38% 1330 9.1% 9.957546 0.06% 
7 21411 34.3% 979.2562 1.98% 4 0.0% 0.158932 0.00% 
8 8052 12.9% 316.1557 2.00% 289 2.0% 2.487154 0.02% 
9 153 0.2% 0.673333 0.05% 100 0.7% 0.112106 0.01% 
All 62366 100.0% 1741.686 1.40% 14582 100.0% 175.5748 0.14% 
 
In the regressions, two other variables are included capturing WTO membership (i.e. a dummy 
set to 1 if both countries are WTO members), and a dummy for membership in preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). PTA data are collected from WTO website. It is expected that 
partners with WTO membership and PTA have better trade relationship. 
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Further variables included are indicators of similarity of countries with respect to GDP per 
capita, indicators of relative capital and land to real GDP of both partners24, and the total 
population of both partners capturing market potential taken from the Penn World Tables 
(Feenstra et al., 2013, and 2015; PWT 8.125), and the World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Similarities in two relative factors of production are measured as follows: 
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑓𝑗𝑘𝑡 = |𝑙𝑛 (
𝐹𝑓𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
) − 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐹𝑓𝑘𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡
)| , 𝐹𝑓 ∈ { 𝐾, 𝐴𝑙} 
where K and Al refer to capital stock and agricultural land area of the country (j or k) 
respectively. When the two countries are very similar in relative endowments, this index goes 
to zero, and it increases as the countries diverge.  
Further, a set of the usual gravity variables taken from CEPII are included: geographic distance, 
common language, contiguity, colonial ties and a variable for being in the same country 
(smctry).  
All variables except dummies are included in logs in the regressions. The above equation is 
estimated with simple OLS. Robust estimator clustering product-country-pair is used to control 
for the diverse bilateral-product shocks causing heteroskedasticitic error term. Due to the 
multiplicative – or log-linear – relationship between these eleven variables the estimated 
coefficients of each explanatory variable on the respective trade measure can be summed up 
providing an overall measure of the relative importance of quantity effects, quality effects and 
quality-adjusted price effects. 
3.4. Results 
In this section, we present the results of this exercise. First, we start with the overall results, i.e. 
including all products in the regressions. In the second subsection, we present results for 
individual SITC groups.  
3.4.1. The whole sample 
The results for the whole sample are presented in Table 3.2. Overall, the regressions perform 
quite well through the R-squared for the values of exports and imports are relatively low. These 
are higher for the unit values, the quality indicator and the quality-adjusted prices and quantities.  
For an overview of results, we opt for a graphical presentation. Note that the respective 
dependent variables are multiplicative or log-linear, thus the estimated coefficients can be 
summed up to give the relative importance of the dimensions quantities, quality and quality-
adjusted prices.  
                                                 
24 Since population of both countries are included in the regressions, relative similarities in labor force is not 
included 
25 Can be found at: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/ 
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Figure 3-1 presents the cumulated effect of the import flows. The regressions are run on both 
the export data (in f.o.b. prices) and import data (in c.i.f. prices). Not surprisingly, the overall 
results of the gravity models on traded values are very similar as the difference is only the 
c.i.f./f.o.b. margins.26 The coefficients are graphically represented in Figure 3-1 and 
Figure 3-2.27 
As mentioned above, the coefficients on the various variables can be summed up and in these 
figures, therefore the overall effect of the respective variable on the trade flows in nominal 
terms (the blue diamond), the quantity effect, the quality effect, and the effect on the quality-
adjusted price index are presented. By theoretical construction, import value equals quantity 
multiplied by unit values; hence, the summation of coefficient on the log of unit-value and the 
log of traded quantity can be equal to the coefficient on the log of import value. Moreover, the 
summation of coefficient on the log of imported quality and the log of quality-adjusted import 
price should be equal to the coefficient on the log of import unit-value. However, the coefficient 
on the log of traded quantity is equal to the coefficient on the log of import quality deducted 
from the quality-adjusted quantity. 
For all variables, the quantity effect dominates which can be better seen in Figure 3 reporting 
the relative effects in percent of the overall effect. However, some other interesting points can 
be found in Table 3.2 as follows.  
Countries with larger population have larger traded quantities, but lower traded quality and 
prices. This might refer to the economies of scale in the destination market, in which larger 
quantities and qualities demanded are relevantly cheaper. Therefore, the overall effect of 
population on the trade values is statistically insignificant.  
A larger GDP per capita of the trading partners implies a higher quality of trade with a negligible 
effect on the quality-adjusted price. This is in line with the formulations of the theoretical 
framework, which indicates higher preferences for quality in advanced economies and higher 
quality of produced commodities in advanced economies. Besides, countries with higher GDP 
per capita, export larger quantities.  
Negative coefficients of endowment factors dissimilarities indicated that similar countries in 
terms of relative endowments have larger trade with each other, either in nominal terms or in 
quantities. However, the less the countries are similar in factors of production, the higher are 
the price and quality of their bilateral trade, and the lower are the quality-adjusted quantities 
traded. 
While tariffs have hampering effects on trade, they increase the quality and quality-adjusted 
quantity of exports. This lies in the construction of the theoretical framework (i.e. equation 
(3.7)), the quality-adjusted export revenue is positively affected by tariffs and fixed cost of 
exports. Hence, quality and quality-adjusted quantity should increase by tariffs. 
Washington apple effect: Distance means less quantity, but higher quality and higher quality-
adjusted (c.i.f.) price. This is also in line with the formulation of the theoretical framework, 
                                                 
26 Larger differences in coefficients occur only for tariffs which we will investigate in the next step.  
27 In these graphs we calculated the GDP effect from the coefficients on population and GDP per capita.  
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which suggests that in order to export to distant destinations, exporting firms should produce 
with higher qualities to maintain the quality at the destination. 
Having PTA between bilateral partners, both being a member of the WTO, having the same 
border, ethnical languages and colonial heritage have almost similar impact on all dependent 
variables. In other words, these factors improve trade by decreasing the transaction costs. 
However, countries with such relationships trade products with lower quality. Moreover, when 
both trading partners are WTO members, the quality-adjusted price of their bilateral trade is 
higher, which might refer to higher costs of production. 
In contrast, trade between same countries is more costly and with higher quality. In fact, same 
countries such as Hong Kong, Thailand, and China have higher bilateral trade flows, with 
higher products quality and higher prices. 
With respect to the trade policy variables, one finds that tariffs have a strong negative quantity 
effect, with only a very limited role for quality-adjusted prices and quality of imports. Both 
these variables have a negative effect of about 10% of the overall effect of tariffs on import 
flows (Figure 3-3). This large quantity effect relative to price and quality effect is similarly the 
case for SPS, which however shows a – tiny – positive effect on the imports unit-values, traded 
quality, and quality-adjusted price of export. The results in Table 3.2 suggest that SPS 
imposition has positive impact on the quality of imports rather than the prices related to 
production of quantities (i.e. quality-adjusted price). However, quality-adjusted import quantity 
is negatively affected by SPS, which indicates a lower demand induced by the measure. Overall, 
a hampering effect on trade values is observed. Export quality is also improved by the measure, 
showing the impact of measure on the production in the country of origin. This quality 
improvement is accompanied with a lower quality-adjusted price and higher export unit-values, 
which are not statistically significant. However, SPS STCs have opposite impact on the quality 
of products. These bilateral measures are decreasing the quality of traded products and unit-
values inducing larger traded quantities. In spite of raising concerns on the SPS measures, these 
specific regulations enhance trade through lower prices. 
For TBTs, one finds a trade enhancing impact for which about 36% is due to an increase in 
quantities traded, 25% due to an increase in the import quality-adjusted prices and the remaining 
38% due to an increase in the import quality. Export values are increased by TBTs through 6% 
increase in quality-adjusted export price and 60% improvement in quality of exports. This 
considerably indicates the positive impact of TBTs on the production quality in the country of 
origin. However, trade-improving impact of TBT STCs is largely contributed to both higher 
quantity and higher prices net of quality. In fact, while quality of export is not affected by these 
STCs, quality of imports is downgraded statistically significantly. 
The NTMs collected in the category QNTM have a negative impact on quantities and quality 
adjusted-price of imports. However, while traded quality is improved by these measures, the 
overall impact on trade shows the prohibitive behavior of these quantitative measures. 
The impact of ADP is surprisingly trade enhancing. The results suggest that traded values and 
quantities are strongly higher for the bilateral flows in which there are more anti-dumping cases. 
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Moreover, both unit values and quality of trade products are lower for the bilateral product 
flows in which there are more ADP notifications. However, quality-adjusted import price and 




Table 3.2 – Results from gravity estimation including all products, OLS with Fixed Effects 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j 0.029
* 0.013 0.073*** -0.044*** -0.060*** -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.021*** -0.0037** 0.049*** 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Population k 0.011 -0.0067 0.33
*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.076*** -0.024*** 0.087*** 0.017 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0060) (0.0082) (0.0043) (0.0017) (0.018) (0.018) 
GDP pc j 0.086
*** 0.10*** 0.0074 0.078*** 0.094*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.0014 0.00028 0.084*** 0.10*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0085) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.00073) (0.0072) (0.0073) 
GDP pc k 0.43
*** 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.078*** 0.075*** -0.012*** 0.047*** 0.090*** 0.031*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0097) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.00082) (0.0082) (0.0084) 
Factor K -0.089
*** -0.086*** -0.12*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.0036*** 0.0022*** -0.093*** -0.088*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.00071) (0.00028) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Factor Al -0.056
*** -0.059*** -0.087*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.033*** -0.0020 -0.0014* -0.054*** -0.057*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0075) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.00064) (0.0063) (0.0065) 
Tariff -0.70*** -0.71*** -0.63*** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.028*** 0.82*** -0.039*** -0.89*** -0.66*** 0.18*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.014) (0.015) 
Distance -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.49*** 0.096*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.088*** 0.019*** 0.0087*** -0.41*** -0.41*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.00097) (0.00097) (0.00066) (0.00087) (0.00042) (0.00016) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
PTA 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.15*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.0045*** -0.0033*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.00091) (0.0012) (0.00058) (0.00022) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
WTO 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** -0.0073*** -0.0083*** -0.020*** -0.0095*** 0.013*** 0.0021*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.00077) (0.00030) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Contiguity 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.39*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.042*** 0.0080*** -0.0022*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.00040) (0.0061) (0.0063) 
Com. lang. 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.00049 -0.0015*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.00077) (0.00028) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
Colony 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.34*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.0059*** -0.0028*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0067) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.00039) (0.0058) (0.0060) 
Same Ctry 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.0086*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.0066*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.010) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.00063) (0.0088) (0.0090) 
ADP 1.11*** 1.12*** 1.22*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 0.027*** 0.00036 1.09*** 1.12*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0081) (0.0040) (0.0016) (0.021) (0.022) 
SPS -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.059*** 0.0031** 0.0018 0.0039*** 0.0022* -0.00080 0.00087*** -0.055*** -0.058*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.00072) (0.00094) (0.00045) (0.00017) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
TBT 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.0093*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.0066*** 0.0016*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.00084) (0.00085) (0.00057) (0.00075) (0.00037) (0.00014) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
TBTSTC 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.012* 0.017*** -0.0096** 0.0062 0.021*** 0.0057*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0022) (0.00085) (0.011) (0.011) 
SPSSTC 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.21*** -0.066*** -0.092*** -0.067*** -0.071*** 0.0015 0.0048** 0.14*** 0.11*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0067) (0.0087) (0.0045) (0.0017) (0.024) (0.024) 
QNTM -0.024** -0.027*** -0.032*** 0.0079* 0.0043 0.011*** 0.0079** -0.0029* 0.000055 -0.021** -0.027*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.00055) (0.0079) (0.0081) 
_cons 3.73*** 3.74*** 9.33*** -5.59*** -5.59*** -2.91*** -4.89*** -2.69*** -0.71*** 6.42*** 4.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.047) (0.048) (0.032) (0.042) (0.021) (0.0079) (0.10) (0.11) 
N 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 13584744 
R2 0.282 0.286 0.679 0.900 0.898 0.892 0.901 0.903 0.908 0.487 0.323 
adj. R2 0.282 0.285 0.679 0.900 0.898 0.892 0.901 0.903 0.908 0.487 0.323 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 3-1 – Differentiated effects for import c.i.f. values 
 
Figure 3-2 – Differentiated effects for export f.o.b. values 
 





Export dumping usually occurs when the exporter reduces its price in the destination market to 
increase its market share. While this strategy is countered by an ADP, the exporter would rather 
provide goods with lower quality to make it more compliable with its previously low price in 
the market of destination. This might also be the case that ADP regulations damage the quality 
of the imported products. This strategy is reflected in lower traded unit-values whose quality 
contribution is much higher than the disturbed quality-adjusted price. The net effect of the ADP 
is reflected in higher quality-adjusted import price, which is much smaller in magnitude than 
the affected lower quality. However, no statistically significant impact of ADP on the quality-
adjusted export price shows that the cost of production of each unit net of quality is not affected 
in the country of origin. Therefore, the lower quality contributing to lower prices would attract 
more demand resulting in higher quality-adjusted traded quantities and consequently higher 
import values. Overall, it can be stated that ADP has negative impact on the quality of traded 
products, and in general, it cannot be introduced as a suitable protectionist measure, while the 
exporters prefer to adjust their products quality at the border rather than adjusting their prices. 
3.4.2. Differentiated effects by product groups 
In separate estimations over aggregate SITC 1-digit categories28, we analyze the impact of 
NTMs on trade. The estimation results on 10 categories of products are presented in appendix 
Table 3.3 through Table 3.12.  
ADPs imposed on mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials improves their quality of 
exports statistically significantly. Quality of trade products in categories 1, 4, and 9 are not 
statistically influenced by the imposed ADPs. Quality of other products increases of with the 
ADP similar to the sample over all categories. Except for category 9 – which includes only 
three ADP notifications– ADP has a similar relationship with the dependent variables in all 
categories, wherever the coefficients are statistically significant. Hence, in general, the 
interpretation of ADP impact on dependent variables holds similar to the whole sample. In 
general, ADP induces exporters to downgrade the quality of products and increase their prices 
net of quality. The quality downgrade is larger than the price increase, which leads to higher 
demand of that specific product in a broad category of products. Overall, ADP affects the 
quality of traded products negatively. 
QNTMs improve the quality of traded products within categories 5 and 7. While they do not 
influence trade values and quantities in these two categories of products, they simply increase 
unit-values through quality improvement and quality-adjusted prices. The number of QNTM 
notifications in these two categories is the largest across all categories (29% and 23% of all 
affected lines by QNTMs during the period are in category 5 and 7 respectively, with an average 
1.27 notifications per line). The third and fourth categories with the largest number of QNTMs 
                                                 
28 The categories are: 0 - Food and live animals; 1 - Beverages and tobacco; 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels; 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; 5 - 
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.; 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; 7 - Machinery and 
transport equipment; 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles; 9 - Commodities and transactions not classified 




in the sample are respectively Manufactured goods (SITC 6) and Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (SITC 8) covering 14% and 13.2% of the affected lines by QNTMs respectively. The 
trade of these products is hampered by the QNTMs. In fact, quality, unit-values, and quantity 
of trade are decreased by these types of NTMs. Overall, QNTMs are observed to be restrictive 
obstacles on trade only for categories 2, 6, 8, and 9, in addition to the whole sample. 
SPS enhances traded values and quantities mainly for Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
(SITC 2). While these measures do not statistically influence the quality of products in this 
category, the quality-adjusted price and quality are increased. Trade values of products in 
categories 1, 4, 5, and 9 are not affected by the imposed SPS. Moreover, these regulations imped 
trade of products in categories 0, 3, 6, 7, and 8. Food and live animals (SITC 0) covers 38% of 
all affected lines by SPS during the period with average 4.9 number of notifications in each 
line. This category is considered the most predominant area at the focus of SPS, which is 
affected by significant quality improvement and price increase. However, a larger impeding 
effect on the traded quality-adjusted quantity leads to lower trade values. Chemicals and related 
products (SITC 5), is the second largest affected category covering 23% of all affected lines by 
SPS. However, it is observed that only quality-adjusted prices are affected statistically 
significantly by the SPS imposed on this category. 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) with 33.9% of total world imports in 2011 covers 
7.8% of all affected products by SPS. Safety issues can be accounted for as the most important 
issue within the measures of this product category. However, quality of the traded products in 
the seventh category is not statistically significantly affected by SPS. These regulations are 
impeding trade without any impact on quality of these products.  
Results suggest that SPS measures have negative impact on quality of trade products within 
category of beverages and tobacco (SITC 1), and manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material (SITC 6). 10.8% of affected products by SPS measures are included in these two 
categories. Overall, SPS notifications have diverse effects on the quality of traded products. 
SPS STCs are affecting the quality of imports in categories 0, 5, and 2 negatively. These 
categories include the largest affected lines by TBT STCs (respectively 55%, 15.8%, and 10.2% 
of all affected lines). However, increased quality-adjusted quantity with these measures 
enhances the traded values of these products, while the unit-values of only food and live animals 
(SITC 0) are decreased statistically with these measures. In spite no significant impact on the 
quality of products in SITC 9 category SPS STCs are increasing the trade values. 466 lines in 
category 4 are affected by these notifications, which have higher trade values statistically. 
Nevertheless, we observe that import quality of Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes are 
improved by these measures at 5% level of significance.  
TBTs are impeding import values and import quantities of Food and live animals (SITC 0), 
Beverages and tobacco (SITC 1), Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC 3), and 
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) products. SITCs 7, 0, 1, and 3 cover respectively 
26.8%, 17.6%, 2%, and 0.6% of all affected products by TBT. We observe quality improvement 
of products by the imposition of TBT in these categories. Import quality and traded unit-values 
of Food and live animal products are not affected by TBTs. TBTs imposed on the seventh 
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category do not affect the quality-adjusted prices. This means that while there is a quality 
improvement by the regulations within the TBTs, the costs associated to the production of the 
quantities remain unchanged. This raises the traded unit-values leading to lower demanded 
quantity. The 14295 affected lines by the imposed TBTs in the third category of products enjoy 
higher quality and prices net of quality, which leads to lower quantity and values of traded 
products. 
Traded values, quantities, unit-values, and quality of Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 
(SITC 5), and miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8) are improved by the imposed 
TBTs. 34% of affected products by TBT are in these two categories. Technical regulations 
within these trade policy instruments lead to higher quality of traded products. These products 
are often used as intermediates and inputs of productions. Therefore, intermediates with higher 
qualities complying with domestic standards can find higher demand, leading to higher import 
values. 
Except for crude materials, inedible, except fuels (SITC 2), we observe higher quality of traded 
products where TBTs are imposed. By nature, TBTs are regulations affecting product qualities 
and production procedures. High standards regulated within these trade instruments improve 
the quality of imported products in general. Depending on the type of the product and its usage 
in the supply chains, the demand for the products and their imports will be affected as observed.  
Except for food and live animals (SITC 0) whose trade values are not affected by TBT STC, 
and for Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes (SITC 4) whose traded values and quantities 
are impeded by these measures, TBT STCs are enhancing trade in other sectors. In SITC 1 
category, traded quantity and quality-adjusted quantity is improved proportionally higher than 
the quality and price downgrading, leading to higher trade values by TBT STCs. Moreover, 
while quality of imports of SITC 7 is decreased with these regulations, all other products enjoy 
higher quality of traded products where the TBT STCs are notified. In spite of the concerns 
raised within these notifications, we observe trade enhancing, and quality improvement of TBT 




Figure 3-4 – Tariff impact on import of product categories 
 
Figure 3-5 – SPS impact on import of product categories 
 




Figure 3-7 – ADP impact on import of product categories 
 
Figure 3-8 – QNTM impact on import of product categories 
 
3.5. Summary and concluding remarks 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) have attracted attentions of politicians and economists since tariffs 
have fallen after establishment of GATT and WTO. Moreover, various causes and motivations 
behind the impositions of NTMs make their implications hard to interpret. Complex and opaque 
nature of these trade policy instruments have been emphasized in the literature. Despite trade 
impeding consequences of NTMs, quality improvement of the traded products can point to the 
direction of legitimate motives behind them. Discriminatory behavior and trade restrictiveness 
of these trade policy instruments have been extensively studied in the literature. However, a 
visible gap remained for the analyzes studying positive impact of these complex measures on 
the quality of traded products. In this study, we contributed to the literature by filling this gap. 
Using a rich database on NTM notifications of the WTO members, we analyzed the diverse 
impact of six types of NTMs on traded values, quantities, quality, and prices. Anti-dumping 
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(ADP), technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), were three 
main NTMs of the analysis. In addition, specific trade concerns (STCs) raised on TBT and SPS 
regulations were other two NTM types under investigation. Countervailing measures (CV), 
safeguard measures (SG), special safeguards (SSG), and quantitative restrictions (QR) were 
other types of NTMs classified under other quantitative NTMs (QNTMs) in the analysis. 
Applying a demand-supply theoretical framework proposed by Feenstra and Romalis (2014) 
for the measurement of quality of traded goods, we distinguished the impact of NTMs on traded 
qualities and prices net of quality. In a gravity framework, we observed the diverse role of NTM 
in trade components. 
The outcomes of the analysis points at quality improvement of traded products affected by the 
TBTs and especially by TBT STCs. This finding is in line with previous study by Ghodsi 
(2015c) showing the good features of these core NTMs in trade. While the general impact of 
TBTs on trade flows is positive, traded values and quantities are affected differently by each 
product category, which gives insights on the diverse characteristics of products and their final 
use. 
In contrast, SPS imposition influences the product quality differently. In spite of observing 
statistical significant influence of these core NTMs on quality over the whole sample products, 
different categories of products are affected diversely by SPS. In fact, quality improvement is 
observed in trade of food and live animals (the most affected category by SPS notifications), 
mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; and animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; 
which are usually the categories with the most affected SPS lines. However, our results point 
to the impeding behavior of these trade policy instruments in general. On the other hand, SPS 
STCs are in general enhancing trade of products. In fact, trade flows of food and live animals, 
crude materials, inedible, except fuels, and chemicals and related products (covering 81% of 
affected lines) are increased with SPS STC. However, major quality improvement by these 
measures is indicated in other sectors. 
The findings of the analysis show that ADP and the rest of quantitative NTMs significantly 
downgrade the quality of products. While QNTMs are trade restrictive, ADPs enhance trade 
values and quantities. The ADP is imposed to restrict the low pricing of the imported product 
under dumping. When the exporter is obliged to import to the destination with higher price after 
the imposition of ADP, reducing the quality of the exported product can be a good strategy to 
excuse the low dumping price. This strategy increases the demand and finally the import values 
of the product under the ADP, which makes the ADP a trade-improving policy instrument rather 
than a restrictive one. 
Dual causality between trade flows and trade policy instruments giving endogeneity problems 
in the estimations can be mentioned as the weaknesses of the analysis. As robustness check of 
the presented analysis, Generalized Method of Moments can be applied to control for the 




3.6.1. Technical Appendix 























































































































the c.i.f./f.o.b.-margin (c.i.f. price including tariffs) is given by 
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Again inserting and re-arranging yields 
𝑃𝑖













































which can be simplified to 
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3.6.2. Appendix of Tables 
Regressions on 10 categories of SITC products at 1-digit are presented next. In all regressions 
country fixed effects, time fixed effects, and product fixed effects are included. Robust Standard 
errors clustering country-pairs-product are represented in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 3.3 – Food and live animals – SITC 0 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j -0.050 -0.059 0.17
*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.100*** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.032*** 0.075* -0.027 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0093) (0.014) (0.0076) (0.0032) (0.033) (0.034) 
Population k -0.28
*** -0.26*** 0.089 -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.21*** -0.34*** -0.16*** -0.032*** -0.12* -0.23*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.060) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.0048) (0.053) (0.053) 
GDP pc j 0.019 0.041 -0.052
* 0.071*** 0.093*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.0019 0.0019 0.017 0.039 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.0100) (0.010) (0.0060) (0.0087) (0.0048) (0.0020) (0.022) (0.022) 
GDP pc k 0.18
*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.0024 0.030** 0.043*** 0.015*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0066) (0.0096) (0.0053) (0.0022) (0.024) (0.025) 
Factor K -0.0078 -0.0038 -0.028
** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.0091*** 0.0048*** -0.017 -0.0086 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.010) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.00081) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
Factor Al -0.053
** -0.056** -0.050* -0.0026 -0.0064 0.0099 0.0025 -0.012** -0.0051** -0.040* -0.051** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0053) (0.0076) (0.0042) (0.0018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Tariff -0.77*** -0.78*** -0.71*** -0.058*** -0.068*** -0.032*** 0.81*** -0.026*** -0.87*** -0.75*** 0.089* 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0089) (0.012) (0.0066) (0.0031) (0.042) (0.043) 
Distance -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.34*** 0.062*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.051*** 0.031*** 0.011*** -0.31*** -0.33*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.00050) (0.0076) (0.0077) 
PTA 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.016*** 0.00084 -0.0022** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.00068) (0.010) (0.010) 
WTO 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.15*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.013*** -0.0046*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0022) (0.00087) (0.010) (0.011) 
Contiguity 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.40*** -0.084*** -0.080*** -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.016*** -0.0077*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0046) (0.0065) (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.020) (0.021) 
Com. lang. 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.0020 0.0028 -0.0092** -0.0012 0.011*** 0.0032*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0024) (0.00090) (0.014) (0.014) 
Colony 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.012 0.012 -0.0084 0.0047 0.020*** 0.0068*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0048) (0.0068) (0.0037) (0.0014) (0.021) (0.022) 
Same Ctry. 0.066* 0.063* 0.071* -0.0043 -0.0071 -0.012 -0.0086 0.0074 0.0043* 0.059* 0.059* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0070) (0.0099) (0.0052) (0.0020) (0.028) (0.028) 
ADP 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.25*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.10*** 0.016 -0.0024 1.13*** 1.15*** 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.084) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.0041) (0.076) (0.078) 
SPS -0.0100* -0.0097* -0.024*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.0035*** 0.00099** -0.013*** -0.011** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.00075) (0.00030) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
TBT -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 0.0018 0.0010 0.0015 0.0029* 0.00021 -0.0011*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.00089) (0.0013) (0.00069) (0.00029) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
TBTSTC -0.038 -0.030 -0.11*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.052*** 0.060*** 0.016*** 0.0086*** -0.054* -0.039 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0049) (0.0020) (0.027) (0.027) 
SPSSTC 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.51*** -0.089*** -0.096*** -0.080*** -0.085*** -0.0089 -0.0042* 0.43*** 0.42*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0073) (0.0099) (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.032) (0.033) 
QNTM 0.014 0.014 0.057 -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.018*** -0.0055*** 0.032 0.020 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0060) (0.0082) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.033) (0.034) 
_cons 7.01*** 6.92*** 13.5*** -6.45*** -6.55*** -3.57*** -5.75*** -2.88*** -0.71*** 9.89*** 7.62*** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.12) (0.13) (0.075) (0.11) (0.059) (0.023) (0.30) (0.31) 
N 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 1225158 
R2 0.209 0.210 0.409 0.752 0.756 0.828 0.757 0.895 0.947 0.409 0.291 




Table 3.4 – Beverages and tobacco – SITC 1 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j 0.51
*** 0.59*** 0.92*** -0.41*** -0.33*** -0.20*** -0.39*** -0.22*** -0.023*** 0.72*** 0.61*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.048) (0.048) (0.029) (0.045) (0.023) (0.0045) (0.11) (0.11) 
Population k 0.27 0.27 1.06
*** -0.80*** -0.80*** -0.46*** -0.73*** -0.33*** -0.070*** 0.60*** 0.34* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.068) (0.068) (0.041) (0.064) (0.032) (0.0060) (0.15) (0.15) 
GDP pc j 0.15
* 0.16* 0.024 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.072*** 0.11*** 0.050*** 0.0099*** 0.097 0.15* 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.072) (0.030) (0.030) (0.018) (0.028) (0.014) (0.0027) (0.065) (0.067) 
GDP pc k 0.13 0.099 0.11 0.026 -0.0067 -0.010 0.030 0.036
* -0.0044 0.095 0.10 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.077) (0.033) (0.033) (0.020) (0.031) (0.015) (0.0029) (0.069) (0.070) 
Factor K 0.00086 -0.0023 0.035 -0.034
** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.031** -0.011* -0.0029** 0.012 0.00056 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0066) (0.010) (0.0050) (0.00098) (0.025) (0.026) 
Factor Al 0.011 0.022 -0.035 0.046 0.057
* 0.032* 0.041 0.014 0.0051* -0.0028 0.017 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.024) (0.012) (0.0024) (0.058) (0.060) 
Tariff -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.28*** -0.064** -0.056** -0.024* 0.87*** -0.040*** -0.93*** -0.30*** 0.60*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.0096) (0.0019) (0.049) (0.051) 
Distance -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.40*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.021*** 0.0051*** -0.34*** -0.33*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0030) (0.00054) (0.016) (0.016) 
PTA 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.015 0.012 -0.00028 0.014 0.015*** 0.0011 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0055) (0.0084) (0.0041) (0.00076) (0.024) (0.024) 
WTO 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.0013 -0.0071 -0.012 0.0011 0.013* 0.00021 0.12*** 0.13*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0076) (0.012) (0.0058) (0.0011) (0.028) (0.028) 
Contiguity 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.39*** -0.016 -0.0062 -0.027* -0.018 0.011 0.0022 0.36*** 0.38*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.051) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.0080) (0.0015) (0.046) (0.048) 
Com. lang. 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** -0.026* -0.027* -0.023** -0.024* -0.0036 -0.0020* 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0075) (0.011) (0.0055) (0.00100) (0.032) (0.033) 
Colony 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.23*** -0.018 -0.020 -0.023* -0.018 0.0050 -0.00011 0.21*** 0.21*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.0077) (0.0014) (0.048) (0.050) 
Same Ctry. 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.54*** -0.075** -0.081** -0.064*** -0.074** -0.011 -0.0013 0.47*** 0.46*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.025) (0.012) (0.0023) (0.059) (0.061) 
ADP -0.10 -0.25 -0.41 0.31* 0.16 0.046 0.27 0.26*** 0.040** -0.36 -0.29 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.34) (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (0.066) (0.012) (0.28) (0.29) 
SPS 0.010 0.018 0.054*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.020*** -0.040*** -0.023*** -0.0030*** 0.034* 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0035) (0.0054) (0.0027) (0.00045) (0.015) (0.016) 
TBT -0.028* -0.0095 -0.050*** 0.022*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.022*** -0.0088** 0.00017 -0.019 -0.0096 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0027) (0.00047) (0.013) (0.013) 
TBTSTC 0.22** 0.23** 0.32*** -0.098** -0.087** -0.063*** -0.091*** -0.035* -0.0066** 0.25** 0.24** 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.087) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) (0.0026) (0.079) (0.082) 
SPSSTC 0.091 0.11 0.16 -0.071 -0.055 -0.051 -0.066 -0.021 -0.0050 0.11 0.11 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.052) (0.050) (0.033) (0.048) (0.024) (0.0041) (0.12) (0.12) 
QNTM 0.13 0.13 0.17* -0.039 -0.040 -0.029 -0.040 -0.011 0.00073 0.14 0.13 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.023) (0.012) (0.0020) (0.076) (0.080) 
_cons 2.84*** 2.72*** 4.55*** -1.71*** -1.83*** -0.89*** -1.73*** -0.81*** 0.028 3.65*** 2.70*** 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.71) (0.30) (0.30) (0.18) (0.28) (0.14) (0.027) (0.63) (0.65) 
N 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 181588 
R2 0.215 0.228 0.810 0.962 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.955 0.968 0.533 0.246 




Table 3.5 – Crude materials, inedible, except fuels – SITC 2 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j -0.073 -0.043 0.36
*** -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.21*** -0.37*** -0.22*** -0.061*** 0.14** 0.018 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.068) (0.032) (0.032) (0.022) (0.028) (0.014) (0.0055) (0.055) (0.057) 
Population k -0.26
*** -0.29*** -0.20* -0.054 -0.086* -0.093*** -0.095** 0.039* 0.041*** -0.30*** -0.33*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.081) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) (0.032) (0.016) (0.0061) (0.068) (0.070) 
GDP pc j 0.23
*** 0.21*** 0.24*** -0.0089 -0.024 -0.0091 -0.0090 0.00018 0.000066 0.23*** 0.21*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.0083) (0.0033) (0.033) (0.034) 
GDP pc k 0.038 0.053 -0.12
** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.073*** 0.13*** 0.082*** 0.029*** -0.044 0.024 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.0084) (0.0033) (0.034) (0.035) 
Factor K 0.056
*** 0.067*** 0.052*** 0.0035 0.014* -0.011* 0.00030 0.015*** 0.0032** 0.041** 0.063*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0028) (0.0011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Factor Al 0.0040 -0.012 0.030 -0.026 -0.042
** -0.012 -0.022 -0.014* -0.0044 0.018 -0.0079 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.0071) (0.0028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Tariff -0.10 -0.082 0.090 -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.13*** 0.71*** -0.065*** -0.91*** -0.040 0.83*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.10) (0.032) (0.032) (0.024) (0.030) (0.013) (0.0046) (0.090) (0.093) 
Distance -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.33*** 0.12*** 0.084*** 0.074*** 0.11*** 0.048*** 0.015*** -0.25*** -0.26*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0017) (0.00062) (0.0098) (0.010) 
PTA 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.089*** -0.012* -0.011 -0.014** -0.012* 0.0011 -0.00091 0.076*** 0.079*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0054) (0.0023) (0.00085) (0.013) (0.013) 
WTO 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.14*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.039*** -0.047*** -0.011*** -0.0033** 0.10*** 0.094*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.014) (0.015) 
Contiguity 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.41*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.030*** -0.015*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0079) (0.0097) (0.0042) (0.0015) (0.025) (0.026) 
Com. lang. 0.041* 0.042* 0.044* -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0064 -0.0016 0.0038 -0.0010 0.037* 0.043* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0030) (0.0011) (0.018) (0.019) 
Colony 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.16*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.046*** -0.0083 -0.0039* 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0086) (0.011) (0.0043) (0.0016) (0.026) (0.026) 
Same Ctry. 0.092* 0.098** 0.051 0.041* 0.048** 0.029* 0.038* 0.012 0.0024 0.080* 0.096* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.0068) (0.0025) (0.036) (0.037) 
ADP 1.65*** 1.71*** 1.93*** -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.061*** -0.051*** 1.71*** 1.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.042) (0.042) (0.030) (0.036) (0.018) (0.0079) (0.15) (0.15) 
SPS 0.031*** 0.020* 0.032** -0.00066 -0.011* -0.0071 -0.0022 0.0065*** 0.0015* 0.024** 0.019* 
 (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.011) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0016) (0.00064) (0.0087) (0.0091) 
TBT 0.0088 0.0041 0.051*** -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.019*** -0.0036*** 0.027** 0.0077 
 (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.011) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0016) (0.00069) (0.0092) (0.0096) 
TBTSTC 0.14* 0.14* 0.045 0.092** 0.099*** 0.061** 0.084** 0.031** 0.0079 0.11 0.14* 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.072) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.0099) (0.0046) (0.060) (0.062) 
SPSSTC 0.42*** 0.25** 0.28** 0.14** -0.035 -0.082* 0.066 0.22*** 0.071*** 0.20** 0.18* 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.092) (0.045) (0.043) (0.034) (0.040) (0.021) (0.0082) (0.071) (0.076) 
QNTM -0.077** -0.077** -0.048 -0.029 -0.028 0.0018 -0.016 -0.031*** -0.013*** -0.047 -0.064* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.0058) (0.0024) (0.027) (0.028) 
_cons 5.22*** 5.39*** 12.6*** -7.36*** -7.20*** -4.09*** -6.40*** -3.27*** -0.96*** 8.49*** 6.34*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.42) (0.19) (0.18) (0.13) (0.17) (0.077) (0.028) (0.35) (0.36) 
N 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 708989 
R2 0.223 0.221 0.546 0.840 0.836 0.855 0.843 0.922 0.935 0.513 0.307 




Table 3.6 – Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials – SITC 3 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j -1.29
*** -1.29*** -1.13*** -0.17** -0.16** -0.011 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.013 -1.14*** -1.27*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) (0.043) (0.033) (0.018) (0.15) (0.15) 
Population k 0.81
*** 0.82*** 0.65*** 0.16** 0.17*** 0.025 0.16*** 0.14*** -0.0014 0.68*** 0.82*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.049) (0.049) (0.036) (0.040) (0.031) (0.016) (0.16) (0.17) 
GDP pc j -0.25
** -0.26** -0.34** 0.089** 0.087** 0.052* 0.059* 0.038* 0.031** -0.29** -0.29** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.11) (0.032) (0.032) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.011) (0.091) (0.095) 
GDP pc k 0.71
*** 0.72*** 0.57*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.018 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.030** 0.59*** 0.69*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.11) (0.032) (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.020) (0.011) (0.091) (0.096) 
Factor K 0.16
*** 0.16*** 0.16*** -0.0041 -0.0015 -0.016* -0.00071 0.011 -0.0034 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0068) (0.0036) (0.032) (0.033) 
Factor Al -0.41
*** -0.41*** -0.46*** 0.048 0.047 0.049* 0.026 -0.00031 0.022* -0.41*** -0.43*** 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.096) (0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.0093) (0.080) (0.084) 
Tariff -0.22 -0.23 -0.34 0.12 0.11 -0.0048 0.82*** 0.12*** -0.70*** -0.34 0.47* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.065) (0.065) (0.044) (0.050) (0.038) (0.021) (0.18) (0.19) 
Distance -0.35*** -0.39*** -0.43*** 0.075*** 0.036*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.0093* 0.013*** -0.36*** -0.41*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.023) (0.024) 
PTA 0.083* 0.086** 0.084* -0.0017 0.0016 -0.017* -0.0087 0.015** 0.0070* 0.068* 0.079* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0056) (0.0029) (0.031) (0.033) 
WTO 0.0041 0.0049 0.023 -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.021* -0.0052 0.0018 0.0093 0.0031 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0079) (0.0092) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.034) (0.036) 
Contiguity 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.31*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.0043 -0.0052 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.063) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0092) (0.0045) (0.054) (0.057) 
Com. lang. -0.10* -0.11* -0.17*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.017* 0.0044 -0.12** -0.11* 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0095) (0.011) (0.0074) (0.0038) (0.041) (0.043) 
Colony 0.15* 0.15* 0.20** -0.055** -0.053** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.0037 -0.0028 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.067) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.0099) (0.0051) (0.056) (0.059) 
Same Ctry. 0.26** 0.26** 0.26** -0.0015 -0.0042 -0.036* -0.013 0.034* 0.011 0.23** 0.25** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.092) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.0066) (0.078) (0.082) 
ADP 0.99*** 0.98*** 0.78** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.0081 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.037 0.79*** 0.95*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.060) (0.060) (0.055) (0.049) (0.051) (0.030) (0.23) (0.25) 
SPS -0.058* -0.049 -0.097** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.0094 0.0093** -0.067* -0.059* 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0059) (0.0033) (0.026) (0.028) 
TBT -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.29*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.024*** 0.020*** -0.23*** -0.21*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0052) (0.0031) (0.022) (0.023) 
TBTSTC 0.42** 0.43** 0.13 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.018 0.15** 0.27*** 0.14*** 0.15 0.29* 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.070) (0.070) (0.044) (0.053) (0.038) (0.022) (0.13) (0.14) 
SPSSTC 0.20 0.21 -0.037 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.23* 0.099 0.0082 0.10 0.20 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.42) (0.13) (0.13) (0.088) (0.094) (0.087) (0.051) (0.35) (0.37) 
QNTM -0.10 -0.093 -0.13 0.027 0.034 0.031 0.027 -0.0036 0.00030 -0.097 -0.093 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.029) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.011) (0.075) (0.079) 
_cons 7.97*** 8.13*** 18.2*** -10.3*** -10.1*** -4.91*** -8.17*** -5.35*** -2.09*** 13.3*** 10.2*** 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.86) (0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.078) (0.73) (0.77) 
N 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 129168 
R2 0.512 0.516 0.620 0.834 0.840 0.842 0.878 0.884 0.929 0.636 0.560 




Table 3.7 – Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes – SITC 4 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j -0.30
* -0.30* -0.13 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.070* -0.12** -0.097*** -0.049*** -0.20 -0.26* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.047) (0.047) (0.030) (0.038) (0.022) (0.012) (0.12) (0.12) 
Population k 0.52
** 0.53** 1.19*** -0.66*** -0.66*** -0.54*** -0.62*** -0.13*** -0.044* 0.65*** 0.57** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.069) (0.069) (0.045) (0.057) (0.032) (0.018) (0.18) (0.18) 
GDP pc j -0.068 -0.058 -0.12 0.047 0.057
* 0.050** 0.048* -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.065 -0.057 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.081) (0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.0070) (0.070) (0.071) 
GDP pc k 0.41
*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.00016 0.0018 -0.045* -0.023 0.045** 0.023** 0.36*** 0.39*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.092) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.0085) (0.081) (0.082) 
Factor K 0.064
* 0.068* 0.027 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.020** 0.026** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.047 0.057 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0075) (0.0092) (0.0051) (0.0028) (0.031) (0.031) 
Factor Al -0.18
** -0.18** -0.20** 0.020 0.019 0.035* 0.030 -0.015 -0.010 -0.16** -0.17** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.070) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.0060) (0.061) (0.062) 
Tariff -0.40** -0.41** -0.34* -0.063 -0.073 -0.031 0.69*** -0.031 -0.76*** -0.37** 0.34* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.045) (0.044) (0.029) (0.036) (0.020) (0.011) (0.13) (0.13) 
Distance -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.28*** 0.088*** 0.066*** 0.050*** 0.068*** 0.038*** 0.020*** -0.23*** -0.24*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.023) (0.023) 
PTA 0.086** 0.088** 0.094** -0.0077 -0.0060 -0.014* -0.0077 0.0067 0.000011 0.079* 0.088** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.010) (0.010) (0.0071) (0.0086) (0.0044) (0.0023) (0.031) (0.032) 
WTO 0.0038 0.0026 -0.013 0.017 0.016 0.0048 0.010 0.012* 0.0067* -0.0082 -0.0042 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0079) (0.0100) (0.0057) (0.0031) (0.035) (0.036) 
Contiguity 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** -0.0025 -0.0018 -0.015 -0.0013 0.013 -0.0011 0.24*** 0.26*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.063) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.0077) (0.0039) (0.055) (0.056) 
Com. lang. 0.080 0.080 0.056 0.024 0.024 0.012 0.021 0.013* 0.0035 0.067 0.077 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.047) (0.015) (0.015) (0.0099) (0.012) (0.0063) (0.0032) (0.041) (0.042) 
Colony 0.059 0.059 0.066 -0.0071 -0.0072 -0.013 -0.013 0.0062 0.0059 0.053 0.053 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.071) (0.023) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.010) (0.0055) (0.061) (0.062) 
Same Ctry. 0.21* 0.21* 0.15 0.063* 0.065* 0.027 0.049* 0.036** 0.014* 0.17* 0.20* 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.095) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.022) (0.012) (0.0060) (0.083) (0.086) 
ADP 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.038 0.037 0.00014 0.018 0.038 0.020 0.13 0.15 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) (0.043) (0.028) (0.018) (0.16) (0.16) 
SPS -0.011 -0.010 -0.035** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.0077*** 0.0027* -0.019 -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.011) (0.011) 
TBT -0.012 -0.013 -0.0040 -0.0083 -0.0090 -0.0032 -0.0054 -0.0052* -0.0030* -0.0071 -0.0100 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.011) (0.011) 
TBTSTC -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.50*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.064*** 0.041*** -0.37*** -0.34*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.091) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) (0.014) (0.0078) (0.077) (0.078) 
SPSSTC -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.46*** 0.074 0.077 0.064* 0.051 0.010 0.022* -0.39*** -0.40*** 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.12) (0.044) (0.044) (0.029) (0.038) (0.018) (0.0092) (0.10) (0.100) 
QNTM -0.087 -0.088 -0.098 0.011 0.010 0.0045 0.0022 0.0065 0.0088 -0.094 -0.097 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.073) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.022) (0.013) (0.0083) (0.063) (0.065) 
_cons 3.64*** 3.63*** 9.71*** -6.07*** -6.08*** -2.58*** -4.60*** -3.49*** -1.47*** 7.13*** 5.10*** 
 (0.74) (0.74) (0.96) (0.40) (0.40) (0.34) (0.36) (0.13) (0.071) (0.73) (0.74) 
N 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 118879 
R2 0.239 0.240 0.327 0.566 0.574 0.816 0.725 0.913 0.962 0.427 0.375 




Table 3.8 – Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. – SITC 5 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j -0.074
* -0.076* 0.083* -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.056*** -0.0084** -0.018 -0.068* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.030) (0.030) 
Population k 0.20
*** 0.21*** 0.46*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.050*** -0.013** 0.25*** 0.22*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.055) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.0094) (0.0045) (0.045) (0.046) 
GDP pc j 0.052
** 0.066*** -0.0040 0.055*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.055*** -0.0049 0.00046 0.056** 0.066*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0074) (0.0094) (0.0041) (0.0019) (0.018) (0.019) 
GDP pc k 0.51
*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.035** 0.040** -0.023** 0.012 0.058*** 0.023*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0086) (0.011) (0.0047) (0.0022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Factor K -0.11
*** -0.11*** -0.16*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.0099*** 0.0056*** -0.12*** -0.11*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0090) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.00076) (0.0074) (0.0076) 
Factor Al -0.039
* -0.042* -0.044* 0.0052 0.0023 0.0077 0.0061 -0.0026 -0.00092 -0.036* -0.041* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0066) (0.0083) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Tariff -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.39*** -0.040 -0.043* -0.014 0.85*** -0.026*** -0.89*** -0.40*** 0.46*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.057) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.0078) (0.0036) (0.049) (0.049) 
Distance -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.65*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.018*** 0.010*** -0.54*** -0.55*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0074) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.00044) (0.0062) (0.0063) 
PTA 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.017*** 0.0024 -0.0011 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0095) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0014) (0.00059) (0.0079) (0.0080) 
WTO 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** -0.0063 -0.0057 -0.011*** -0.0045 0.0052** -0.0017* 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.011) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.00078) (0.0087) (0.0089) 
Contiguity 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.37*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.050*** -0.038*** 0.0090*** -0.0029** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0054) (0.0066) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.017) (0.017) 
Com. lang. 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.10*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.00059 -0.0027*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0019) (0.00076) (0.011) (0.011) 
Colony 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.30*** -0.022** -0.020** -0.032*** -0.024*** 0.0098*** 0.0024* 0.27*** 0.28*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.016) (0.016) 
Same Ctry. 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.027* 0.026* -0.00054 0.016 0.027*** 0.011*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0081) (0.010) (0.0041) (0.0018) (0.025) (0.026) 
ADP 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.97*** -0.034 -0.036* -0.083*** -0.043** 0.049*** 0.0096*** 0.89*** 0.93*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.0061) (0.0027) (0.037) (0.038) 
SPS 0.0044 0.0062 0.0075 -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.00088 -0.0021 -0.0022* -0.00094* 0.0066 0.0072 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.00095) (0.00041) (0.0054) (0.0056) 
TBT 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.010 0.0055** 0.0059** 0.0043** 0.0055** 0.0013 0.000064 0.014** 0.016*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.00079) (0.00036) (0.0044) (0.0045) 
TBTSTC 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0077) (0.0095) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.022) (0.022) 
SPSSTC 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.31*** -0.041 -0.039 -0.043** -0.032 0.0020 -0.0082 0.27*** 0.28*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.021) (0.0095) (0.0044) (0.047) (0.048) 
QNTM 0.0018 0.0034 -0.023 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.0035 0.0019 -0.0017 0.0015 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.010) (0.010) 
_cons 3.39*** 3.30*** 9.60*** -6.21*** -6.29*** -3.68*** -5.46*** -2.53*** -0.75*** 5.92*** 4.06*** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.051) (0.024) (0.23) (0.23) 
N 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 1790401 
R2 0.343 0.345 0.497 0.762 0.767 0.737 0.750 0.893 0.879 0.465 0.371 




Table 3.9 – Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material – SITC 6 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j 0.056
* 0.051* 0.077** -0.022 -0.026* -0.017* -0.025* -0.0046 0.0038 0.060** 0.047* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0072) (0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0025) (0.021) (0.022) 
Population k -0.080
* -0.085* 0.42*** -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.31*** -0.43*** -0.20*** -0.080*** 0.12*** -0.0050 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0083) (0.0038) (0.034) (0.035) 
GDP pc j 0.12
*** 0.13*** 0.039* 0.081*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.017*** 0.0060*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0035) (0.0016) (0.014) (0.014) 
GDP pc k 0.48
*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.024** 0.033*** -0.031*** -0.00013 0.055*** 0.024*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0040) (0.0018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Factor K -0.13
*** -0.13*** -0.19*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.015*** 0.0074*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.00061) (0.0055) (0.0056) 
Factor Al -0.0063 -0.011 -0.036
** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.0096** 0.0025 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Tariff -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.48*** -0.037** -0.036** -0.021** 0.83*** -0.016** -0.86*** -0.50*** 0.35*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0081) (0.011) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.027) (0.028) 
Distance -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.56*** 0.093*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.48*** -0.50*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.00080) (0.00034) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
PTA 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.0028* -0.0037*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.00047) (0.0056) (0.0058) 
WTO 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** -0.0093** -0.0097** -0.018*** -0.0098*** 0.0089*** 0.00043 0.16*** 0.17*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.00062) (0.0062) (0.0064) 
Contiguity 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.39*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.049*** -0.035*** 0.015*** 0.00020 0.34*** 0.36*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.00083) (0.011) (0.012) 
Com. lang. 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.0074* -0.0077* -0.013*** -0.0057 0.0053*** -0.0017** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0092) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.00062) (0.0079) (0.0081) 
Colony 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.30*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.0064** -0.0025** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.00087) (0.011) (0.011) 
Same Ctry. 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.0062 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.0093*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0030) (0.0013) (0.016) (0.017) 
ADP 1.20*** 1.19*** 1.36*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.16*** 0.047*** 0.0026 1.15*** 1.19*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0098) (0.012) (0.0062) (0.0028) (0.034) (0.035) 
SPS -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.0021*** -0.028*** -0.037*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.00043) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
TBT 0.015** 0.012* 0.017** -0.0018 -0.0048* -0.0012 -0.0016 -0.00061 -0.00014 0.015*** 0.012** 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.00094) (0.00041) (0.0044) (0.0045) 
TBTSTC 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.0012 0.036** 0.052*** 0.017*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0085) (0.011) (0.0063) (0.0028) (0.027) (0.028) 
SPSSTC -0.023 -0.028 -0.091 0.068* 0.063* 0.028 0.060** 0.040** 0.0080 -0.063 -0.036 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.073) (0.028) (0.027) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.0056) (0.064) (0.066) 
QNTM -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.034* -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.013** -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.0030 -0.047*** -0.061*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0044) (0.0059) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.014) (0.014) 
_cons 3.73*** 3.65*** 9.04*** -5.31*** -5.39*** -2.83*** -4.61*** -2.48*** -0.70*** 6.21*** 4.35*** 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.10) (0.10) (0.060) (0.086) (0.048) (0.020) (0.21) (0.21) 
N 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 3339038 
R2 0.287 0.290 0.629 0.875 0.874 0.877 0.883 0.890 0.873 0.481 0.330 




Table 3.10 – Machinery and transport equipment – SITC 7 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j 0.090
*** 0.057** -0.057* 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.063*** 0.12*** 0.083*** 0.023*** 0.0066 0.034 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0083) (0.011) (0.0059) (0.0020) (0.021) (0.022) 
Population k -0.0060 -0.083
* 0.35*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.093*** -0.043*** 0.087** -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.0093) (0.0032) (0.033) (0.034) 
GDP pc j 0.061
*** 0.084*** -0.016 0.077*** 0.10*** 0.082*** 0.078*** -0.0052 -0.00091 0.066*** 0.085*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0055) (0.0076) (0.0040) (0.0013) (0.014) (0.014) 
GDP pc k 0.67
*** 0.66*** 0.56*** 0.11*** 0.096*** 0.0058 0.080*** 0.10*** 0.027*** 0.57*** 0.63*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Factor K -0.17
*** -0.16*** -0.18*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.017*** -0.012*** -0.0034*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.00050) (0.0054) (0.0056) 
Factor Al -0.12
*** -0.12*** -0.17*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.0052 0.0022* -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0035) (0.0011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Tariff -0.89*** -0.90*** -0.89*** -0.0025 -0.0084 0.012 0.90*** -0.015* -0.90*** -0.88*** 0.000056 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0090) (0.012) (0.0061) (0.0020) (0.028) (0.029) 
Distance -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.61*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.013*** 0.0071*** -0.51*** -0.50*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.00083) (0.00026) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
PTA 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.011*** -0.0057*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.00037) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
WTO 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.36*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.017*** 0.023*** 0.0044*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.00055) (0.0061) (0.0063) 
Contiguity 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.41*** -0.011* -0.013* -0.039*** -0.014** 0.029*** 0.0031*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0048) (0.0023) (0.00070) (0.011) (0.012) 
Com. lang. 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.23*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.0090*** -0.0048*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.00047) (0.0073) (0.0076) 
Colony 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.48*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.012*** -0.0063*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0021) (0.00063) (0.0097) (0.010) 
Same Ctry. 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.012 0.013 -0.0011 0.0087 0.013*** 0.0031** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0056) (0.0075) (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.017) (0.018) 
ADP 1.11*** 1.14*** 1.30*** -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.17*** -0.055*** -0.022*** 1.16*** 1.17*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.023) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011) (0.0034) (0.050) (0.052) 
SPS -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.0014 -0.0042 0.0016 -0.00098 -0.0030* -0.00045 -0.038*** -0.043*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.00036) (0.0051) (0.0053) 
TBT -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.035*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.0014 0.000017 -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.00080) (0.00025) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
TBTSTC 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.020* 0.020* -0.020*** 0.017* 0.039*** 0.0032* 0.61*** 0.65*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0058) (0.0079) (0.0042) (0.0014) (0.017) (0.017) 
SPSSTC -2.48* -2.27 -2.91* 0.43 0.64 0.58** 0.43 -0.15 0.00082 -2.33 -2.27 
 (1.21) (1.30) (1.26) (0.27) (0.33) (0.22) (0.27) (0.085) (0.040) (1.22) (1.34) 
QNTM 0.0031 -0.0096 -0.014 0.017* 0.0044 0.0027 0.016* 0.014*** 0.0014 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.012) (0.012) 
_cons 1.99*** 2.09*** 6.24*** -4.25*** -4.15*** -2.15*** -3.82*** -2.10*** -0.43*** 4.09*** 2.51*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.096) (0.096) (0.064) (0.086) (0.042) (0.014) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 3851572 
R2 0.362 0.368 0.718 0.893 0.887 0.883 0.896 0.859 0.820 0.499 0.377 




Table 3.11 – Miscellaneous manufactured articles – SITC 8 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j 0.027 -0.00047 0.018 0.0084 -0.019 0.0035 0.013 0.0049 -0.0050 0.022 0.0045 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.014) (0.0077) (0.0031) (0.026) (0.026) 
Population k 0.19
*** 0.16*** 0.26*** -0.072** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.10*** 0.051*** 0.031*** 0.14** 0.13** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.052) (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.0046) (0.045) (0.045) 
GDP pc j 0.073
*** 0.092*** -0.074*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.019*** -0.0021 0.053** 0.095*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.017) (0.018) 
GDP pc k 0.50
*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.011 0.0026 -0.073*** -0.024* 0.084*** 0.035*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0071) (0.010) (0.0055) (0.0021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Factor K -0.076
*** -0.071*** -0.079*** 0.0032 0.0078 0.014*** 0.0072* -0.010*** -0.0041*** -0.065*** -0.067*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0082) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.00075) (0.0070) (0.0071) 
Factor Al -0.11
*** -0.11*** -0.19*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.010* -0.0024 -0.12*** -0.11*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0058) (0.0082) (0.0044) (0.0016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Tariff -0.70*** -0.74*** -0.75*** 0.049** 0.011 0.046*** 0.93*** 0.0026 -0.88*** -0.71*** 0.14*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.0078) (0.0029) (0.031) (0.031) 
Distance -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.64*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.030*** 0.0096*** -0.53*** -0.52*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.00040) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
PTA 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.16*** -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.0092*** -0.0034*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0077) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.00056) (0.0068) (0.0069) 
WTO 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.029*** 0.030*** -0.0023 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.0081*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.00077) (0.0074) (0.0075) 
Contiguity 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** -0.011 -0.014* -0.036*** -0.015** 0.025*** 0.0041*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0030) (0.0011) (0.014) (0.015) 
Com. lang. 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.28*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.027*** 0.0021 -0.00070 0.25*** 0.25*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.011) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0020) (0.00073) (0.0097) (0.0099) 
Colony 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.41*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.078*** -0.090*** -0.020*** -0.0076*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0027) (0.00095) (0.014) (0.014) 
Same Ctry. 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.016 0.015 -0.0037 0.0090 0.019*** 0.0066*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0060) (0.0085) (0.0045) (0.0017) (0.020) (0.020) 
ADP 1.19*** 1.25*** 1.27*** -0.084** -0.024 -0.079*** -0.089*** -0.0049 0.0054 1.19*** 1.24*** 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.026) (0.025) (0.017) (0.024) (0.014) (0.0045) (0.062) (0.064) 
SPS -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.0040 -0.0084** 0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0063*** -0.0027*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.00047) (0.0062) (0.0063) 
TBT 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.0095*** 0.00037 0.061*** 0.063*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.00098) (0.00034) (0.0044) (0.0045) 
TBTSTC 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.0072 0.040** 0.043*** 0.0097*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0095) (0.013) (0.0068) (0.0022) (0.028) (0.029) 
SPSSTC -0.016 -0.0062 -0.22 0.21** 0.22*** 0.083* 0.15** 0.13*** 0.056*** -0.14 -0.062 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.065) (0.065) (0.036) (0.057) (0.034) (0.016) (0.11) (0.11) 
QNTM -0.091*** -0.11*** -0.057*** -0.034*** -0.050*** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.012** -0.00089 -0.079*** -0.11*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0059) (0.0080) (0.0040) (0.0015) (0.015) (0.015) 
_cons 2.62*** 2.63*** 8.88*** -6.26*** -6.25*** -3.00*** -5.49*** -3.26*** -0.78*** 5.87*** 3.40*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.33) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.17) (0.060) (0.020) (0.23) (0.22) 
N 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 2200702 
R2 0.358 0.362 0.545 0.759 0.763 0.754 0.757 0.836 0.883 0.482 0.382 





Table 3.12 – Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere – SITC 9 
 v_cif v_fob Q uv_cif uv_fob q_cif q_fob qa_p_cif qa_p_fob qa_Q_cif qa_Q_fob 
Population j 1.11
*** 1.14*** 1.34*** -0.24 -0.20 -0.099 -0.28* -0.14 0.041 1.24*** 1.10*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.16) (0.16) (0.097) (0.14) (0.076) (0.031) (0.26) (0.27) 
Population k 2.06
*** 2.03*** 1.09** 0.97*** 0.94*** 0.39** 0.92*** 0.58*** 0.057 1.49*** 1.97*** 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.40) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.17) (0.086) (0.037) (0.36) (0.37) 
GDP pc j 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.0025 0.0053 0.22 0.21 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.096) (0.095) (0.058) (0.083) (0.047) (0.019) (0.17) (0.18) 
GDP pc k 0.18 0.17 -0.10 0.29
** 0.27** 0.092 0.25** 0.20*** 0.037 -0.012 0.13 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.10) (0.10) (0.064) (0.089) (0.048) (0.020) (0.19) (0.19) 
Factor K -0.35
*** -0.35*** -0.39*** 0.038 0.043 0.060** 0.053 -0.022 -0.015* -0.33*** -0.33*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.075) (0.036) (0.036) (0.022) (0.031) (0.017) (0.0070) (0.066) (0.067) 
Factor Al 0.24 0.24 0.32 -0.079 -0.083 -0.012 -0.073 -0.067 -0.0053 0.31
* 0.24 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.083) (0.082) (0.051) (0.071) (0.039) (0.016) (0.15) (0.16) 
Tariff 0.21 0.23 0.048 0.16 0.18 0.17 1.04*** -0.0045 -0.88*** 0.21 1.11*** 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.077) (0.027) (0.33) (0.33) 
Distance -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.42*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.037*** 0.020*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0081) (0.0033) (0.041) (0.042) 
PTA -0.13* -0.13* -0.16* 0.022 0.022 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.010* -0.15* -0.15* 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022) (0.011) (0.0046) (0.060) (0.062) 
WTO 0.071 0.060 0.039 0.032 0.021 -0.0035 0.022 0.035 0.0099 0.035 0.050 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.076) (0.038) (0.037) (0.023) (0.032) (0.018) (0.0077) (0.066) (0.068) 
Contiguity 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.036 0.034 -0.0040 0.028 0.040 0.0084 0.55*** 0.58*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.048) (0.048) (0.030) (0.043) (0.023) (0.0079) (0.12) (0.12) 
Com. lang. -0.028 -0.029 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 0.0020 -0.0073 -0.017 -0.0074 -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.083) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.014) (0.0052) (0.077) (0.078) 
Colony 0.20* 0.19* 0.27** -0.069 -0.079 -0.056* -0.074* -0.013 0.0056 0.21* 0.18* 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.10) (0.042) (0.042) (0.027) (0.037) (0.020) (0.0071) (0.092) (0.093) 
Same Ctry. -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 0.0096 0.0065 -0.017 0.00043 0.026 0.0092 -0.25 -0.24 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.069) (0.068) (0.042) (0.059) (0.033) (0.014) (0.15) (0.15) 
ADP -0.88** -0.87** -1.35 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.50 -0.051 -0.026 -0.83 -0.85* 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.98) (0.84) (0.86) (0.52) (0.74) (0.32) (0.12) (0.52) (0.37) 
SPS -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.065* 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.039*** 0.054*** 0.025*** 0.0095*** -0.026 -0.011 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0097) (0.013) (0.0066) (0.0026) (0.026) (0.027) 
TBT 0.0047 -0.0076 -0.035 0.040* 0.027 0.011 0.024 0.029*** 0.016*** -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0075) (0.0030) (0.026) (0.028) 
TBTSTC 0.089 0.056 0.12 -0.031 -0.063 -0.060 -0.033 0.029 0.0015 0.060 0.055 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.077) (0.11) (0.054) (0.019) (0.17) (0.18) 
SPSSTC 0.65*** 0.52** 0.47* 0.18 0.051 -0.038 0.11 0.22*** 0.070** 0.43** 0.45** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.069) (0.092) (0.055) (0.022) (0.15) (0.16) 
QNTM -0.20* -0.22* 0.18 -0.38*** -0.40*** -0.25*** -0.36*** -0.13*** -0.021* -0.066 -0.19 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.061) (0.061) (0.037) (0.054) (0.027) (0.0087) (0.098) (0.10) 
_cons -4.36** -3.96** 2.55 -6.91*** -6.52*** -3.38*** -6.09*** -3.53*** -0.82** -0.83 -3.14* 
 (1.48) (1.49) (1.62) (0.93) (0.96) (0.51) (0.73) (0.50) (0.29) (1.41) (1.45) 
N 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 39249 
R2 0.336 0.350 0.544 0.886 0.894 0.880 0.891 0.860 0.801 0.309 0.325 
adj. R2 0.330 0.344 0.539 0.885 0.893 0.879 0.890 0.859 0.799 0.303 0.319 
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4. Technical Barriers to Trade Notifications and Dispute 
Settlement within the WTO 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to verify to what extent and in which circumstances TBT 
notifications can serve as an early warning system for future disputes in the area of TBTs. From 
1995-2011, there were 45 requests for consultation under the Dispute Settlement (DS) Body of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to identify violations of the technical barriers to 
trade (TBT) agreement. The DS Body’s decisions regarding violations of the TBT agreement 
will be discussed in this paper. WTO members, in order to increase transparency in trade policy, 
have made efforts to compile data on notified TBTs. The WTO provides a TBT dataset that 
covers the Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) raised by its members. This paper attempts to find 
the linkages between DS cases citing the TBT agreement and the STC data. We will analyze, 
descriptively and econometrically, the relationship between raising TBT STCs and DS cases on 
TBTs. 
4.1. Introduction 
Eight Multilateral Rounds of Trade negations under the GATT contributed significantly to the 
reduction of import tariffs among World Trade Organization (WTO) members. However, non-
tariff measures (NTMs) have become relatively more important and have raised global 
attention. For example, the Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST)29 described NTMs as 
follows: “Non-tariff measures (NTMs) are policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, 
that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities 
traded, or prices or both.” (MAST, 2008).  
According to the latest classification by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) in 
February 2012, NTMs include 16 categories. The first and second categories are the most 
frequently notified by WTO members, which are sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, 
and technical barriers to trade (TBT). According to WITS, TBTs are “measures referring to 
technical regulations, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations 
and standards, excluding measures covered by the SPS Agreement.” 
The general aim of the TBT agreement, concluded during the Uruguay Round, is to ensure that 
technical regulations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. However, it is recognized that countries have the 
right to establish protection, at levels they consider appropriate, for example, for human, animal 
                                                 
29 The MAST group, as of July 2008, comprises of the following institutional members: the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Trade Centre 
UNCTAD/WTO (ITC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/TAD), the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Observers: the 
European Commission (EC), the United States International Trade Commission (USITC), and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). UNCTAD and the World Bank jointly coordinate the MAST group. The 
MAST group reports to the Group of Eminent Persons, which is convened by the director general of UNCTAD. 
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or plant life or for health or environmental protection. Countries should not be prevented from 
taking the necessary measures to ensure that those levels of protection are met. Therefore, the 
Agreement encourages countries to use international standards where these are appropriate, but 
it does not require them to change their levels of protection because of standardization.  
As of 31 December 2012, there have been 454 requests for consultations filed under the Dispute 
Settlement (DS) Understanding. Since 1995, the TBT agreement has been cited in 45 WTO 
disputes. This is about one tenth of all disputes, showing the real trade significance of TBTs. It 
is worth mentioning that in the majority of DS cases, multiple agreements are cited. However, 
according to the WTO report (2012)30, out of the 393 disputes relating to the trade of goods 
from 1995-2011, TBTs have been cited in 10.2% of them, which is the fifth agreement in terms 
of the number of citations.  
Thus, there have been 45 requests for consultations to the DS Body citing the TBT agreement. 
Most of these consultations have been requested because – according to the complainant - the 
imposed measures have been creating unnecessary obstacles to trade.  
Maskus et al. (2000) briefly analyzed DS requests from 1995-2000 citing TBT and SPS 
agreements. Their analysis focused on the new standards and regulations and their importance 
for international trade. There are already many studies analyzing the economic implications of 
some TBT and SPS measures. In some cases, the authors demonstrate the drastic disruption of 
trade flows resulting from the imposition of “legitimate” higher standards. For example, Otsuki 
et al. (2001) analyzed the impact of new EU safety aflatoxin standards on the importing of food 
products from Africa. Their analysis showed that this new regulation decreased the health risk 
by 1.4 deaths per billion a year, while it reduced imports from African countries by 64%, i.e. 
about 670 million US dollars. The authors argue that this substance rarely causes death in 
developed countries. They did not find any conclusive scientific evidence for the relationship 
between aflatoxicosis and the amount of aflatoxin intake. Their main perception of this more 
rigorous EU regulation was that the costs imposed on developing countries were much higher 
than the benefits in the EU. 
Aisbett and Pearson (2012) present another interpretation of TBT and SPS measures. In an 
empirical analysis, they demonstrated that countries imposing SPS regulations are acting in 
good faith. They showed that a smaller tariff-binding overhang causes a higher probability of 
the imposition of new SPS measures. Moreover, they argue, based on econometric results, that 
high environmental standards, healthcare, and institutional governance qualities are the main 
factors affecting the imposition of SPS. While other countries facing NTMs perceive them as a 
protectionism measure, the imposing country is actually imposing them in good faith to protect 
human health, safety, and other environmental qualities. 
The issue of complementarity or substitutability between tariffs and NTMs has been 
emphasized in the literature. Ray (1981) found a causal relationship from tariffs to NTMs in 
the US, meaning that NTMs are supplements for tariffs. Yu (2000) provided a theoretical 
framework to show the substitutability of NTMs for tariffs. Kono (2006) showed that most 
                                                 
30 Table C.4 of the report, page 111. 
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democratic countries try to implement opaque and complex NTMs, instead of simple tariffs, in 
order to hide their policies from the public. Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) confirmed the 
substitutability of tariffs with antidumping measures. They found that tariff reductions after the 
WTO agreement, from 1995-2004, increased the likelihood of usage of antidumping protection 
by governments. Moreover, their results suggested that a reduction of tariffs increased the 
number of petitions for this NTM measure filed by WTO member states. The results of Moore 
and Zanardi (2011) suggested the substitution of antidumping for tariff reductions only in the 
developing countries that have become heavy users of this NTM measure. 
A literature review on standardization effects was done by Swann (2010). Based on many 
econometric studies, he argues that the use of international standards in a given country usually 
increases exports from and imports into that country. On the other hand, the use of national 
standards in a given country increases its exports, but the implications for imports into that 
country are less clear. In some cases, standards can facilitate imports, but in other cases, 
standards restrict such imports. In the case of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, 
national standards are more likely to restrict imports; especially those from developing 
countries. The complex nature of TBTs does not always allow one to find the true motivation 
behind their implementation. Despite the declared, official motivation and consequent trade 
effects of TBTs, it is not always possible to prove whether or not they are in accordance with 
the TBT agreement. Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2012) also reviewed the political and 
economic literature on standards. They exclusively categorized standards as barriers or catalysts 
to trade: barriers in the sense that some regulations might root from the special interest groups 
protecting domestic industries and causing trade prohibitions; and catalysts to trade pursuing 
the protection of consumers within a society, or reducing the information costs of the market, 
affecting trade positively. However, it is not yet evidently possible to distinguish between these 
two motives through the opaque nature of TBT and SPS. 
Recent efforts by international organizations to provide databases on these measures have 
improved the transparency of NTMs. Santana and Jackson (2012) reviewed the inventories and 
instruments to identify the issues affecting trade such as NTMs. They found GATT and WTO 
disputes as proxies of NTMs in order to forecast their future impositions. The Specific Trade 
Concern (STC) database, compiled by the WTO secretariat, is one of the most important 
instruments in increasing trade policy transparency.  
In this chapter, we will analyze the STC database and will try to find a possible relationship 
between the DSs held on TBTs and STCs. In particular, we will verify whether or not TBT 
notifications can serve as an early warning system for future disputes involving the TBT 
agreement. The structure of this paper is as follows: in the next section, we will elaborate on 
the importance of transparency issues in WTO agreements. In the third section, a detailed 
description of TBT and STC data will be provided. The fourth section describes the relationship 
between the DSs and the TBT data. In the fifth section, we will provide an econometric analysis 
to find the linkages between raised TBT STCs and DS cases citing the TBT agreement. Finally, 
in the fifth section, the conclusions will be presented. 
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4.2. Transparency in the imposition of TBT 
The Preamble to the TBT agreement states: "no country should be prevented from taking 
measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal, 
and plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the 
levels it considers appropriate.” However, “Members shall ensure that technical regulations are 
not prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary 
obstacles to trade.” (Article 2.2).31 Therefore, flexibility in introducing restrictive TBT 
measures is - in principle - limited. Technical standards are often introduced to protect the 
interests of consumers (for health, safety or environmental reasons etc.), but they can also 
restrict the volume of international trade, as foreign suppliers might not be able to comply with 
the country’s regulatory framework. Such restrictions on foreign competition may decrease 
welfare by allowing domestic firms to charge higher prices and by reducing the volume of trade.  
In principle, unnecessary obstacles to trade can result when (i) a regulation is more restrictive 
than necessary to achieve a given policy objective, or (ii) when it does not fulfill a legitimate 
objective. A regulation is more restrictive than necessary when the objective pursued can be 
achieved through alternative measures, which have less trade-restricting effects, taking into 
account the risks non-fulfillment of the objective would create.32 The obligation to avoid 
unnecessary obstacles to trade also applies to conformity assessment procedures (Article 5.1.2). 
An unnecessary obstacle to trade could result from stricter or more time-consuming procedures 
than are necessary to assess that a product complies with the domestic laws and regulations of 
the importing country.  
There can be three main arguments for the imposition of regulatory measures. Firstly, TBT can 
serve as an instrument of public policy aiming at the protection of human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment. Secondly, from an economic point of view, 
TBT might focus on the increase of social welfare, in the case of market failures, without the 
implementation of discriminations in trade. For instance, mandatory labelling of products, a 
sub-category of TBT, will provide better information to consumers and other suppliers in the 
market, which can improve the efficiency of the market. Consequently, this will lead to a rise 
in social welfare, while it might incur some costs to the supplier facing the regulation. Thirdly, 
a TBT measure can be caused by a political economy motivation, i.e., it can create an 
unnecessary obstacle to trade in order to protect special domestic interest groups, and 
potentially reduce social welfare. The first two reasons are expressions of good faith by 
governments and are accepted by the TBT agreement. The last approach hampers trade and 
violates the articles of TBT, SPS, and other agreements made by the WTO.  
In developed countries, almost all tariff lines are bound within the schedules of concessions and 
duties and cannot be raised to increase the level of protection. On the other hand, higher 
technical standards can be implemented, and in this manner, they might protect the domestic 
industry capable of meeting higher standards, relative to foreign industries. However, 
                                                 
31 The results of the Uruguay Round (1994), the TBT agreement, page 139. All other citations of the TBT 
agreement come from the same source. 
32 Articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. 
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sometimes it is difficult to find out whether or not a given TBT is in line with the TBT 
agreement. In other words, neither the aims of the TBT declared by the imposing governments, 
nor its trade effects, can provide a conclusive legal judgment. It is worth adding that according 
to WTO regulations, governments should be transparent in all of the trade policies that they 
impose. It can happen that governments might satisfy the special interest of lobbying groups by 
concealing the protectionist policy instruments behind TBTs. In order to realize the trade 
discriminative characteristics of these policies, thorough analyzes should be carried out.  
Asymmetric information is one of the major causes of market imperfections. According to 
Geraats (2002), transparency decreases the asymmetry of information in the market. Thus, the 
efficiency of the international market can also be increased due to the symmetry of information. 
TBT and SPS Agreements explicitly require a high level of transparency and require that 
member states shall set up “enquiry points” providing information on technical regulations. 
WTO Members should also notify any new technical regulation, standards, and conformity 
assessment procedures to the WTO Secretariat. They should also inform the Secretariat about 
any international agreements involving these issues. The number of relevant notifications is 
several hundred each year, and about 25% of them are conducted by the European Union.  
The TBT agreement explicitly encourages Members to use existing “international standards or 
relevant parts of them” for their national regulations, unless "their use would be ineffective or 
inappropriate" to fulfill a given policy objective. Technical regulations, in accordance with 
relevant international standards, “shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary 
obstacle to international trade” (Article 2.5). Similar provisions apply to conformity assessment 
procedures: international guides or recommendations issued by international standardizing 
bodies, are to be used in national procedures for conformity assessment unless they are 
"inappropriate for the Members concerned, inter alia, such reasons as national security 
requirements, … protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or 
protection of the environment, … fundamental technological or infrastructural problems"33. 
Thus, the concept of transparency is well defined in the TBT agreement and is one of the key 
principles governing the WTO system34. “WTO agreements also include multiple provisions 
aimed at improving the transparency of policy measures affecting trade. These provisions can 
be grouped into the following four categories: (a) publication requirements; (b) notification 
requirements; (c) the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the monitoring reports; (d) the 
possibility of raising specific trade concerns (STC) in the SPS and TBT committees and in the 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM).”35 These provisions increase the transparency of TBTs 
maintained by member states. However, governments pursuing political economy goals, aimed 
at supporting interest groups, can be reluctant to notify new measures. In such cases, WTO 
regulations allow member states to raise specific trade concerns on the measures maintained by 
                                                 
33 Article 5.4. 
34 The concept of transparency can have many attributes when applied to policy measures. According to Geraats 
(2002), transparency should be completed by the following steps: 1- ensuring the openness of policy; 2- references 
to economic, scientific, and technical aspects; 3- procedural and implementation transparencies; 4- publications 
and notifications of policy. In general, articles of GATT and TBT agreements oblige members to carry out all of 
these steps for the imposition of NTMs. 
35 World Trade Report 2012, page 96. 
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other countries. For example, exporters facing new obstacles to trade usually inform their 
government and ask for support within the framework of the WTO. Thus, even if a TBT 
measure is notified by a WTO member, other countries can raise concerns on those TBTs. In 
fact, STCs for TBT are a subset of all TBTs maintained by all WTO members. The WTO has - 
in order to increase transparency - constructed a database on STCs of TBTs and SPSs. The STC 
features are presented in the next section. 
4.3. Technical issues of the TBT dataset of STC 
The WTO, World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) have recently combined their efforts to compile data on NTMs, and especially on 
TBTs and SPSs. This dataset should help governments and industries to be informed about 
measures applied to international markets and, thus, should increase transparency and reduce 
market imperfections. 
WTO members can discuss issues related to specific measures imposed by other members at 
the meetings of the TBT and SPS committees. The STCs are “reverse notifications” that inform 
the WTO secretariat about other members’ “concerns” regarding notified measures. The WTO 
Secretariat has compiled the data for all of the concerns related to TBT and SPS from 1995 to 
201136. We chose to focus our attention on the TBTs included in the TBT dataset of STCs. The 
data has been compiled from two sources: TBT Committee minutes that cover STCs and WTO 
notifications, which include all direct notifications made by imposing countries. When the 
information from both sources is not equivalent, the one from the TBT Committee’s minutes is 
preferred and included in the dataset. This data contains 12,426 observations37 for 31738 
notifications over various types of products (tariff lines at a two to six-digit level of the 
Harmonized System revision 2). All 317 STCs are treated as the first (original) source, and only 
251 of them are included in the WTO notifications (secondary source). In fact, for 66 cases, 
countries imposing TBT were reluctant to notify the WTO and their trade partners informed the 
WTO instead. Some data on products, where concerns were not raised but the measure was 
imposed, was not listed on the database. In other words, the STC data covers products where 
the concern was raised and not the products on which the TBTs were introduced. Therefore, it 
does not cover all TBT measures, but only those related to STCs. Thus, the TBTs imposed in 
line with the TBT agreement, and not creating unnecessary obstacles to trade, are presumably 
not included in the STC database.  
The number of observations for each STC can show how many products are covered by the 
notified TBT. This can be used as an indicator of TBT trade coverage. For example, the STC 
                                                 
36 The data is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr12_dataset_e.htm. 
37 Each observation refers to a row on the database, which represents the product in the focus of the STC raised by 
various countries (concerned ones) for a specific TBT imposed by another (maintaining) country. Each observation 
also covers different information such as the dates the STC was raised, notification numbers and symbols, the 
classification of the TBT, and some other descriptive issues from the minutes recording. 
38 The data shows 318 STCs, however, item 220 is missing from the data; thus, there exists only 317 STCs. Item 
number 220 also does not exist in the TBT Information Management System of the WTO. According to the 
description of the STC data, item 220 has been deleted because it was a duplication of item no. 219. 
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item number 88 includes a huge number of products. Under this STC, 1,424 observations cover 
178 chemicals and goods using chemicals products (at a four-digit level of HS2). Each product 
is in fact repeated 8 times and the main characteristics are the same, except for the STC 
notification type symbol and the notification number (provided by the WTO notification 
source). In other words, under this item, there are 8 STC symbols and 3 notification numbers 
for each product, and all the other things, like the TBT Committee minutes’ description, are 
similar. It means that, in this case, several countries raised concerns on the same measures 
several times. Thus, we have to bear in mind that, in this case, all of the concerned WTO 
members are listed in 8 separate observations, for each product. This is a serious disadvantage 
for the STC dataset as it repeats similar concerns (observations) from different sources, which 
makes the whole database artificially large and less suited for comparisons. We should also 
mention that different STC symbols and notification numbers can, in principle, be fitted into 
one observation of each product when all of the concerned members are also fitted into one 
observation. 
Table 4.1 – Sample of item number 88 of the STC data for product code 2801 
1 
2 3 4 5 






88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/52 40090 2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/52/Rev.1  2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 92925 2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297 93368 2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/333  2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/334  2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/335  2801 
88 G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and Add.1; 
G/TBT/N/EEC/297; G/TBT/N/EEC/333-6 
G/TBT/N/EEC/336  2801 
Correction G/TBT/N/EEC/52 and Adds.1-5; Add.3/Rev.1; G/TBT/N/EEC/295 and 





Source: STC database on TBT and own corrections in the last row. 
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Table 4.1 shows the example of item number 88 of the STC database. This item covers only 
Fluorine, chlorine, bromine and iodine products (HS code no. 2801) among the other 177 
products covered by item 88. Out of the 29 columns of STC data, only 5 columns have been 
presented in this table. As can be observed, three columns (i.e. Item No., STC Notif Type 
Symbol 2 and HS Code (Rev. 2)) are exactly the same, while there are only differences in the 
third and fourth columns. In fact, only two columns, out of all of the 29 columns in the STC 
data, are not similar. That is why there are 8 observations for one product in this item39. Because 
of this monotonous repetition, the STC data is not very well suited for economic analysis. 
However, if all of the data is corrected in a simple way, as it is shown in the sample of item 
number 88, the quality of the data can be higher, as each observation would only focus on the 
product on which the concern is raised. 
As was already mentioned, item no. 88 is one of the most important STCs as it covers a large 
number of products. Since 20 March 2003, concern about this item has been raised 29 times by 
34 countries. In this case, the European Communities are maintaining Regulation on the 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH). The main concerns for 
other WTO members on this item regard: discrimination, further information, clarification, 
international standards, text, rationale, legitimacy, special and differential treatment, technical 
assistance, time to adapt, reasonable intervals, transparency, and unnecessary barriers to trade. 
Table 4.2 shows the top 10 countries (and groups of countries) maintaining TBT for which 
STCs were raised by other members most frequently (the full list of countries can be found in 
the Appendix, table 7). Among 43 groups of countries with STC on TBTs, the leaders were the 
European Union (EU), including its 27 members, with 3138 observations covering 64 STCs, 
China with 1366 observations covering 39 STCs, and the United States with 1083 observations 
covering 35 STCs raised by others. According to the complete list (see the appendix), 
developing countries are at the bottom of the list. The World Trade Report (2012) comes to the 
same conclusion for countries raising concerns. Thus, developed countries are participating in 
the STC mechanism more frequently than developing countries in terms of maintaining or 
raising STCs. The econometric analysis in the 2012 Report shows that the trade coverage under 
these concerns is higher for developed countries rather than for developing ones. Moreover, the 
WTO Report states that developing countries are gradually increasing their participation in both 
activities. 
When analyzing the product coverage of STC, we shall note that “Undenatured ethyl alcohol 
of an alcoholic strength by volume of less than 80 % vol.; spirits, liqueurs and other spirituous 
beverages” (HS Code 2208), with 126 observations, is the most frequent STC in the dataset. 
Since there are many products at a four-digit level, below the aggregated products are studied 
at a two-digit level. 
                                                 
39 It is possible to simply correct the data and remove the duplications for such a problem as represented in table 
1. First, all of the different rows in the third and fourth columns can be summarized and fitted within one row (the 
same as what we have in the shaded row at the bottom of table 1). Then, duplicated rows (white rows) need to be 
removed, and finally, the last row with one observation will remain. 
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Table 4.2 – 10 top countries (groups of countries) - respondents of STCs raised by other 
members 








1 European Union 3138 64 6 Brazil 635 18 
2 China 1366 39 7 Japan 198 11 
3 United States 1083 35 8 Indonesia 613 10 
4 Korea, Republic of 698 25 9 Mexico 509 9 
5 India 642 18 10 Canada 177 9 
Source: Own calculations from the STC database. 
Table 4.3 shows the 10 most frequent products at a two-digit level of HS2 on which STCs were 
raised. The complete table, covering all of the products on which STCs were raised, is illustrated 
in table 8 of the appendix. The order of the numbering of the groups of products is according 
to the decreasing number of STCs and then the number of observations in the data. Beverages, 
Spirits and Vinegar products with code 22, at a two-digit level, are the most frequent products 
under the focus of STCs, which have been mentioned in the dataset 543 times. 
Table 4.3 – 10 most frequent products at a 2-digit of HS 2 level in the focus of STCs 
Rank Codes N. STC N. Obs. Rank Codes N. STC N. Obs. 
1 22 57 543 6 3 36 290 
2 85 41 428 7 21 34 224 
3 2 40 480 8 19 34 191 
4 84 40 291 9 16 34 188 
5 4 38 388 10 15 33 770 





Figure 4-1 – Trends of STCs and observations in the data raised by members 
 
Apart from product 22, it can be observed that food, beverages, and agricultural products are 
not the main issues concerning TBTs, but they make up the majority of the top 10 most frequent 
products in the focus of TBT STCs. The second product in Table 3, with the HS Code 85, 
includes “Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and 
reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories 
of such articles”. This shows that STCs are also maintained for technical reasons and not only 
for health and safety issues. HS-Codes 02, 03, 04, 15, 16, 19, 21 and 22 are food related products 
as mentioned in the STC data description. HS-Code 84 includes all of the products related to 
nuclear reactors, boilers, machineries, and some mechanical appliances. Thus, a broad variety 
of products representing high or low technology can raise concern from WTO members. 
However, as the bottom of the list in the appendix shows, agricultural products are more in the 
focus of TBT STCs. 
Figure 4-1 presents the trends of STCs (items) and the number of related observations (rows) 
for each year40. It reveals the upward trends of STCs during the periods 1995-1998, 1999-2002, 
and 2005-2009, while there were sudden or gradual decreases outside of these periods. In 
general, there was an increasing trend of concerns raised by WTO members. Trends in the 
number of observations demonstrate a similar pattern to the STC trends, but in some years, this 
pattern did not coincide. Thus, there is no clear correlation between STCs and the number of 
                                                 
40 It is worth mentioning that in the SPS STC data provided by the WTO, the dates that the STC cases were resolved 
were also mentioned, while there is no such information in the TBT STC database. Therefore, some STCs on TBT 
might have been resolved during those years, but it was not mentioned in the data. 
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observations, because of frequent repetitions in some STCs. However, despite the data 
misspecification that is due to multiple inclusions, STCs with a large number of observations 
in the data can cover a great number of products. This can mean that STCs with great coverage 
of products have bigger effects on trade. 
According to Figure 4-1, there was a sudden increase in the number of STCs and observations 
after 2008. The recent financial crisis encouraged some governments to impose new NTMs for 
“emergency” reasons. These TBTs with a large coverage seem to have a protectionist 
motivation behind them. They can effectively influence imports and they are called 
“emergency” measures according to the World Trade Report (2012)41. In fact, during the recent 
financial crisis, some governments were probably tempted to impose NTMs such as TBTs to 
help their domestic enterprises. 
4.4. Descriptive Analysis on the Linkages between Dispute Settlements and 
STCs 
A dispute at the WTO starts when a government of a member state believes that another member 
is violating one of the WTO agreements. The complaining member must identify the violated 
agreements and request consultation within the DSM. If consultations do not solve the problem, 
a Member state will request that a panel be set up. Since 1995, 45 cases have cited the TBT 
agreement in their request for consultation42. In this section, we will analyze these disputes and 
the linkages between them and the TBTs included in the STC. 
Table 4.4 – Summaries of DS cases based on their respondents 
Respondent Cases Resolved 
Matched 
STCs 
Cited TBT Art. Average Length Max Length 
EU Countries 20 14 11 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 4.6 14.6 
USA 11 11 7 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14 4.4 14.6 
Argentina 4 2 1 2, 2.2, 5, 12 2.4 2.6 
South Korea 4 4 4 2, 5, 6 3 6.2 
Australia 3 0 3 2.1, 2.2 - - 
Mexico 2 1 0 1, 2, 5 2.7 2.7 
India 1 0 1 2 - - 




Source: WTO website and the STC database on TBT.  
                                                 
41 Page 80 of the report. 




Table 4.4 shows the summary of disputes in which the TBT agreement was cited. The disputes 
were geographically concentrated. Since 1995, only seven groups of countries have been the 
respondent of forty-five cases of DS, citing violation of the TBT agreement. The European 
Union (and its 27 members of the WTO), more frequently than any other countries, was the 
respondent to DSs, 20 times in total. It has already been shown that EU countries were 
maintaining 64 STCs raised by others, which was the highest record among all members. While 
China was the second largest country in terms of maintaining TBT STCs, no one requested 
consultation against China in DSs. Thus, measures maintained by the Chinese government 
raised STC but did not seemingly violate TBT agreements and provoked no action regarding 
DS. In fact, the TBT measures implemented by China might have been imposed in good faith 
and there might have been justifiable motivations behind them.43 
The United States of America is the second highest respondent for DSs totaling 11 cases. South 
Korea is the fourth country in terms of the imposition of STCs on TBT, and the fourth member 
respondent for violation of the TBT agreement (four cases). Argentina, Australia, Mexico, and 
India are the rest of the WTO members responding to violations of the TBT agreement within 
the DSM. Among all of these 7 groups of countries, Australia maintained the lowest number of 
TBT STCs in the data. 
4.4.1. Matching DS cases with the TBT data 
Figure 4-2 shows the trend of raised STCs in bars and that of DS cases in the marked line. 
Before 1999, these two trends were moving in opposite directions. From 1995-1999, the number 
of new STCs was gradually increasing, while DS cases were decreasing to zero. In 1999, 2004, 
2005, 2006, and 2011, there were no requests for consultation within the DSM citing the TBT 
agreement. From 1999 until 2011, these two trends followed almost similar patterns. Santana 
and Jackson (2012) stated that the number of DS cases citing TBT agreements decreased along 
with all other DS cases during 1995-2011. In order to find the possible explanations of these 
patterns, the linkages between STCs and DSs on TBT will be analyzed in this subsection. 
 
                                                 
43 There might be some reasons explaining this situation: firstly, because China implemented TBT measures on 
real grounds and on a non-discriminative basis that have had no impact on trade flows; secondly, because China 
is a very competitive country in the international market, the measures imposed have had no visible effect on 




Figure 4-2 – Trends of DSs and TBT STCs 
 
 
The STCs raised and the DSs initiated do not follow similar patterns during 1995-1998. Some 
of the DS cases have no “equivalents” in the STC database on TBT. Several explanations are 
possible: Firstly, the dates on which DS cases have been requested are mostly different from 
those of the related STCs being raised. In some cases, STCs (e.g. DS144) were raised on a later 
date; Secondly, a reason for the trends’ disparity can be that sometimes an STC is equivalently 
referring to multiple cases of DS (e.g. item number 304 is related to DS434, DS435, and 
DS441); Thirdly, sometimes, a reverse case can also be observed when a special case of DS 
refers to multiple items of STCs (e.g. DS135 is related to items number 12, 22, and 25); 
Fourthly, some TBT cases of DS are not included in the TBT data but are included in the SPS 
data (e.g. DS5 and DS20 are related to item number 1 of the SPS STC data; DS3 and DS41 are 
mentioned in item number 2 of that data); Fifthly, there are many disputes (18 cases) that have 
not been found in the data or in the online TBT Information Management System of the WTO. 
They might not have been included in the data or have been suspended afterwards because the 
complainants have withdrawn their requests (e.g. DS72, DS210, and DS232).  
Some TBT complaints in DS cases have been rejected by the DS findings, which mean that 
there was not sufficient evidence of violations of the TBT agreement. In many cases, the TBT 
agreement has been cited in addition to some other agreements. Obviously, only after the final 
acceptance of the Panel and the Appellate bodies’ reports is it possible to conclude whether or 
not the TBT Agreement was violated. For instance, in DS56, the United States requested 
consultation with Argentina citing, inter alia, Article 2 of the TBT agreement. The Panel found 
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violations of Article II and VIII of the GATT44 but did not find violations of the TBT agreement. 
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings. Thus, the citation of the TBT agreement in 
one’s request for a panel does not mean that there was a violation of the TBT Agreement.  
According to Table 4.4, it is observed that more than two thirds of all cases have been resolved 
so far. Almost two thirds of these cases have been found in the STC data on TBT. Article 2 of 
the TBT agreement has been the most frequently cited among all of the articles of the 
agreement. The second column to the left shows the average time between the date of the 
consultation request and the date of the report’s acceptance. It took about 4.14 years on average 
for disputes to be resolved. The last column of this table shows the maximum duration between 
the consultation request and the case resolution. According to this data, it took a long time to 
solve the cases in which the EU and the USA were involved; with some cases taking more than 
14 years. 
4.4.2. Time consuming procedures within the DSM 
A lengthy dispute procedure from the request for consultation until the DS resolution can be 
costly. Firstly, there are the costs for the complainant countries that are exporting to the 
countries imposing TBT measures (the costs of decreased exports). For instance, Canada 
requested consultation with the United States in December 2008 (DS384) concerning certain 
mandatory country of origin labelling (COOL) provisions. “Meat of swine, fresh or chilled—
carcasses and half carcasses” with HS code “020311” was one the products covered by this 
dispute.45 During the procedures, exportation of this product from Canada to the USA dropped 
from 13.68 million USD in 2007 to 5.12 million USD in 2008, and finally to 3,000 USD in 
201246. After the findings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the USA made a commitment 
to implement the rulings until May 2013. Thus, until the date of the dispute resolution, there 
were significant costs incurred by Canadian exporters of swine meat. 
Secondly, long lasting consultations impose a high cost to the DSB analyzing the case. For 
example, in the extreme case of DS144, the dispute took more than 14 years to be completed; 
an apparently similar case to DS384, in which violations of Article 2.1 of the TBT agreement 
were concluded by the DSB. During this time, the US was discriminating against products 
imported from Canada in comparison to similar domestic products, incurring high costs on trade 
for Canada, as well as the costs of the expertize and analysis within the DSB. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement provides the timetable for the dispute settlement mechanism. 
According to the schedule, from the time a case is requested for consultation, it should not take 
more than one year until the Panel’s report becomes a ruling. If one side appeals, it should not 
take more than three months for the ruling of the Appellate Body (AB). However, the DSM 
                                                 
44 According to the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds56_e.htm, the 
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s report with some modifications including that: “The Panel found that the 
minimum specific duties imposed by Argentina on textiles and apparel are inconsistent with the requirements of 
Article II of GATT, and that the statistical tax of three per cent ad valorem imposed by Argentina on imports is 
inconsistent with the requirements of Article VIII of GATT.” 
45 According to the matched item in the TBT STC data, item number 91. 
46 This data is collected from UN COMTRADE, available at: http://comtrade.un.org/. 
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Agreement has some flexibility and countries can resolve cases themselves through 
consultations at any stage. 
Table 4.5 – TBT DS cases and their total duration until their final resolution 
DS conclusion No. DSs DS Cases Comments 
In consultation without 
panel 
8 137, 203, 233, 263, 
279, 435, 441, 446 
 
In consultation but 
seems resolved 
6 3, 41, 61, 100, 134, 
144 
DS3 and DS41 are resolved without panel establishment 
after more than 5 years (according to the STC database on 
SPS). DS61 seems to be resolved after about 5 years with 
DS58 (according to the WTO website47). DS100 seems to 
be resolved with related cases like DS384 and DS386 after 
more than 14 years since its request. DS134 seems to be 
resolved after more than 3 years with DS210. DS144 seems 
to be resolved after more than 14 years along with the 
related cases DS384 and DS386. 
In consultation after 
panel establishment 




panel before 1 year 
3 5, 20, 85  
Withdrawn after 1 to 2 
years by request 
5 7, 12, 14, 151, 210 DS7, DS12, and DS14 have been resolved by mutual 
agreements before the Panel’s reports. DS7’s mutual 
agreement took less than one year after the request was 
made. 
Cases that last from 2 to 
3 years 
10 72, 77, 232, 290, 2, 4, 
56, 135, 231, 206 
DS72, DS77, and DS232 were withdrawn before the 
Panel’s reports. DS290 was concluded by the Panel’s 
report. The rest of the cases have been concluded by the 
Appellate’s report. 
Cases that last from 3 to 
5 years 
4 291, 381, 384, 386 DS291 was resolved by the Panel’s report after more than 3 
years. The rest of the cases were resolved by the Appellate’s 
findings after more than three years, but the adaptation 
would take place after more than 4 years. 
Cases that last from 5 to 
7 years 
2 292, 293 These cases reached mutual agreements after more than 6 
years, but the Panel’s report was circulated about 3 years 
after the requests were made. 
Cases that last from 13 
to 15 years 
2 26, 48 DS26 and DS48 reached mutual agreements after more than 
13 and 14 years respectively, but the Appellate reports were 
circulated after 2 and one and a half years respectively after 
the requests were made. 
Source: WTO website and own analysis. 
Table 4.5 shows disputes with the total duration until the final resolutions of the cases. There 
are still 8 DS cases in consultation without the establishment of a panel body. The second row 
                                                 
47 Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds61_e.htm. 
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of this table shows the cases that, according to the WTO website, are still in consultation, but 
according to a deeper analysis, they seem to have been resolved. As it is explained in the 
comment column, all of these six cases took too long to be resolved48. Of course, long lasting 
consultations usually mean that both sides of the conflict are trying to reach an agreement and 
the nature of the WTO rules violation is not obvious49. The last five rows show that there are 
also many DS cases with procedures lasting for more than one year. In some of these cases, the 
duration for adopting DSB findings was very long. For instance, the last row shows two cases 
responded to by the EU in which the Appellate Body circulated its findings within less than 2 
years of the request being made, and the implementation of the Appellate ruling took more than 
12 years. 
Thus, it appears that the DSM is working less expeditiously in comparison to the provisions in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement. There are only two DS cases (DS4 and DS2) leading to the 
Appellate Body’s findings concluded within 15 months of the first request for consultation. The 
Appellate Body circulated its findings for 5 cases between 15 and 24 months after the date that 
the request had been made, among which, two of them, (DS26 and DS48), have been finally 
implemented about 14 years after the date of request. The rest of the Appellate Body’s findings 
were circulated more than about 3 years after the first requests for consultation. It is worth 
mentioning that in addition to the significant costs incurred by the complainant countries due 
to TBTs, there are important costs incurred by the WTO Secretariat assisting DS bodies and 
carrying out detailed analyzes. 
In 28 of the 45 requests for consultation, citing the TBT agreement, the complaining countries 
requested the establishment of a panel. For 25 of them, the panels were established and for 19 
of them, the panels circulated their reports. After the Panel’s reports, 8 cases were concluded 
by mutual agreement between the parties. 11 other cases led to the establishment of the 
Appellate Body because one of the parties appealed certain issues in the Panel’s report. The 
Appellate Body has already provided its findings for all 11 cases listed in the reports50. 
Afterwards, the parties reached mutual agreements.  
Table 4.6 shows the violations of WTO agreements confirmed by the final findings of the Panel 
and AB’s reports. When the procedure is sent to the Appellate Body after the Panel report, the 
final conclusions of the AB should be adopted by the parties of the DSB, and not the Panel 
report. Cases in the left column have been found in the STC database on TBT. Only five out of 
the 19 cases analyzed by the Panel and/or the AB have been proven as violations of the TBT 
agreement. Thus, among 45 DS cases citing the TBT Agreement, only 11% (5 out of 45) of 
them have been TBT violations. All five cases were concluded by the Appellate Body. These 
simple statistics demonstrate how complicated the evaluations of TBT measures can be. DS231 
covers only 3 observations, DS381 covers 13 observations, DS384 covers 28 observations, 
DS386 covers 34 observations, and DS406 covers only 1 observation from the TBT STC data. 
Even though the scope of trade flows covered by the disputes includes a limited number of 
                                                 
48 It seems that these cases are resolved thanks to analysis of the linkages between the TBT and SPS datasets. 
49 It is worth mentioning that on the WTO website there is no updated information for these old cases. 
50 As mentioned earlier, DS100 did not lead to the establishment of a panel, but it seems that it is a similar case to 
DS384 that was concluded by the Appellate findings. 
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products, these DS cases were important for the exporters of goods on which the TBT measures 
were imposed. 
4.4.3. Panel and Appellate Bodies’ Reports 
Table 4.6 – Violated Articles Approved by the Panel or the Appellate Body 
DS Respondent Concluded Violated Art. DS Respondent Concluded Violated Art. 
406 USA 2.1, 2.9.2, 2.12 TBT 72 EU Withdrawal of Request 
386 USA 2.1 TBT 56 Argentina II, and VIII of GATT 
384 USA 2.1 TBT 48 EU 3.3, and 5.1 of SPS 
381 USA 2.2 TBT 26 EU 3.3, and 5.1 of SPS 
293 EU 
Annex C(1)(a), 8, 5.1, 5.5, 
and 2.2 of SPS 
14 EU Withdrawal of Request 
292 EU 
Annex C(1)(a), 8, 5.1, 5.5, 
and 2.2 of SPS 
12 EU Withdrawal of Request 
291 EU 
Annex C(1)(a), 8, 5.1, 5.5, 
and 2.2 SPS 
7 EU Withdrawal of Request 
290 EU 
Annex C(1)(a), 8, 5.1, 5.5, 
and 2.2 SPS 
4 US III:4 of GATT 
231 EU 2.4 TBT 2 US III:4 of GATT 
135 EU III:4 GATT    
Note: The shaded areas are the cases concluded by the Panel and the white areas are the ones concluded by the Appellate 
Body. 
Source: WTO website. 
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the key provisions of the GATT/WTO system and 
is included in the National Clause (Article III of the GATT). Its equivalent in the TBT 
agreement is Article 2.1 that states: “members shall ensure that in respect of technical 
regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment 
no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country.” When it is proved that Article 2.1 has been violated, it should 
be clarified whether or not the policy measure was introduced to pursue protection of domestic 
industries rather than protection of human health, safety, animal or plant life, or the 
environment, i.e. in accordance with WTO regulations. However, clear conclusions on this 
issue have been presented in only four cases out of the 45 DS requests. 
For example, in the case of DS406, the AB’s report stated that the US violated articles 2.9.2 
and 2.12 of the TBT agreement. It concludes that the imposition of the TBT measure by the US 
government violated transparency requirements. In order to maintain transparency, the DS body 
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recommended that the US implement the Appellate Body’s report. In addition to the above-
mentioned four cases in which Article 2.1 was violated, there have been 14 other requests for 
consultation under Article 2.1 of the TBT agreement. The Panel has analyzed four of them51 
and found no violation of the TBT agreement. Ten other cases have not been submitted to the 
Panel or the Appellate Body’s analyzes in order to find whether they were violations of this 
article. Seven of these cases are still in consultation and three others were mutually agreed 
before the submission of the Panel report. In the case of DS231, the Appellate Body found that 
TBTs maintained by the EU were inconsistent with Article 2.4 and recommended that the 
measures be brought into conformity with the EC’s obligations under this article. Thus, despite 
many arguments presented in the economic literature, there are only a few cases in which a 
violation of the non-discrimination principle was found by the DSM reports. 
4.5. Econometric Analysis of the Linkages between Dispute Settlements 
and STCs 
As discussed in the previous section, we have found few direct linkages between the raised TBT 
STCs and DS cases citing the TBT agreement. In this section, we will use econometrics to find 
evidence of such linkages. In other words, we will analyze the impact of TBT STCs on the 
occurrence of DS cases citing the TBT agreement. To achieve this goal, we will use an 
unbalanced panel database gathered from three data sources encompassing all WTO members 
from 1995-2011. We will consider the following equation to be estimated: 
𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜗𝑗 + 𝛿ℎ
+ 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 
(4.1) 
where the dependent variable 𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 is the number of DS cases responded to by the reporter 
country i that is complained about by country (or third parties) j on product h at a 2-digit level 
of HS at time t. This variable is gathered from the WTO website covering all DS cases citing 
the TBT agreement during 1995-2011. This variable is a count variable that takes discrete 
values. Most of the DS cases are addressing a group of products that are correspondingly 
matched with HS rev. 2. The maximum value of this variable in the sample is 2, referring to 
DS3, which was responded to by the Republic of Korea, and to DS cases 290 and 291, which 
were responded to by the EU52.  
𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 is the TBT STC on product h maintained by the reporter country i raised by partner 
country j at time t, which is obtained from the database provided by the WTO secretariat.  
SM refers to the share of product imports from the partner country relative to the total imports 
of that product. In the majority of the requests for consultation within the DSM, the complainant 
                                                 
51 DS290, DS291, DS292, DS293. 
52 There are some DS cases such as DS291, DS292, and DS293, for which only the complainant countries are 
different, while they are also third parties in the two other cases. Hence, such DS cases are considered in our 
analysis as one unique DS case. Therefore, the maximum value of the DS variable is 2, meaning that for DS290 
and DS291 (DS292 and DS293) two cases exist responded to by the EU for a specific product in 2003. 
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and third party countries are motivated to make their requests due to the significant share of 
their exports within the total import of the respondent country. Therefore, we expect to find a 
positive relationship between this variable and the occurrence of a DS case. The data on bilateral 
imports of products is obtained from the WITS website53. 
T stands for the average tariff imposed by the reporter country on all subcategories of a 2-digit 
level of Harmonized System products imported from the partner country. Most favored nation 
(MFN) applied tariff rates are considered in the analysis obtained from WITS54.  
Regulations imposed within TBT notifications are usually permanent rules affecting trade 
during the long run. A similar hypothesis can be argued for tariff rates. Besides, the share of 
imports, or being a major exporter to a country in a previous year, can be a motivation for a 
request for consultation. Therefore, in our analysis, we also consider the lag of these three 
variables in separate specifications. 
The trade policy of a large country can have more significant implications than that of a small 
country. Obstacles imposed by TBT regulations at the focus of a DS case can draw more 
attention if the maintaining importer country is a large country. On the other hand, controlling 
for trade shares (SM variable), a small country that has fewer trade partners and faces a 
restrictive TBT regulation, can be more affected than a large country. Therefore, a small country 
is potentially more vulnerable to an unnecessary obstacle and more motivated to initiate a 
dispute. In order to control for the size of both trade partners, we include the real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the two countries. The data for GDP is collected from the World 
Development Indicator database provided by the World Bank55. 
In the above estimation equation, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜗𝑗 , 𝛿ℎ, and 𝜇𝑡 are, respectively, the possible reporter, 
partner, product, and time fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 is the error term. The database used is from 
unbalanced panel data. Since the dependent variable is count discrete data, we apply Maximum 
Likelihood Poisson regression to achieve unbiased results. Moreover, due to the heterogeneity 
of the countries and products, there are possible fixed effect problems and heteroskedasticity 
within the error term. To control for these issues, we use a Fixed Effect (FE) robust Poisson 
estimator to attain the most consistent unbiased regressions. Besides, the efficiency and 
consistency of the FE estimator is tested using the Hausman test. It is important to mention that 
FE Poisson regression will drop some observations from the dataset if no variation within the 
dependent variable is detected during the period. Firstly, single observations within each group 
of individual (i.e. product-paired-country) are dropped. Secondly, if there are no changes of the 
dependent variable within a specific group during the period, the group will be completely 
dropped. This omission of a variable is consistent with the econometric specification of the 
Poisson FE method, giving robust results. However, the estimation of the pooled Poisson 
regression will be presented in the appendix as a robustness check. In the following sub-section, 
the results of the regressions will be discussed. 
                                                 
53 Can be found at: https://wits.worldbank.org/. 
54 Preferential tariff rates and Effectively Applied rates have also been tested giving similar results. 
55 Can be found at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
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4.5.1. Estimation Results 
Table 4.7 represents the FE Poisson regression results of the model. Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) 
is presented as the estimated coefficients of the variables. Thus, a coefficient bigger than one 
indicates the positive impact of the given variable on the dependent variable, and a coefficient 
smaller than one indicates a negative impact. As it is observed within all of the specifications, 
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between disputes and current TBT STCs. 
From the second column to the left, we can state that, given that other variables are constant in 
the model, a new TBT STC raised by a partner country on a TBT imposed by a reporter country 
on a specific product is expected to increase the probability of a DS case being requested by the 
partner on the given product by about 1.142 times. However, TBT STCs raised in the previous 
year (TBT STCt-1) are statistically significant but decrease the probability of an occurrence of 
such a DS case, holding the current TBT STCs and other variables constant. Although current 
TBT STCs have strong positive influence on DS requests to the WTO, previous TBT STCs act 
in the opposite direction.  
The possible explanation of these results can be as follows. Usually, TBT regulations are of a 
long lasting nature. The significant effects of regulations are generally observed instantly after 
their imposition. After a period of time, producers can adjust the characteristics of their products 
to meet new regulations and can continue their participation in the foreign market. This means 
that a TBT STC that is raised in a previous year does not cause the same problems that it had 
provoked in the beginning. As Swann (2010) demonstrated in his literature review, the 
implementation of standards, increasing market transparency, can have a positive impact on 
trade flows in the long run. Therefore, it is very likely that TBT STC, existing after some period 
of time, would decrease the “demand” for consultation, as the producers and countries facing 
those TBTs have already complied with those standards. Overall, we can state that our analysis 
confirms the hypothesis that the imposition of new TBT STCs can act as an early warning for 
future DS cases. 
Share of imports is statistically significant at a 10% level but only in one specification including 
only TBT STC. This suggests that a major exporter is not evidently more eager to request 
consultation within the DSM than a smaller exporter is. Hence, increasing the share of imports 
from a trade partner will not increase – in a statistically significant way - the probability of a 
trade partner filing a case. 
As discussed earlier, there is a possible substitutability between tariffs and NTMs. In our 
specifications ((3) to (5)), we control for both of them. The results show a statistically 
significant positive relationship between current tariffs and the occurrence of a TBT DS case. 
Since the tariffs contained in the schedules of concessions are bound for WTO members, one 
can argue that a one-unit drop in the tariff on a product, would decrease the probability of an 
occurrence of a DS case citing the TBT agreement on the given product by a factor of about 
0.9656, holding other variables constant. Probably, this means that decreasing tariffs are treated 
as a signal of trade liberalization, while countries only request for consultation when they 







believe that the TBT agreement has been violated by the imposition of unnecessary obstacles 
to trade. Thus, such a positive relationship between tariffs and the requests for consultation is 
quite in line with the economic literature.   
Table 4.7 – FE Poisson Regression Results (IRR) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
TBT STC t 1.182** 1.183** 1.182** 1.152* 1.142* 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.085) 
      
TBT STC t-1 0.491*** 0.490*** 0.492*** 0.485*** 0.485*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
      
SM t  14.21* 11.18 11.08 14.76 
  (22.3) (18.6) (18.1) (24.5) 
      
SM t-1  0.679 0.598 0.633 0.779 
  (0.96) (0.87) (0.92) (1.14) 
      
T t   1.025 1.039** 1.039** 
   (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
T t-1   0.985*** 0.990 0.990 
   (0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0072) 
      
Y it    39.69*** 34.83*** 
    (19.4) (17.3) 
      
Y jt     0.468** 
     (0.17) 
      
N 31413 31413 31413 31413 31413 
AIC 6673.4 6684.7 6666.1 6629.3 6631.5 
BIC 6690.1 6768.3 6716.2 6721.2 6756.8 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exponentiated coefficients reported indicate Incidence-Rate Ratios (IRR) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
      
As discussed earlier, the real GDP of the reporter and the partner country has the expected 
influence on the occurrence of DS cases. The bigger the reporter country is, the higher the 
effects will be of its policy instruments on international trade. The statistically significant 
coefficient of the real GDP of the reporter suggests that a 1% increase in the real GDP of that 
country is expected to increase the probability of that country being a respondent for a DS case 
by about 34 times. On the other hand, the statistically significant coefficient of the partner’s 
real GDP suggests that the smaller the trade partner is, the higher the probability of that country 
being a complainant by about 2.13 times. A smaller country is more vulnerable than a larger 
country to the prohibitive trade policies of a given country. 
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4.6. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we present a summary of the STC database on TBT. The newly created STC 
database is a useful tool in increasing information on TBT measures and reducing the 
asymmetry of information. It has been mentioned that the STC data on TBT has several 
potential weaknesses resulting from the duplication of observations. In order to improve the 
data for analytical analysis, we suggest the deletion of multiple observations within one STC 
item.  
The descriptive analysis of linkages between DS cases and the STC database on TBT measures 
was based on matching information from both sources. Out of 45 requests for consultation in 
the DSM for violation of the TBT agreement, 27 cases were found in the STC data as well; 
among which four cases were found in the SPS STC database. There are 19 cases in the TBT 
STC database that are related to 23 disputes. The probable reasons for the dissimilarity between 
the trends of the STCs and the initiated disputes on TBT have been discussed in the paper. Gaps 
between the dates of the raised concerns on TBT and the requested cases in the DSM, multiple 
cases of DS relating to one STC, and multiple items of STC relating to one DS case, are 
probably the main reasons for such dissimilarities.  
According to the citations in the DS cases, in the Panel’s and the Appellate Body’s reports, 
article 2 of the TBT agreement was the most frequently violated article in all cases. In 16 cases, 
Article 2.1 of the TBT agreement was cited and it was the main issue of some the Appellate 
Body’s reports. In fact, discriminative aspects of the TBTs imposed by some governments have 
led to complaints by other members, leading to requests for consultation. Even though all WTO 
members demand transparency in trade policies, some TBTs are still having discriminatory 
effects in international trade. The European Communities and the United States of America are 
maintaining most of the STCs on TBT and they are the respondent for most of the DS cases. In 
45 cases of disputes citing the TBT agreement, the DS body has proved in its findings that EU 
members have violated the TBT agreement once and violated other WTO agreements 8 times. 
We also showed that the USA has violated the TBT agreement four times and other WTO 
agreements twice. While China is the second placed country for maintaining TBT STCs, there 
have been no consultations requested against this country under the DSM regime. Nevertheless, 
the EU as the first and the US as the third placed country imposing TBT STCs have responded 
to the largest numbers of DS cases citing the TBT agreement. It is worth mentioning that 
countries raising STCs are mostly quite reluctant to initiate cases in the DSM in order to 
maintain frictionless multilateral trade with their partners. In other words, WTO members 
usually prefer using bilateral and multilateral negotiations under the TBT Committee rather 
than rapidly starting costly disputes. 
Thus, based on a simple descriptive analysis, we find no genuine evidence that STCs provide a 
good foresight for future disputes on TBTs. However, the econometric analysis allows us to 
draw more precise conclusions. We provided econometric evidence linking the current raising 
of STCs on TBT and the request for consultation citing the TBT agreement. In other words, at 
present, an increase in TBT STCs increases the probability of raising a request for consultation 
citing the TBT agreement within the DSM. Nevertheless, past STC TBT does decrease this 
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probability, since producers have already had time to adapt their products to new TBT 
regulations. 
Thus, we believe that trade economists should analyze both sources, i.e., STCs and disputes, in 
order to find out whether TBT measures are creating “unnecessary” barriers to trade. Moreover, 
an increase in the number of TBT STCs should be interpreted as a warning signal for new, 
costly, and long-lasting disputes within the WTO system. These TBT measures can create 
significant trade distortions if they discriminate between domestic and foreign suppliers, and 





Table 4.8 – Countries (groups of countries) respondents of STCs raised by other members 








1 European Union 3138 64 23 Chile 174 2 
2 China 1366 39 24 Viet Nam 68 2 
3 United States 1083 35 25 Hong Kong, China 13 2 
4 Korea, Republic of 698 25 26 Moldova 8 2 
5 India 642 18 27 Norway 2 2 
6 Brazil 635 18 28 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Kuwait 
465 1 
7 Japan 198 11 29 Kuwait 247 1 
8 Indonesia 613 10 30 Tunisia 161 1 
9 Mexico 509 9 31 Ukraine 161 1 
10 Canada 177 9 32 Venezuela 44 1 
11 Colombia 78 8 33 Qatar 20 1 
12 Argentina 177 7 34 Kenya 17 1 
13 Thailand 29 6 35 Croatia 11 1 
14 Taipei, Chinese 399 5 36 Philippines 10 1 
15 South Africa 341 4 37 Switzerland 6 1 
16 Egypt 249 4 38 Australia 2 1 
17 Turkey 23 4 39 Uruguay 2 1 
18 Israel 12 4 40 Bahrain 1 1 
19 Malaysia 65 3 41 Jordan 1 1 
20 Peru 62 3 42 Saudi Arabia 1 1 
21 Ecuador 11 3 43 United Arab Emirates 1 1 
22 New Zealand 506 2     






Table 4.9 – Products at 2-digit HS 2 level in the focus of STCs 
Rank Codes N. STC N. Obs. Rank Codes N. STC N. Obs. Rank Codes N. STC N. Obs. 
1 22 57 543 28 29 12 511 55 50 6 42 
2 85 41 428 29 61 12 329 56 24 6 15 
3 2 40 480 30 95 12 68 57 34 5 72 
4 84 40 291 31 62 11 337 58 39 5 11 
5 4 38 388 32 63 11 164 59 25 5 10 
6 3 36 290 33 72 11 97 60 37 4 71 
7 21 34 224 34 30 11 93 61 70 4 30 
8 19 34 191 35 64 10 111 62 68 4 20 
9 16 34 188 36 69 10 47 63 96 4 5 
10 15 33 770 37 55 8 189 64 41 3 40 
11 8 32 523 38 58 8 91 65 71 3 23 
12 12 32 511 39 60 8 83 66 74 3 13 
13 7 31 519 40 65 8 45 67 48 3 11 
14 9 31 363 41 43 8 35 68 86 3 10 
15 20 31 326 42 32 7 167 69 6 3 8 
16 11 30 326 43 51 7 88 70 83 3 4 
17 10 30 291 44 54 7 78 71 91 2 22 
18 18 30 217 45 56 7 74 72 44 2 18 
19 33 29 279 46 52 7 73 73 75 2 16 
20 17 29 144 47 53 7 73 74 5 2 12 
21 87 26 223 48 31 7 67 75 82 2 11 
22 90 26 119 49 36 7 65 76 27 2 5 
23 94 18 32 50 42 7 42 77 76 2 2 
24 1 14 114 51 73 7 36 78 92 1 3 
25 40 14 100 52 57 7 35 79 26 1 2 
26 38 13 295 53 35 6 73 80 88 1 2 
27 28 12 578 54 59 6 66 81 23 1 1 
        82 Undefined 42 57 
Source: Own calculations from STC database 






5. Services trade liberalization in the transport sector 
Abstract: Transportation sectors play an important role in the economies of the advanced 
European economies. The aim of this chapter is to assess the degree of the trade liberalization 
and its impact on bilateral trade of rail transportation services. We estimate a gravity equation 
using bilateral trade data similar to those used in the analysis of merchandise trade. In order to 
do that, we provide an up-to date inventory of the currently available bilateral services trade 
data in rail transportation sub-sector. In our estimations, we include several auxiliary variables 
related to transport infrastructure as well as the volume of bilateral trade in goods. The estimated 
gravity model is then used to compute time varying tariff equivalents. In the absence of data 
regarding possible duties or tariffs imposed on services trade, computation of tariff equivalents 
such as proposed in the study can shed light on the level of liberalization. 
5.1. Introduction 
Modern economies are increasingly dominated by services, which cover a broad range of 
industries, encompassing ‘network industries’ such as electricity, natural gas and 
telecommunications, other ‘intermediate services’ such as transport, financial intermediation, 
distribution, construction and business services, and ‘final demand services’ such as education, 
health, recreation, environmental services, tourism and travel. Services for a long time were 
believed to be non-tradable, but technological changes have allowed an increasing number of 
services markets to be contested internationally through cross-border trade (mode 1) and 
commercial presence (mode 3).57 Economic theory emphasizes that countries can derive 
welfare gains from freer trade, and that the proposition applies to both goods and services. 
However, the types and forms of liberalization of services are quite different from those of 
liberalization of merchandise trade. Barriers to the flow of goods typically arise as customs and 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and hence for goods trade most discussion of liberalization focuses 
on tariffs and on NTBs. On the other hand, barriers to trade in services are typically regulatory 
in nature, and outcomes of services liberalization depend heavily on the regulatory 
environments. 
Recent research indicates that barriers to services trade in the world remain prevalent, and that 
service barriers in both high income and developing countries are higher than those for trade in 
goods. Policies are more liberal in OECD countries, Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
whereas most restrictive policies are observed in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and 
Asian countries. Overall pattern of policies across sectors is increasingly similar in developing 
                                                 
57 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) distinguishes between four modes of supplying services 
trade: cross border supply (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2), commercial presence (mode 3), and presence 
of natural persons (mode 4). While mode 1 refers to services supplied from the territory of one member into the 
territory of another, mode 2 consists of services supplied in the territory of one member to the consumers of 
another. On the other hand mode 3 refers to services supplied through any type of business or professional 
establishment of one member in the territory of another (foreign direct investment (FDI)), and mode 4 includes 
both independent service suppliers, and employees of the services supplier of another member (consultants). 
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and industrial countries. Whereas telecommunications and banking services are more 
competitive, transport and professional services remain bastions of protectionism.58  
Barriers to services trade lead to inefficiencies in service sectors and to high costs of services. 
Since the productivity and competitiveness of goods and services firms depend largely on 
access to low cost and high-quality producer services such as transportation, distribution, 
telecommunications, and finance, and since they have powerful influence on economic growth, 
it is of utmost importance to increase the efficiency of service industries, which can largely be 
achieved through liberalization of service industries.  
In principle, countries can choose to liberalize a service sector unilaterally and try to derive 
efficiency gains. Indeed, during the last two decades there has been significant unilateral 
liberalization in services by different countries driven by the prospects of large welfare gains. 
Many countries have taken action to increase competition on service markets by liberalizing 
FDI and privatizing state-owned or controlled service providers. However, unilateral 
liberalization may be constrained by the fact that a country cannot on its own gain-improved 
access to larger foreign markets. Second, a country may face difficulty in increasing 
competition. Finally, a country may lack the expertise and resources to devise and implement 
the appropriate domestic regulatory policies.  
In recent years, the number of regional trade agreements has increased significantly. Many 
provide free trade in goods but also include some measures to facilitate trade in services. Such 
agreements could lead to gains from liberalization of trade in services. Nevertheless, not much 
has been achieved in terms of actual liberalization with the exception of the European Union 
(EU) and a small number of agreements between high-income countries. On the other hand, 
multilateral negotiations on services began during the Uruguay Round, which culminated in the 
signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 1995. Article XIX GATS 
required members to launch new negotiations on services no later than 2000, and periodically 
thereafter. Initial negotiations were launched in 2000, which later became part of Doha. 
Between 2000 and the end of 2005, WTO members pursued a bilateral approach to negotiations, 
submitting request to others and responding to requests with offers. However, large 
asymmetries in interest across membership impeded progress. In 2006, WTO members 
launched an effort to complement the bilateral request offer process with a plurilateral or 
‘collective’ approach. This involved subsets of the WTO membership seeking to agree to a 
common ‘minimum’ set of policy commitments for a given sector. However, even with the new 
approach not much progress could be achieved until now.  
In order to design successful reform strategies it is crucial that the effects of economic 
liberalization be analyzed thoroughly. To do that, we first need to quantify the barriers to trade 
in services. The simplest and most-common approach to measuring the barriers to trade in 
services involves frequency measures developed by Hoekman (1995). A more elaborate 
restrictiveness measure than that of Hoekman has been constructed for different service 
industries by the Australian Productivity Commission (APC) in collaboration with the 
                                                 
58 See B. Gootiiz and A. Mattoo (2009). 
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University of Adelaide and the Australian National University. To develop these indices, the 
actual restrictions on trade in a service industry have been compiled from specifically designed 
questionnaires using a number of different sources. These restrictions were then assigned scores 
and grouped into categories, each of which is assigned a numeric weight. These scores and 
weights were based on subjective assessments of the costs of restrictions to economic 
efficiency. Finally, the sectoral tariff equivalents were computed using these scores and 
econometrically estimated relations between restrictiveness values and performance indicators 
such as the price of the service under consideration.59 Finally, we have the gravity approach 
developed by Francois and Hoekman (1999). 
In the following, we shall focus our attention on one specific transportation sector, namely the 
rail transportation sector. There are several reasons why the analysis of this specific sector is 
important to understand the implications of liberalization efforts. This sector has been and it 
still is nationalized in majority of European countries based on natural monopoly argument; 
and it is the sector in which network effects exist. The entry to this sector by independent 
operators has been severely limited by the infrastructure ownership. In the majority of European 
countries, the rail infrastructure has been owned by state rail undertakings (RUs). Although the 
EU has issued three packages of directives aiming at liberalization of the sector, there were 
large differences in the implementation of legislation among the EU Member States as revealed 
by a study conducted by IBM Consulting Services. The performance of the sector depends 
largely on the quality of rail infrastructure, and the sector faces strong competition from road 
transportation. However, the investments in rail transportation sector in Poland and in the 
majority of new member states of the EU have been far too small in relation to modernization 
and maintenance needs.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 focuses on the impact of liberalization of rail 
services. For this purpose, we use the gravity approach and the liberalization indices constructed 
by the IBM Consulting Services. Thereafter, in Section 2 we consider the gravity approach to 
calculate tariff equivalents in the rail sector. Finally, Section 3 concludes. 
5.2. The Impact of Institutional Liberalization on Rail Services’ Trade 
In this section, we analyze the impact of liberalization on the import of rail transport services. 
We check whether the liberalization introduced by the European countries has increased the 
trade of these services. This hypothesis will be tested in a standard gravity model using 
econometric techniques. The gravity model has been applied by Park (2002) to trade in services. 
Afterwards, several other authors have used this framework in a similar fashion. These include 
Grünfeld and Moxnes (2003), Lejour and de Paiva Verheijden (2003), Walsh (2006) or 
Marouani and Munro (2011). 
We applied the gravity model to all four categories of rail transport services, available in the 
Extended Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS). Thus, our econometric analysis will be 
                                                 




presented in four separate specifications for each category of rail transport services. In each 
specification, apart from standard gravity variables, four different liberalization indices will be 
included in a separate equation as follows: 
ln(𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡) =  𝑐 + 𝛾𝑟 + 𝜂𝑝 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐿𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐿𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑡
+ 𝛽4 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽5 ln(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝐺𝐷𝑃) + 𝛽5 ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑝) + 𝑍𝑟𝑝𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 
(5.1) 
where 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 is the import of rail transport service i from the partner country p to the reporter 
country r at time t. The term c is the intercept. 𝐿 is one of the liberalization indices. GDP is the 
nominal GDP in USD. The variable diff_GDP refers to the differences of the real GDP per 
capita in USD between the two countries. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑝 is the distance between the two partners in 
kilometres. In general, according to the gravity approach, the volume of trade is an increasing 
function of the economic potential trading partners (GDP) and a decreasing function of the 
distance between them. Z is a vector of some control variables as follows, used in the majority 
of studies based on gravity model. 
Contig, comlang_off, and colony are respectively referring to the contiguity, common official 
language, and common colonial history between the two trading partners. These variables are 
expected to increase bilateral trade between the two countries as they are reducing the costs 
associated with trade. ln_Inv and ln_Main that are respectively natural logarithms of rail 
infrastructure investment and maintenance in each partner country. Those variables, improving 
the quality of rail infrastructure, are expected to have positive effects on the trade of rail 
transport services. ln_Exrpt and ln_Imrpt are respectively total bilateral export and import of 
goods between the two partners in natural logarithm forms. Since freight transport is one of the 
possible means of goods transportation between European countries, it is expected that these 
variables should have positive impact on the import of rail transport services, especially on 
freight transport services. 
𝛾𝑟, 𝜂𝑝, and 𝜆𝑡 are respectively, reporter country, partner country and time fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 is 
the error term. Running normal OLS estimation for the above model produces biased results 
due to country specific and time fixed effects. Therefore, we used Fixed Effect (FE) and 
Random Effect (RE) estimators, where Hausman test suggests the efficiency and consistency 
of them to be chosen. We recall that geographical variables, that are time invariant are dropped 








Table 5.1 – Data Description 
Variable Description Source 
ln_Imirp Import of Transport Services – 
USD Millions 
TSDv8.7 database provided by Francois and 
Pindyuk (2013) 
Services flows (i): EBOPS Code 219: Rail transport  
 EBOPS Code 220: Passenger  
EBOPS Code 221: Freight  
EBOPS Code 222: Other 
ln_Inv Infrastructure Investment – EUR 
Millions 
International Transport Forum at the OECD 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/
statistics/investment/data.html) 
ln_Main Infrastructure Maintenance – EUR 
Millions 
International Transport Forum at the OECD: 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/
statistics/investment/data.html) 
rail_dens Rail lines (total route-km) divided by 
the Area of the country (sq. km) 
Own Calculations – Data fromWorld 
Development Indicator 
ln_diff_GDP Difference of GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 USD) between the 
two countries 
World Development Indicator 
ln_GDP GDP (current USD) World Development Indicator 
ln_Exrp Total Export from Reporter to 
Partner – Thousands USD 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
 - UN COMTRADE 
ln_Imrp Total Import to Reporter from 
Partner – Thousands USD 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) - 
UN COMTRADE 
ln_dist Distance between the two countries 
in km 
CEPII database 
Contig Contiguity of the two countries CEPII database 
comlang_off Common official language in the 
two countries 
CEPII database 
colony Colonial history of the two countries CEPII database 
ln_Access Access Liberalization Index (data 
exists for 2002, 2004, 2007, and 
2011. Interpolation for missing year 
during 2002-2010 is estimated) 
IBM, Global Business Services, Rail 
Liberalization Index 2011 
ln_COM COM Liberalization Index (data 
exists for 2002, 2004, 2007, and 
2011. Interpolation for missing year 
during 2002-2010 is estimated) 
IBM, Global Business Services, Rail 
Liberalization Index 2011 
ln_LEX LEX Liberalization Index (data 
exists for 2002, 2004, 2007, and 
2011. Interpolation for missing year 
during 2002-2010 is estimated) 
IBM, Global Business Services, Rail 
Liberalization Index 2011 
ln_OveralLib Overal Liberalization Index (data 
exists for 2002, 2004, 2007, and 
2011. Interpolation for missing year 
during 2002-2010 is estimated) 
IBM, Global Business Services, Rail 
Liberalization Index 2011 
The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel database during 2002-2010 for 27 European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and United Kingdom). Dependent variable, 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡, is obtained from TSDv8.7 database 
provided by Francois and Pindyuk (2013). Liberalization indices are collected from IBM, 
Global Business Services and we used interpolation for the missing years during 2002-2010. 
The detailed description of those indices has been presented in the previous section.  
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The first three control variables and Dist are geographical gravity variables gathered from 
CEPII60. Exrpt and Imrpt variables are provided by UN COMTRADE data collected from World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)61. Infrastructural variables are collected from International 
Transport Forum at the OECD62. The rest of the variables are collected from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank63. The following table represents 
the complete list of variables and data sources. 
5.2.1. Whole Rail Transport Services (BOP Code 219) 
Table 5.2 shows the estimation results for the Whole Rail Transport category (BOP: 219). The 
difference between the four equations is mainly inclusion of a different liberalization index in 
each of them. According to the Hausman test, all equations are preferred to be estimated using 
FE regression. Among all liberalization indices, only Access index for the partner country and 
LEX index for the reporter country has statistical positive significant coefficients (at 5% and 
10% levels of significance respectively). Thus, the improved access to the rail infrastructure of 
the exporters and legal liberalization of importer stimulates overall trade in rail services.  
Infrastructure investment in the railroads of the reporter country has no statistical significant 
effect on the import of rail services. Maintenance of railroads in the reporter countries 
statistically significantly decreases the import of rail transports. However, infrastructure 
investment and maintenance of the partner country increases the import of these services from 
the partner countries, according to almost all statistical significant positive coefficients. 
Railroad density in the reporter country has statistical negative significant coefficients in all 
equations, which suggests that the development of rail infrastructure is negatively related to 
imports of rail transport services. This result may stem from the fact that in some countries 
(such as Poland) due to a period of disinvestments in railway transport infrastructure, the quality 
of majority of railroads is low and cannot be used for international freight or passenger 
transportation, while due to other factors imports of rail trade services went up. However, 
railroad density in the partner country has no statistical significant impact on the export of rail 
transports. 
Differences in real GDP of both partners and nominal GDP of both countries have no impact 
on imports of all rail transport services according to almost no statistical significant coefficients. 
Export of goods from reporter to the partner country is significantly increasing the import of 
rail transport services. This suggests a country increasing the exportation of goods to a partner 
for about 1 percent, increases the demand for rail transport services by about 0.3 percent from 
the partner. Surprisingly, the estimated parameter on the imports of goods is not only 
statistically insignificant, but also it is roughly half of the size of the export coefficient. This 
                                                 
60 Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales and Can be found at: 
http://www.cepii.com/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
61 Can be found at: https://wits.worldbank.org/ 
62 Can be found at: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/statistics/investment/data.html 
63 Can be found at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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suggests that merchandise exports create extra demand for foreign rail services, while they do 
not boost the exporting country rail sector exports. 
Table 5.2 – Regressions of Whole Rail Transport (219) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of Estimation FE FE FE FE 
Dependent: Imirp Imirp Imirp Imirp 
ln_Invr -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.088 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
ln_Mainr -0.19** -0.17** -0.19** -0.19** 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
ln_Invp 0.24** 0.21* 0.31*** 0.24** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
ln_Mainp 0.13 0.16** 0.14* 0.14* 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) 
rail_densr -48.1** -47.5** -52.4*** -49.0** 
 (19.4) (19.5) (19.7) (19.4) 
rail_densp 19.4 18.6 17.4 16.2 
 (19.3) (19.3) (19.5) (19.3) 
ln_diff_GDP -0.15 -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) 
ln_GDPr -0.65 -0.26 -1.12** -0.80 
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.52) (0.51) 
ln_GDPp -0.15 0.25 0.26 -0.13 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.52) (0.51) 
ln_Exrp 0.30* 0.29* 0.27* 0.30* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
ln_Imrp 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.14 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) 
ln_Accessr 0.16    
 (0.21)    
ln_Accessp 0.37*    
 (0.21)    
ln_COMr  -0.22   
  (0.21)   
ln_COMp  -0.053   
  (0.22)   
ln_LEXr   0.68**  
   (0.31)  
ln_LEXp   0.091  
   (0.32)  
ln_OveralLibr    0.33 
    (0.26) 
ln_OveralLibp    0.38 
    (0.27) 
Constant 14.4 -0.98 14.8 16.6* 
 (9.60) (9.18) (10.1) (9.95) 
Observations 1022 1022 983 1022 
R2 0.046 0.043 0.056 0.047 
AIC 2259.1 2263.2 2163.5 2258.6 
BIC 2328.1 2332.3 2231.9 2327.6 
Hausman Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





5.2.2. Rail Passenger Transport Services (BOP Code 220) 
Table 5.3 shows the estimation results for the Rail Passenger Transport category (BOP: 220). 
According to the Hausman test, only specification (7) is preferred to be estimated using FE 
regression and others are better to be estimated using RE. Among all liberalization indices, only 
LEX index for the reporter country has statistical positive significant coefficient.  
Infrastructure investment and maintenance for both countries has statistically insignificant 
coefficients in all four specifications, which suggests no relationship between these variables 
and import of rail passenger transport services. 
Railroad density in the reporter country has statistical negative significant coefficients in three 
of the equations. Moreover, railroad density in the partner country has no statistical significant 
coefficients in any of the equations. Again, this estimation implies the same possible problem 
as stated above for the whole rail transport services. 
Differences in real GDP of both partners and nominal GDP of reporter country have no specific 
relationship with the import of rail passenger transport services. Nevertheless, nominal GDP of 
the partner country has statistical significant positive coefficients in all columns of this table. 
Since nominal GDP is a proxy for potential market of the partner economy, we argue that the 
bigger the partner market is, the bigger will be the export of rail passenger transport services 
from that country. In fact, in three RE estimations the coefficients are about 0.61 that correspond 
to elasticity. Thus, we can observe that a 1% increase in the nominal GDP of the partner country 
will increase the export of rail passenger services to the reporter country by about 0.61 percent. 
Export and import of goods between the two partners have no relationship with the import of 
rail passenger transport. This result is not surprising because one can argue that export and 
import of goods are related to freight rather than passenger transports. 
Contiguity and common official languages between the two partners can increase the trade of 
rail passenger transports in the FE specifications. The positive impact of common border is very 
strong. It is not surprising, given the fact that rail operational systems are not fully compatible 
among European countries. 
Statistical significant negative coefficients for distance variable in all RE regressions suggest 
that import of rail services are also decreasing functions of the distance between the two 
partners. This result is in line with the standard gravity model. In fact, one can argue that 
passenger travel for longer distances are preferred by air transports rather than rail transports, 
and that is the reason for the negative relationship observed here. Colonial history of the two 
countries has received no statistical significant coefficients. It is important to note that these 







Table 5.3 – Regression of Rail Passenger Transport 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Type of Estimation RE RE FE RE 
Dependent: Imirp Imirp Imirp Imirp 
ln_Invr 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.14 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) 
ln_Mainr 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 
 (0.081) (0.083) (0.13) (0.082) 
ln_Invp 0.10 0.034 0.091 0.10 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.15) 
ln_Main_p -0.099 -0.070 -0.084 -0.10 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.16) (0.092) 
rail_densr -8.66* -9.09* -40.0 -8.59* 
 (5.14) (5.16) (32.6) (5.13) 
rail_densp 4.18 4.61 7.46 4.24 
 (5.28) (5.32) (34.5) (5.28) 
ln_diff_GDP -0.11 -0.12 0.034 -0.11 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.26) (0.10) 
ln_GDPr 0.19 0.13 -1.11 0.20 
 (0.28) (0.28) (1.15) (0.28) 
ln_GDP_p 0.61** 0.62** 2.18* 0.61** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (1.13) (0.27) 
ln_Exrp 0.28 0.24 -0.56 0.28 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.51) (0.22) 
ln_Imrp 0.017 0.044 -0.39 0.017 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.41) (0.22) 
contig 0.98** 0.98**  0.99** 
 (0.39) (0.39)  (0.39) 
comlang_off 1.71*** 1.77***  1.70*** 
 (0.58) (0.58)  (0.58) 
colony -0.77 -0.78  -0.76 
 (0.57) (0.57)  (0.57) 
ln_dist -0.00078* -0.00079*  -0.00078* 
 (0.00041) (0.00041)  (0.00041) 
ln_Accessr -0.13    
 (0.26)    
ln_Accessp -0.021    
 (0.29)    
ln_COMr  -0.14   
  (0.23)   
ln_COMp  0.33   
  (0.23)   
ln_LEXr   1.18*  
   (0.70)  
ln_LEXp   0.67  
   (0.64)  
ln_OveralLibr    -0.18 
    (0.34) 
ln_OveralLibp    -0.045 
    (0.35) 
Constant -25.4*** -25.9*** -27.9 -25.3*** 
 (8.68) (8.72) (21.7) (8.66) 
Observations 443 443 428 443 
R2   0.090  
AIC . . 1088.3 . 
BIC . . 1145.2 . 
Hausman Test 0.159 0.079 0.006 0.086 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5.2.3. Rail Freight Transport Services (BOP Code 221) 
Table 5.4 – Regression of Rail Freight Transport 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Type of Estimation FE FE FE FE 
Dependent: Imirp Imirp Imirp Imirp 
ln_Invr -0.15 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
ln_Mainr -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) 
ln_Invp 0.18 0.11 0.23* 0.17 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
ln_Mainp 0.036 0.044 0.049 0.043 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) 
rail_densr -41.6* -45.1** -39.1* -39.5* 
 (22.9) (22.7) (23.0) (22.9) 
rail_densp -16.6 -14.5 -15.5 -18.3 
 (21.1) (21.0) (21.1) (21.1) 
ln_diff_GDP 0.055 0.058 -0.037 0.058 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
ln_GDPr 0.58 0.82 0.35 0.51 
 (0.52) (0.50) (0.54) (0.53) 
ln_GDPp -1.17** -1.39** -0.91 -1.04* 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.56) (0.55) 
ln_Exrp 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.26 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
ln_Imrp 0.39* 0.42** 0.38* 0.38* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
ln_Accessr 0.070    
 (0.23)    
ln_Accessp 0.084    
 (0.24)    
ln_COMr  -0.30   
  (0.24)   
ln_COMp  0.46*   
  (0.24)   
ln_LEXr   0.68*  
   (0.37)  
ln_LEXp   -0.70*  
   (0.38)  
ln_OveralLibr    0.25 
    (0.30) 
ln_OveralLibp    -0.16 
    (0.31) 
Constant 9.59 9.08 10.3 8.35 
 (10.5) (10.3) (11.0) (10.8) 
Observations 851 851 826 851 
R2 0.041 0.047 0.051 0.042 
AIC 1832.0 1826.3 1764.8 1831.2 
BIC 1898.4 1892.7 1830.8 1897.6 
Hausman Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 5.4 shows the estimation results for the Rail Freight Transport category (BOP: 221). 
According to the Hausman test, all specifications are preferred to be estimated using FE 
regression. Among all liberalization indices, LEX index for the reporter country has statistical 
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positive significant coefficient. On the other hand, the same index for the partner country 
receives negative significant coefficient. 
Similar to the results for rail passenger transport, infrastructure investment and maintenance for 
both countries are not statistically significant in all four equations. Similar to almost all previous 
regressions, railroad density in the reporter country has statistical negative significant 
coefficients in all of the specifications in the below table, and railroad density in the partner 
country has no statistical significant coefficients in any of the specifications.  
Similar to the regressions over the whole rail transports, export of goods has no significant 
relationship with the import of freight transports, while import of goods significantly increases 
the import of freight transport services. The last result is in line with standard expectations. 
5.2.4. Other Rail Transport Services (BOP Code 222) 
Table 5.5 shows the estimation results for Other Rail Transport category (BOP: 222). According 
to the Hausman test, specifications (14) and (15) are preferred to be estimated using FE 
technique, while specifications (13) and (16) are better to be estimated with RE regression. 
Among all liberalization indices, only LEX index for the reporter country has a statistically 
positive significant coefficient. This result in addition to previous results cannot considerably 
determine a clear relationship between liberalization efforts and other rail transports. 
Similar to the results for rail passenger and rail freight transports, infrastructure investment and 
maintenance variables for partner country have no statistical significant coefficients in all four 
specifications. However, investment in rail infrastructures of the reporter country statistically 
significantly decreases the import of other rail transports according to the RE regression results. 
Maintenance of the railroads in the reporter country increases the import of these services given 
the RE estimation results.  
Similar to previous regressions, railroad density in the reporter country has statistical negative 
significant coefficients in the two RE regressions. We already tried to interpret this non-intuitive 
result. Railroad density in the partner country receives statistically significant coefficient in 
specification (15) only. 
The same as regressions over rail passenger and freight transports, differences in real GDP of 
both partners have no specific relationship with the import of other rail transport services. 
However, unlike those last regressions, nominal GDP of the reporter country has statistical 
significant positive coefficients in three columns of the following table. Similar to the whole 
rail transports, nominal GDP of the partner country has no statistically significant influence on 
the import of other rail transports.  
Export and Import of goods have no significant relationship with the import of other transports. 
Among geographical CEPII variables, only contiguity receives statistically significant positive 
coefficients in the two RE regressions, which can be interpreted similarly to the results obtained 
in rail freight transports. 
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Table 5.5 – Regression of Other Rail Transport 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Type of Estimation RE FE FE RE 
Dependent: Imirp Imirp Imirp Imirp 
ln_Invr -0.38** -0.39 -0.27 -0.38** 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.24) (0.19) 
ln_Mainr 0.21* 0.13 0.095 0.21* 
 (0.11) (0.18) (0.17) (0.11) 
ln_Invp 0.18 0.11 0.29 0.19 
 (0.22) (0.29) (0.28) (0.22) 
ln_Mainp -0.046 0.11 0.080 -0.045 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.21) (0.12) 
rail_densr -11.5* 9.78 29.1 -11.2* 
 (6.50) (50.2) (48.9) (6.51) 
rail_densp -5.62 -73.8 -80.5* -5.78 
 (6.49) (45.3) (44.6) (6.49) 
ln_diff_GDP 0.089 -0.10 -0.078 0.093 
 (0.14) (0.27) (0.26) (0.14) 
ln_GDPr 0.79** 2.62** 1.25 0.76** 
 (0.36) (1.30) (1.29) (0.36) 
ln_GDPp -0.18 0.72 0.048 -0.20 
 (0.38) (1.39) (1.41) (0.38) 
ln_Exrp 0.28 -0.73 -0.55 0.26 
 (0.35) (0.73) (0.71) (0.35) 
ln_Imrp 0.36 -0.75 -0.76 0.38 
 (0.35) (0.77) (0.76) (0.35) 
contig 1.70***   1.71*** 
 (0.56)   (0.56) 
comlang_off -1.85   -1.84 
 (1.61)   (1.61) 
colony -0.60   -0.60 
 (0.91)   (0.91) 
ln_dist -0.00088   -0.00086 
 (0.00057)   (0.00057) 
ln_Accessr -0.23    
 (0.39)    
ln_Accessp -0.080    
 (0.40)    
ln_COMr  -0.24   
  (0.50)   
ln_COMp  0.61   
  (0.53)   
ln_LEXr   2.24**  
   (0.90)  
ln_LEXp   0.36  
   (0.85)  
ln_OveralLibr    -0.10 
    (0.53) 
ln_OveralLibp    -0.10 
    (0.53) 
Constant -23.1** -63.5** -30.1 -22.5** 
 (11.3) (29.8) (31.5) (11.3) 
Observations 319 319 319 319 
R2  0.082 0.109  
AIC . 862.5 853.2 . 
BIC . 915.2 905.9 . 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5.2.5. Overview of the results 
In the above subsections, we analyzed the determinants of bilateral trade in rail services. We 
included four indices of market liberalization in rail transport services as the explanatory 
variables of the regressions.  
Among all of these indices, only the First Level Liberalization Index (LEX) in the reporter 
(importing) country received significant positive coefficients in all regressions. This index 
shows the existing legal framework (law in the books). In other words it describes what are the 
legal requirements for market entry and to what extent does a regulatory authority support 
external Railway Undertakings (RU). These results suggest that more liberalized legal 
framework indeed helps imports (trade) of rail services. However, our study did not reveal a 
clear relationship between remaining liberalization indices and trade in rail transport services. 
5.3. Quantification of Restrictiveness of Policy in the Rail Transportation 
Sector Using the Gravity Approach 
While measuring the possible impact of trade liberalization in specific services trade sectors it 
is essential to control for changes in the liberalization level. This can be done by introducing 
specific liberalization indices as explanatory variables into the econometric model, just as in 
the study presented in the previous section. However, one of the main drawbacks of such 
approach is that majority of indices that could be implemented in similar studies is available 
only for specific years. In the example presented above the IBM, Global Business Services Rail 
Liberalization Indices were available only for years: 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011. There is no 
continuity over time, which may significantly hinder the reliability of such variables in the 
context of panel data studies.   
Another possible approach to assess trade liberalization is to infer the level of liberalization 
from the actual trade flows and compare them to the reference trade flows generated from the 
theoretical, frictionless model of trade. Such an approach has been analyzed and discussed in 
various studies, including Park (2002), Francois (2005) and Walsh (2006). In this section, we 
estimate tariff equivalents in imports of rail transportation services and analyze them over time 
to assess the degree of trade liberalization in the period under consideration. Moreover, it will 
be analyzed whether or not the liberalization efforts led to clear reduction of those estimated 
equivalents.  
Following the suppositions of the model applied by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it is 
assumed that products are differentiated by country of origin and that there are trade costs to 










The nominal bilateral services trade flow from partner country p to reporter country r (𝑥𝑟𝑝) is 
related to the exporting and importing countries’ GDP (𝑌𝑝 and 𝑌𝑟 respectively) where 𝑃𝑟 denotes 
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the price index in country r, 𝜑 represents the exporter’s price index which according to Park 
(2002) is a suitable proxy for Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) multilateral resistance terms, 
and σ is the elasticity of substitution between sources of imports (Armington elasticity). The 
bilateral trade costs influencing the trade flow between a pair of countries is denominated as 
𝜏𝑟𝑝. If σ>1, then a higher trade barrier will negatively influence the volume of trade. 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) assumed existence of symmetrical trade costs between pairs of 
countries, i.e. they assumed 𝜏𝑟𝑝 = 𝜏𝑝𝑟. Nevertheless, in this paper, following Park (2002) it is 
assumed that a country has single trade barrier imposed on all trade partners, i.e. 𝜏𝑟𝑘 = 𝜏𝑘. 
These trade costs, following the assumptions introduced by Bergstrand (1985) and Anderson 
Wincoop (2003), consist of two components, which are the bilateral distance between the two 





where 𝑘𝑟𝑝 equals 0 if r equals p, which indicates that they are the same country in which case no 
additional tariff to trade is present and 𝜌 represents the extent to which distance affects trade. The trade 
barrier t equals 1 plus the country r’s tariff equivalent.  
The empirical problem in this case is associated with measuring the barriers to trade in services 
(tr), which cannot be directly observed. Following Park (2002) an indirect method of computing 
this term is applied. In order to specify the significance of this term, it is required to compare 
the observable, empirical trade flows with the hypothetical trade value that should take place 
under assumption of frictionless conditions to trade. The difference between the two values 
should indicate the level of existing trade barriers that causes distortion of empirical trade flows 
as compared to theoretical predictions.  
In order to capture the information on most probable expected trade flows, it is necessary to 
identify a set of variables that combined constitute a reliable gravity model. The variables 
should enable controlling for specific aspects of rail transportation services, such as the 
development of rail infrastructure and a country level demand for such services. Additional 
binary variables describing the impact of common language and other regional characteristics 
influencing the propensity to trade between a pair of countries should also be included in the 
analysis. However, under assumption of fixed effects model, their impact will be assessed by 
the assumption of existence of fixed effects among pairs of countries. Consequently, the final 
equation might be written as: 
ln 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑝
+ 𝛽4 ln(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) + 𝛾1𝑍𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 
(5.4) 
where 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 is the import of rail transport service i by reporter country r from the partner 
country p at time t, c refers to the intercept term,  GDPrt represents the nominal GDP in year t 
of country r (or p respectively) measured in US Dollars, diff_GDPt  determines the difference 
of real GDP per capita in US Dollars between the two countries,  distrp defines the distance 
between the two partners in kilometers, and  Z is a vector of control variables. 
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In order to evaluate the possible impact of volume of goods trade as a source of demand on rail 
transportation services flows between a pair of countries, the data on the value of imported 
goods (Imrp) was included in the study. The development of physical infrastructure was 
captured by information concerning the density of rail infrastructure measured as total lines 
divided by the area of the country. Additionally it was aimed to capture information on the 
country-specific demand on rail transport services by introduction of variables describing total 
number of rail passengers and total value of goods transported by rail in a given country. 
Table 5.6 – Data description 
Variable Description Source 
ln_Imirp Import of Transport Services – 
USD Millions 
TSDv8.7database provided by Francois 
and Pindyuk (2013) 
 Service i (EBOPS Code 219): Total Rail transport  
ln_Inv Infrastructure Investment – EUR 
Millions 
International Transport Forum at the 
OECD (can be found at: 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.or
g/statistics/investment/data.html) 
ln_rail_dens Rail lines (total route-km) 
divided by the Area of the 
country (sq. km) 
Own Calculations – Data from World 
Development Indicator 
ln_passengers Railways, passengers carried 
(mln passenger) 
Own Calculations – Data from World 
Development Indicator 
ln_freight Railways, goods transported 
(mln ton km) 
Data from World Development Indicator 
ln_diff_GDP Difference of GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 USD) between 
the two countries 
World Development Indicator 
ln_GDP GDP (current USD) World Development Indicator 
ln_Imrp Total Import of goods to 
Reporter from Partner – 
Thousands USD 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) - 
UN COMTRADE 
ln_distcap Distance between the capital 
cities of the two countries in km 
CEPII database 
Contig Contiguity of the two countries CEPII database 
comlang_off Common official language in the 
two countries 
CEPII database 
The time period for which the analysis was conducted is restricted to years from 2003 to 2010 
due to limited data availability. It is both due to constricted data on bilateral trade flows of 
services and due to lacking of continuous data on transport infrastructure. Consequently, the 
presented analysis is based on an unbalanced panel database for 29 countries, mostly European. 
The analysis is based on the same database as the study presented in the first part of the chapter. 
Therefore, the dependent variable 𝐼𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 is obtained from TSDv8.7 database provided by 
Francois and Pindyuk (2013). The control variables describing the time-invariant relations 
between country pairs and geographical gravity variables were gathered from CEPII64. Imrp is 
UN COMTRADE data collected from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)65. 
Infrastructural variables are collected from International Transport Forum at the OECD66. The 
                                                 
64 Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales and Can be found at: 
http://www.cepii.com/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
65 Can be found at: https://wits.worldbank.org/ 
66 Can be found at: http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/statistics/investment/data.html 
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rest of the variables are collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by 
the World Bank67. Table 4.6 presents the complete data description. 
Table 5.7 presents the coefficient estimates and their significance under assumption of 
occurrence random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) among pairs of countries. The conducted 
Hausman test for the study suggests that the preferable model in this case should be the fixed 
effects model.  
Due to the fact, that information on the total number of passengers carried by rail transport 
proved to be insignificant under fixed effects model, and the removal of these variables, both 
with the respect to the importing as well as to the exporting country, did not cause a major 
change in the value of adjusted R-squared, they were omitted in the final study. 
The estimated variables of the gravity model are in majority of cases in line with the 
expectations. The positive impact of contiguity and negative impact of distance has been 
expected. The positive impact of trade in goods on rail freight has also been expected. Finally, 
the GDP level had, at least in some specifications, positive impact of rail transportation.  
The correct estimation of proper set of variables enabling construction of a reliable gravity 
model is essential for further analysis aimed at estimating the tariff equivalents for rail 
transportation services. The knowledge of the variables enables conduction of series of analyzes 
focused on predicting the most probable trade flows.  
In order to obtain the estimates for tariff equivalents some constraints have to be imposed on 
the above equation: The sum of residuals 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 for a given importing country in a given year 
should be equal to 0 and the sum of all residuals for a given year must also be equal to 0.  
Following Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Park (2002) we assume that the residual 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑝𝑡 is 
defined as the difference in log values of actual and predicted export value from country p to 
country r. The difference between the total predicted value of country imports and total 
observed import flows are assumed to indicate the level of distortion to trade caused by 
existence of trade barriers. The absolute differences should be then normalized relative to a 
benchmark free-trade country case, where the trade volume is least distorted. Then the relative 
trade barrier (tr) in transportation services sector i for a given country in a given year can be 
measured on the basis of the following relation: 









The indices a, p and b represent the actual, predicted and benchmark trade volumes. The σ is 
the elasticity of substitution between sources of imports (Armington elasticity) of a given 
service. 𝑋𝑟
𝑎 is then the country r’s observable value of imports. Countries for which the total 
difference between the actual and predicted value of imports is negative and has greatest 
absolute value are assumed to be most restrictive. The most liberalized country in the sample, 
that is the country with greatest actual trade volumes relative to the predicted values, is the 
                                                 
67 Can be found at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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Great Britain in the year 2007. Therefore, it was regarded as the benchmark country in further 
analysis. 
Table 5.7 – Gravity model estimation results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES RE FE RE FE 
ln_Imrp 0.352*** 0.152 0.384*** 0.131 
 (0.0852) (0.132) (0.0836) (0.129) 
ln_GDPr -0.140 -0.0920 0.108 0.104 
 (0.169) (0.392) (0.135) (0.377) 
ln_GDPp -0.126 -0.0134 -0.242** -0.0649 
 (0.137) (0.266) (0.122) (0.260) 
ln_inv_rep 0.0751 -0.0527 0.0811 -0.0743 
 (0.0841) (0.100) (0.0831) (0.0986) 
ln_invp 0.166** 0.251*** 0.137* 0.215** 
 (0.0793) (0.0899) (0.0775) (0.0878) 
ln_diff_GDP 0.122** 0.0877 0.0822 0.0690 
 (0.0599) (0.101) (0.0577) (0.0978) 
ln_densr -0.173 -2.442*** -0.00145 -0.801* 
 (0.141) (0.885) (0.111) (0.409) 
ln_densp 0.441*** -1.340 0.376*** -0.968 
 (0.130) (0.875) (0.122) (0.781) 
ln_passangersr 0.272** 0.231   
 (0.114) (0.233)   
ln_passangersp -0.0920 0.193   
 (0.0744) (0.145)   
ln_freightr 0.0921 -0.0737 0.116* -0.0251 
 (0.0664) (0.111) (0.0614) (0.108) 
ln_freightp 0.274*** 0.283*** 0.266*** 0.298*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0846) (0.0558) (0.0827) 
contig 1.383***  1.368***  
 (0.339)  (0.340)  
comlang_ethno 0.687  0.713  
 (0.475)  (0.478)  
ln_distcap -0.736***  -0.663***  
 (0.170)  (0.164)  
     
Constant 0.987 -18.14** -1.262 -11.85* 
 (3.597) (7.251) (3.460) (6.643) 
Observations 1,508 1,508 1,555 1,555 
R-squared  0.035  0.029 
Number of pair 351 351 368 368 
Adj. R-squared 0.528 -0.270 0.518 -0.282 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In order to compute the final trade restrictiveness indices an additional assumption regarding 
the constant elasticity of substitution is required. Following the assumption made by Park 
(2002) we apply value of 5.6 as representing σ. being the most likely consumer preferences, 
characteristic for most services sectors.  
As shown above, the reference estimations of the gravity equation were performed for the 
pooled sample in a panel form to account for unexplained heterogeneity. However, in order to 
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account for the time variation in the tariff equivalents, a cross-section version of the equation 
was estimated for each of the sample periods. In this manner, the time-varying importer-specific 
fixed effects were estimated and they were subsequently used to compute the time series of 
tariff equivalents. 
Table 5.8 – Estimated tariff equivalents in rail transportation services sector 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean Var 
AUS 0,58  0,61 0,99 0,30 0,44 0,56 0,45 0,56 0,040 
AUT 0,31 0,32 0,28 0,30 0,26    0,29 0,000 
BEL 0,55 0,57 0,67 1,18 0,36 0,44 0,44  0,60 0,065 
BGR 0,62 0,63       0,62 0,000 
CAN   0,54 0,48 0,34 0,48 0,57 0,69 0,52 0,011 
CHE 0,38 0,36 0,39 0,39 0,39    0,38 0,000 
CZE 0,78 0,70 0,67 0,77 0,79 0,61 0,55 0,59 0,68 0,007 
DEU 0,99 0,96 0,72 0,78 0,70 0,58 0,53 0,44 0,71 0,033 
DNK 0,42 0,45       0,43 0,000 
ESP 0,56 0,64 0,90 0,75 1,32 0,56 0,70 0,92 0,79 0,056 
EST 0,30 0,31 0,21 0,23 0,11 0,38  0,30 0,26 0,007 
FIN 0,53 0,48 0,86 0,89 0,70 0,53 0,41 0,36 0,60 0,035 
FRA 0,45 0,45 0,51 0,35 0,36 0,47 0,41 0,50 0,44 0,003 
GBR  0,07 0,12 0,12 0,00 0,33   0,13 0,012 
HRV 0,46 0,50 0,45  0,16 0,74 0,46 0,89 0,52 0,047 
HUN 0,34 0,24 0,81 0,49 0,77 0,56 0,30 0,23 0,47 0,047 
ITA 0,59 0,64 0,54 0,61 0,61 0,52 0,48  0,57 0,003 
JPN 0,46 0,39 0,30 0,47 0,51 0,61 0,58 0,40 0,47 0,009 
LTU 0,77 0,85 0,91 1,35 0,60 0,83 0,64 0,65 0,83 0,050 
LUX   0,63 0,65 0,60 0,39 0,51  0,56 0,009 
LVA 0,37 0,35 0,33 0,39 0,20 0,17 0,64 0,56 0,38 0,023 
POL 0,38 0,39 0,41 0,52 0,46 0,55 0,69 0,63 0,50 0,011 
PRT 0,86 0,79 0,51 0,24 0,58 0,61 0,59 0,57 0,59 0,030 
ROU 0,44 0,36 0,29 0,27 0,43 0,61 0,66 1,29 0,54 0,096 
RUS 0,81 0,86 0,70 0,30 0,72 0,37 0,09 0,32 0,52 0,071 
SVK 0,34 0,26 0,20 0,44 0,35 0,28 0,35 0,25 0,31 0,005 
SVN 0,74 0,93 0,75 0,46 0,87 0,73 0,79 0,79 0,76 0,017 
SWE 0,47 0,53 0,54 0,48 0,68 0,59   0,55 0,005 
TUR 0,21 0,36 0,54 0,36 0,70 0,59 0,45 0,68 0,49 0,026 
Mean 0,52 0,52 0,53 0,55 0,50 0,52 0,52 0,58  
Var 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,09 0,07 0,02 0,02 0,06 
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 5.8 presents the measured relative restrictiveness indices for transportation services sector 
for a group of European countries during 2003-2010. In addition to the indices themselves, the 
table shows the unweighted averages and variances of indices for all countries in a given year 
in the last two rows of the table, and for a given country for all available years in the two most 
right columns of the table. The differences in the level of restriction are greater between 
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countries in a given year than within one country over the time period. This observation is 
consistent with expectations – there are obvious differences in the state of legislation and rail 
services sector development among countries and the state of restrictiveness in a given country 
is not an attribute subject to significant changes under a limited time period. 
One has to remember that presented outcomes refer to relative differences in restrictiveness 
levels, not to the absolute values. Therefore, the fact that in this data, Great Britain in year 2007 
is defined as the country with 0% restrictions to trade in the sector indicates that this country 
was experiencing most liberalized market compared to other countries in the sample, not that 
there were literally no restrictions in this country. 
The results presented in the Table 5.8 demonstrate large differences in tariff equivalents among 
the analyzed countries. In general the countries with higher liberalization indices (indicating 
more liberal regimes, which will be discussed in the next section), like Great Britain (GBR), 
Denmark (DNK), Sweden (SVN) or Germany (GER) reveal lower level of tariff equivalents. 
There are, however, exceptions from that rule. For example, Ireland, France, or Latvia have 
relatively low indices of liberalization, while the tariff equivalents are not very high. Thus, we 
can conclude that institutional liberalization reforms have some impact on the level of tariff 
equivalents but this is not a one-to-one type of relationship. 
The empirical analysis, based on gravity model, did not reveal a clear downward trend in the 
levels of tariff equivalents, presumably reflecting existing trade barriers, between EU and 
OECD countries. Therefore, we cannot detect a clear downward trend. It has to be noted that 
there are some countries, such as Germany where the liberalization trend in tariff equivalents 
is clearly observed. On the other hand there are also countries in which the tariff equivalents 
increased over the period 2002-2010. Poland and Turkey are among those countries. These 
results are somewhat surprising given the three rail liberalization packages that have been 
adopted by the EU countries. The estimated trade equivalents that are not going down over 
time, may suggest a slow progress in enforcement of liberalization policies. 
5.4. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The economic analysis of the institutional liberalization was concentrated on the rail sector. We 
used four indices measuring the market liberalization in rail transport services, elaborated by 
the IBM Consulting Services, as the main explanatory variables of the regressions. Among all 
of these indices, only the LEX of the importing country turned out to be significant and positive 
coefficients in all regressions. This index quantifies the legal requirements for market entry and 
to the extent of the support of the regulatory to the external Railway Undertakings. Our results 
suggest that among all the measures, only the liberalization of the legal framework has had a 
significant impact on the volume of imports.  
Thus, on the basis of the LEX index, we can conclude that a more independent status of 
incumbents from the states, higher degree of a vertical separation of network and operations, 
and a higher degree of horizontal separation freight/passenger transport has a positive impact 
on trade flows. In the same way, easier market access for foreign and domestic railway 
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undertakings and easier legal access to operational facilities has positive economic implications. 
On the other hand, results obtained using an alternative empirical approach, based on a gravity 
model, did not reveal a clear downward trend in the levels of trade barriers between EU 
countries and OECD countries over the analyzed period. 
The subject of trade barriers in services sectors is of a complex nature. The restrictions in 
services are of qualitative nature, which makes it hard to conduct empirical research on the 
matter of possible impacts of progressing liberalization. Therefore it is crucial to develop 
methods enabling creation of indices describing the likely level of restrictions in a given 
services sector. Additionally, since many studies assume panel data analysis, there is a need for 




6. The impact of NTMs in global value chains 
Abstract: In this chapter, we examine the impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on trade 
between countries at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System over the period 2002-2011. 
We draw on the existing information on NTM notifications to the WTO from the Integrated 
Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) distinguishing various NTMs, e.g. technical barriers to trade 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Following the existing literature (e.g. Kee et al., 2009) 
a gravity approach is chosen to assess whether NTMs facilitate or impede trade across countries. 
This approach allows calculating implied ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) for NTMs, which 
will be differentiated by NTM types, country groups, industries, and product categories. 
Furthermore, the effects of NTMs are distinguished by the broad economic categories (BEC) 
classification, which allows assessing whether the effects of NTMs differ for intermediary 
products or final goods. 
6.1. Introduction 
The general trend towards an increasing use of non-tariff measures (NTMs) as specific trade 
policy measures, the abrupt increase in using these trade policy instruments during the recent 
financial crisis and its importance in the negotiations of recent trade agreements stimulated 
discussions on the political economy of NTM use. With respect to exports of developing 
countries, the launch of the Sustainable Development Agenda in September 2015 might anew 
boost research in this field beyond advanced economies. 
The recurrent question is whether – or to which extent – NTMs are misused to protect domestic 
producers while policy makers pretend to act for the protection of consumers and the 
environment. Many studies focus on the trade effects for specific products, resulting from the 
imposition of one specific NTM for a group of countries. For example, Disdier et al (2008) find 
that EU sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) are 
more trade restrictive than any other OECD standards. Further, Kee et al (2009) evaluated the 
restrictiveness of NTMs for 78 countries and 4,575 goods at the HS 6-digit-level. Their findings 
underpin the view that NTMs serve as tariff substitutes rather than tariff complements. In 
addition, they find greater trade impeding effects for the agricultural sector than for the 
manufacturing sector. Kee et al (2009) restrict non-tariff measures to be non-tariff barriers, i.e. 
to have a negative impact on trade, by imposing several parameter restrictions.  
However, in the presence of information asymmetries, the imposition of standard-like NTMs – 
e.g. a minimum quality standard – can increase consumer trust, decrease transaction costs, and 
promote trade. Furthermore, exporters differ in their capacities to cope with new standards. 
Therefore, the implementation of a new NTM that is applicable to exporters and domestic 
producers reduces exports of some, increases exports of others, and might in the end increase 
the imports of the NTM imposing country. Bratt (2014) and Beghin et al. (2014) therefore, 
allow also for trade-promoting effects of NTMs, which respectively find for 46% and 39% of 
the HS 6-lines affected.  
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Yet, none of the mentioned studies allows for a differentiation of NTM types. This chapter aims 
to fill this gap by using a rich data compilation of WTO notifications. The WTO provides 
comprehensive data on NTM notifications within the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-
TIP). Ghodsi, Reiter, and Stehrer (2015) have improved this database by matching missing HS 
codes to the notifications. This paper distinguishes between four categories of NTMs: 
antidumping (ADP), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) and other quantitative measures including safeguards, special safeguards, countervailing 
duties and quantitative restrictions (QNTM). Furthermore, working with this unique dataset 
allows evaluating the trade effects of NTMs by means of an intensity measure, i.e. by counting 
how many NTMs a specific importing country imposed against a trading partner in each year 
on each HS 6-digit product.  
Using the number of each NTM type imposed at each product, we estimate the impact of these 
trade policy measures on the bilateral import flows of products to the NTM imposing country 
using a gravity framework. Allowing for both trade promoting and trade impeding effects of 
NTMs, we calculate the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of each product-specific NTM type for 
each imposing country for the period 2002-2011. The remainder of this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview on the literature. Section 3 describes our methodology 
and data to estimate AVEs with empirical results presented in Section 4. The final section 
concludes. 
6.2. Literature Review 
The number of NTMs reported to the WTO has tripled from 1995 to 2010 and has quadrupled 
until 2012. The enormous speed with which NTMs spread as trade policy instruments is 
reflected in the fast growing literature on their economic effects. Ferrantino (2006) offers a 
detailed description of methods frequently used to quantify the effects of NTMs by NTM type. 
Partial equilibrium frameworks (Van Tongeren et al., 2009; Beghin et al., 2012; and Ghodsi, 
2015b), computable general equilibrium models (Andriamananjara et al., 2004; Francois et al., 
2011; and Raza et al., 2014), gravity estimations (Essaji, 2008; Disdier et al., 2010; Yousefi 
and Liu, 2013; and Ghodsi, 2015c), and the calculation of ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) for 
NTMs (Kee et al., 2009; Bratt, 2014; and Beghin et al., 2014) are methods of assessing the 
NTMs’ impact on international trade.  
In light of the political discussions on whether NTMs feature as substitutes for tariffs some 
authors have analyzed the substitutability and/or complementarity of tariffs with NTMs and 
other trade policy instruments (Yu, 2004; Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Aisbett and Pearson, 2013; 
and Ghodsi, 2015a). However, NTMs with their complex and opaque nature cannot be easily 
compared with tariffs that are imposed either in ad-valorem rates or in fixed price charges. 
Therefore, many authors aim to make their effects directly comparable to tariffs by computing 
the AVE of NTMs. Currently there are two approaches most commonly applied in the literature.  
One method is to analyze the price wedge resulting from the implementation of NTMs (Dean 
et al., 2009; Rickard and Lei, 2011; and Nimenya et al., 2012). The amount of information 
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necessary for this analysis restricts most of the papers to the analysis of very few – mainly 
agricultural – products for a small set of countries. The paper by Dean et al. (2009) is a rare 
exception. Other drawbacks of this method are that domestic prices in the absence of NTMs are 
not observable. Therefore, domestic prices affected by NTMs are often directly compared to 
international prices, neglecting the possible impact of differences in product quality. 
Furthermore, NTMs occur at different stages along the supply chain, which makes a comparison 
of different prices along the production and distribution chain (e.g. CIF, DDD) for a single 
product necessary. In addition, in the case of prohibitive NTMs, no prices are observable at all. 
The other branch of literature has been triggered by a contribution from Kee et al. (2009), who 
infer the AVEs of NTMs indirectly in a two-step approach. They assess the impact of NTMs 
on the import values with a gravity model. The results are then converted to AVEs using import 
demand elasticities, which are estimated beforehand. They find that the average AVE of all 
products affected by NTMs is 45%, and 32% when weighted by import values. For 55% of 
affected products, the AVE of the NTM has a higher effect than its corresponding tariff. 
Furthermore, they report a great variation of AVEs across products and countries. The average 
AVE was found to be 17 percentage points higher for the agricultural sector compared to the 
manufacturing sector. The highest average AVE aggregated at HS-2-digit level was shown for 
dairy products, where an average AVE of NTMs of 46% together with an average tariff of 29% 
leads to an overall protection level of 75%. The lowest average AVE was reported for tin and 
tin products, with an average AVE of NTMs of 3% and an additional average tariff of 9% 
leading to an overall protection level of 9%. Differentiating across NTM-imposing countries, 
the highest AVEs for NTMs were observable for low-income countries in Africa, whereas 
countries with the highest AVEs for domestic support were members of the European Union. 
Accounting for product and country fixed effects Kee et al. (2009) conclude that NTMs are 
serving as substitutes to tariffs.  
Kee et al (2009) restricted their AVEs to be positive, i.e. forcing NTMs to have only trade 
restrictive effects comparable to tariffs and quotas. Given market imperfections, NTMs can 
however, also serve to facilitate trade. Beghin et al. (2014) therefore, re-estimate the gravity 
approach proposed by Kee et al. (2009) for standard-like NTMs for the years 2001 to 2003, 
allowing for positive and negative values of AVEs of NTMs. In their analysis, 12% of all 
products at the HS-6-digit level were affected by regulations. Out of these, 39% exhibited 
negative AVEs – i.e. an import-facilitating effect. In a similar analysis, Bratt (2014) concludes 
that overall, NTMs impede rather than facilitate trade, with a median AVE of 15.7%. However, 
46.1% of all AVEs computed show a positive effect on trade. Distinguishing between exporters 
and importers at different income levels, as well as between the food and the manufacturing 
sector, he finds that the effects of NTMs are in the first instance driven by the NTM imposing 
countries, where AVEs on NTMs are highest for low-income countries for both sectors. Only 
within these groups, the heterogeneity of exporters in how to cope with the imposition of NTMs 
seems to matter. Bratt (2014) highlights that NTMs in food sector are more trade restrictive 
than NTMs in the manufacturing sector. Within the food sector, low-income exporters face the 
lowest AVEs on NTMs, irrespective of the importing group. Low-income exporters are also 
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confronted with the lowest AVEs of NTMs imposed by high-income countries for both the food 
and manufacturing sector. 
The main advantage of the gravity approach in comparison with the price wedge approach is 
that the former relies on trade data, which is more abundant at the disaggregated product level 
than price data. In addition, it can be used for broad panel analysis, i.e. for a big set of countries 
and products, with different NTMs and longer periods. Yet, the indirect approach has 
drawbacks too. Like the price gap method, this approach does not distinguish the quality of 
domestic from foreign goods, influencing the impact of NTMs. 
This chapter aims to fill gaps in the literature of AVE calculation. Previous calculations of AVE 
of NTMs (Kee et al., 2009; Bratt, 2014; and Beghin et al., 2014) were conducted on cross 
sectional data due to lack of information on NTMs. Having a rich database on NTMs obtained 
from WTO I-TIP we are extending their approach to a panel analysis which firstly provides 
more efficient estimators, and secondly accounts for the effects of NTMs after their impositions 
over the period considered. Moreover, previous calculations were not distinguishing NTM 
types whose diverse attributes by motives would bring various trade consequences. In this 
article, we differentiate four major categories of NTMs, which can provide better insights on 
the implications of different NTMs. In addition, in previous studies, intensity of NTMs was not 
considered and existence of NTMs captured by employing dummy variables. In contrast, our 
analysis is based on the intensity of NTM types by counting the number of imposed NTMs. The 
prominent contribution of this study relies on the variation of NTM effects by importer 
countries. In previous studies, the empirical approach gave an average impact of NTM on the 
import of products to all importers. The variation in the calculated AVEs thus, depended mainly 
on the variations in the import demand elasticities, which by construction depended only on 
variation of product imports share to GDP across all importers. However, the novelty of this 
contribution is highlighted by both variations of import demand elasticities across importers 
and variations of NTM effects using the interaction approach discussed below. 
6.3.  Methodology and Data 
Given the steadily rising number of various types of NTMs and the resulting intense political 
discussions surrounding their (potential) misuse as protectionist tools that erode the economic 
benefits of preceding cuts in tariff rates, it is desirable to make them directly comparable to 
tariffs. As mentioned in the literature review, there are two basic approaches, how to compute 
respective AVEs of NTMs. A direct approach would be the evaluation of differences in prices 
prior and after the NTM implementation (see e.g. Dean et al., 2009). Yet, this approach has two 
main drawbacks. First, accurate data on domestic and foreign prices are not readily available as 
different NTMs occur at different points along the supply chain. In the extreme case, given a 
prohibitive NTM, no price is observable at all. The indirect approach makes use of import 
demand elasticities and was developed by Kee et al (2009). It is a two-step analysis, where first 
a gravity model is used to estimate the impact of NTMs on import values, where the Heckman 
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procedure accounts for zero trade flows. In the second step, this effect is transformed into a 
price effect – i.e. the AVEs – using import demand elasticities.  
We consider a balanced panel of bilateral trade flows of 149 importers (mainly WTO members) 
and all other trading partners at a 6-digit product level for the period from 2002 to 2011. Given 
the large number of zero trade flows, we make use of the Heckman two-stage estimation 
procedure to address the possible selection bias as follows: 




+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗 +𝜔𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 , ∀𝑛 ∈ {𝐴𝐷𝑃, 𝑆𝑃𝑆, 𝑇𝐵𝑇, 𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑀} 
(6.1) 










+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜔𝑗 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 , ∀𝑛 ∈ {𝐴𝐷𝑃, 𝑆𝑃𝑆, 𝑇𝐵𝑇, 𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑀} 
(6.2) 
In a first step, the selection equation (6.1) evaluates the probability of non-zero trade flows for 
specific country pairs. From this first step, the inverse Mills ratio (𝜙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡)  is obtained, which 
enters the outcome equation (6.2) in the second step as an explanatory variable. The outcome 
equation incorporates the coefficients capturing the impacts of tariffs (𝛽1) and non-tariff 
measures (𝛽2𝑛, 𝛽2𝑛𝑖) on imports, which in a final step are transformed to AVEs. In words, 𝛽2𝑛 
represents the average marginal impact of an additional imposed NTM of type n on the imports 
of one product for one reference importing country. In addition, 𝛽2𝑛𝑖 captures the importer-
specific deviations from the reference country for each NTM type and product. Hence, the 
marginal impact of NTM type n of the ith importer on the log value of imports of product h is 
equal to 𝛽2𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑖. 
Both equations are run separately for each product at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System 
(HS). 𝑚𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 denotes the imports of product ℎ to country 𝑖 from partner country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. 𝛼0ℎ 
and 𝛽0ℎ represent product specific effects captured as constant terms. 𝑡𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 is the tariff AVE 
(using UNCTAD 1 methodology68) imposed by the importing country 𝑖 against the import of 
product h at time t from partner country j. 
𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑛𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 are count variables for 𝑛 = 4 different groups of NTMs: (1) anti-dumping (ADP), 
(2) sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), (3) technical barriers to trade (TBT) and other 
quantitative measures (QNTM) encompassing safeguards (SG), special safeguards (SSG), 
countervailing duties (CV) and quantitative restrictions (QR). In order to obtain importer-
specific AVEs of NTMs, we interact NTM variables with importer country dummies 𝜔𝑖. 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 
captures country-pair characteristics and consists of classical gravity variables and factor 
endowments. Gravity variables in our regressions are: dummy variables indicating whether 
both trading partners are EU members and WTO members; whether they are neighboring 
countries, whether they share a common ethnical language, whether they exhibit a common 
                                                 
68 UNCTAD/WTO (2012) 
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colonial history, whether they belong to the same country (such as Taiwan or Hong Kong to 
China), or whether there is a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in place. The distance 
between the capital cities of the trading countries enter in natural logarithm. These classical 
gravity variables are further supplemented by measures of factor endowments. Following 
Baltagi et al. (2003) and Ghodsi (2015c) we employ an index ranging from 0 to 0.5 depicting 
how different the trading partners are with respect to real GDP per capita, shown in equation 
(6.3). To account for the traditional market potential, we also include the sum of the trading 
partners’ GDP in (6.4). Furthermore, we consider the distance between the trading partners with 
respect to three relative factor endowments in (6.5), which are labor force L, the capital stock 












, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∈ (0, 0.5) (6.3) 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) (6.4) 
𝑓𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐹𝑘𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
) − 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐹𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
) , 𝐹𝑘 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐾, 𝐴𝑙} (6.5) 
𝜔𝑖, 𝜔𝑗, and 𝜔𝑡 in equation (6.2) are respectively importer, exporter, and time fixed effects, 
which are employed using a Fixed Effect Estimator (FE) and time-dummies. Moreover, robust 
estimators clustering by country-pair-product are used to control for the shocks resulting in a 
heteroskedastic error term 𝜇𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡. 𝜙𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 is the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from the selection 
equation and 𝜇𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑡 denotes the error term. 
In a final step, we consider all coefficients of NTMs (𝛽2𝑛, 𝛽2𝑖𝑛) which are significant at least 
at a 5% level, to derive their corresponding AVEs. For this purpose, import demand elasticities 
were computed as reported in Ghodsi and Stehrer (forthcoming)69. AVEs are obtained by 










𝑛  , ∀𝑛 ∈ {𝐴𝐷𝑃, 𝑆𝑃𝑆, 𝑇𝐵𝑇,𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑀} (6.6) 
where 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑡 are prices for product ℎ imported to country 𝑖 at time t, and 𝜀𝑖ℎ is the import demand 
elasticity of product h to country i, which is assumed to be constant during the period of 
analysis. Solving for AVEs and rearranging terms leaves us with four AVEs per product and 





, ∀𝑛 ∈ {𝐴𝐷𝑃, 𝑆𝑃𝑆, 𝑇𝐵𝑇, 𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑀} (6.7) 
                                                 
69 Ghodsi and Stehrer (forthcoming) calculate the bilateral and unilateral import demand elasticities. Latter is the 
update of import demand elasticities from 2002 to 2011 using the approach by Kee et al. (2008). Former is an 
augmented approach with efficient estimators on country-pairs. 
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The heart of our dataset is the I-TIP notifications on NTMs compiled by the Economic Research 
and Analysis Department of the WTO, which later improved and documented by Ghodsi, Reiter 
and Stehrer (2015), who imputed a large number of HS codes for two thirds of the notifications 
with missing HS codes. Import data were taken from the COMTRADE database and were 
complemented by the TRAINS database. We consider AVEs of tariffs at the HS 6-digit level 
from TRAINS and the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB) provided by World Integrated Trade 
Solutions (WITS). The data gathering on tariffs followed a three-step choice rule: Whenever 
available, preferential rates (PRF) were considered. When this information was not given or not 
applicable, the most-favored-nation tariff rates (MFN) entered our set. Lastly, when no 
information of PRF and MFN was given, we used data on the effectively applied tariff rates 
(AHS). Moreover, where AVEs of tariffs are not available, raw data on tariffs are used. It is 
important to mention that since there is no available data on tariffs between the EU member 
states, zero tariffs are included. 
Data on factor endowments (labor force and capital stock) as well as GDP were retrieved from 
the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.1; see Feenstra et al., 2013, and 2015). The latest update of the 
PWT includes data for 2011, which constrains our analysis to the period 2002 to 2011. Output-
side real GDP per capita at chained PPP in 2005 USD was used for the computation of the 
similarity index, while expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPP in 2005 USD was considered 
for representing the traditional market (demand) potential. Information on agricultural land was 
taken from the WDI of the World Bank. CEPII provides data on commonly used gravity 
variables as mentioned above. Finally, we borrow a data compilation for Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) as reported by the WTO. 
6.4. Empirical Results 
Our investigation results in 698,848 importer-product specific observations. Considering 
imports of products at the HS-6-digit level, each importer in our sample imports at least 30 
products, in the case of Sierra Leone, and a maximum of 5,211 products, in the case of Canada. 
The average is 4,842 products per importer.  
Each HS-6-digit product was imported by at least 40 countries, as in the case of lysergic acid 
(HS 293963) and beryllium waste (HS 811213), and at most by 149 countries for machinery, 
i.e. magnetic or optical readers and machines for transcribing data onto data media (HS 847190) 
and still image video cameras (HS 852540). On average, each product was imported by 136 
countries. 
86% of all AVEs calculated are attributable to the manufacturing sector, and 14% to the 
agriculture and food sector respectively. About 40% of our observations correspond to high-
income countries. Table 6.1 summarizes the number of observations by two sectors and by the 
World Bank’s income group classification. 
We dealt with extreme values and potential outliers in two steps: First, we set the lowest non-
zero AVEs equal to the 0.1 percentile and the highest non-zero AVEs equal to the 99.9 
percentile of the distribution for each NTM type. Second, we define the lower bound for 
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negative AVEs at -100%. The rational for this is that a price for a product can only be reduced 
by a maximum of 100%. Therefore, we replaced all AVEs smaller than -1, or equally -100%, 
by this lower bound. Figure 6-3 in the Appendix depicts the resulting distribution of non-zero 
AVEs per NTM. 
Table 6.1 – Distribution of AVEs by Income Group and Sector 
 
Note: It is the data including intra-EU trade 
Out of 698,848 importer-product-pairs, 97,533 – that is 13.96% - were significantly affected by 
at least one NTM, resulting in 113,816 non-zero AVEs. Eighty-four per cent of those affected 
did face only one type of NTM, 15% were confronted with two types and for less than one per 
cent we observed three types of NTMs. Excluding intra-EU trade results in an increasing 
number of non-zero AVEs by 6.4% although the number of total observations was reduced by 
roughly 0.8 per cent. This is possible, as zero AVEs are either due to non-existence of a specific 
NTM for a given importer-product pair, or because the NTM has a statistically insignificant 
impact on its trade flows. Thus, including intra-EU trade and therefore a higher number of 
similar NTMs, average AVEs of NTMs are more likely to turn insignificant. We therefore put 
more emphasis on the analysis of NTMs excluding intra-EU trade. 
For the sample excluding intra-EU trade we find that 47.7% of all non-zero AVEs show a 
positive sign – i.e. a trade impeding effect. Our results therefore suggest, that the majority of 
NTMs is rather trade promoting than being a trade barrier. Table 6.2 lists the number of positive, 
zero, and negative AVEs per NTM type for the sample excluding intra-EU trade. It shows that 
the only NTMs exhibiting a greater share of trade impeding AVEs are technical barriers to 
trade. When putting import weights to the shares, it can be seen that non-zero AVEs gain in 
importance. It results in TBTs and SPS measures showing a higher share of trade restrictive 
AVEs. In addition, for other quantitative measures, the share of positive AVEs increases more 
strongly than the share of negative AVEs. 
Considering non-zero AVEs only, 4.4% are observed for antidumping measures and 23% 
correspond to SPS measures. The majority of non-zero AVEs are found in case of TBTs with 
70% and the remaining 2.6% of non-zero AVEs refer to other quantitative measures (Table 6.3). 
Adding up the calculated AVEs for each NTM type gives the overall impact of NTMs on prices. 
Figure 6-1 gives some first insights on how it differs by income group of the importing country 
and by sector. First, the box plots indicate that for each income-sector combination we find 
positive and negative AVEs of often-similar magnitude, with the median being around zero. 
High income: OECD 22,082 23.2% 138,127 22.9%
High income: non OECD 14,937 15.7% 91,795 15.2%
Upper middle income 23,589 24.8% 148,468 24.6%
Lower middle income 21,168 22.3% 137,152 22.7%
Low income 13,306 14.0% 88,224 14.6%
95,082 603,766
AVEs per Sector 13.61% 86.39%
Agri. and Food Manufacturing
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Second, the range of AVEs is much larger for the manufacturing sector than for the agricultural 
and food sector. Third, high-income countries that are not OECD members are showing the 
highest impacts on trade, while these are smallest for low-income countries. 
Table 6.2 – Sign of AVEs per NTM type, excl. intra-EU trade 
 
Source: own calculation 
Table 6.3 – Number of non-zero AVEs 
 






< 0 4 088 0,6% 3,4%
= 0 688 257 99,2% 95,6%
> 0 1 201 0,2% 1,0%
< 0 14 040 2,0% 2,9%
= 0 665 662 96,0% 93,8%
> 0 13 844 2,0% 3,3%
< 0 37 876 5,5% 13,7%
= 0 608 725 87,8% 70,6%
> 0 46 945 6,8% 15,7%
< 0 1 786 0,3% 2,3%
= 0 690 392 99,5% 95,8%




















% of non-zero 
AVEs
ADP 5 682 4,99% 5 289 4,37%
SPS 26 293 23,10% 27 884 23,02%
TBT 78 742 69,18% 84 821 70,01%
QNTM 3 099 2,72% 3 154 2,60%
NTMs Total 113 816 100,00% 121 148 100,00%
Tariffs 508 773 508 241
Including intra-EU trade Excluding intra-EU trade
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Figure 6-1 – Non-zero AVEs of NTMs by Sector and Income Group 
 
Figure 6-1 does not display outlier values. However, a non-negligible number of observations 
shows AVEs smaller at -100%. This is especially for antidumping measures, suggesting that 
we are possibly capturing the “dumping effect” of the exporter rather than the “antidumping 
response” by the importer.  
The number of AVEs at the minimum of -100% is higher for every type of NTM for the sample 
including intra-EU trade. Believing in the harmonization of regulations at the European level, 
this is what we would expect. If an NTM is introduced by a member state of the European 
Union, it should be found in the I-TIP NTM database of the WTO. However, we cannot 
distinguish between NTMs that substantially differ among EU members and those that were 
adopted by all EU members in the same or a similar way. While we would expect a trade 
impeding effect from the former, we would likewise expect a trade promoting effect among EU 
members from the latter. Therefore, the greater number of trade-boosting effects when 
including intra-EU trade might point to the advantages of the harmonization of NTMs. 
Comparing our AVE results for the sample including all countries with those obtained by 
excluding intra-EU trade shows that the former are on average smaller than the latter. 
Additionally, we find a smaller number of significant effects for AVEs, when including intra-
EU trade, as shown in Table 6.3. Both observations support the view that NTMs within the EU 
are more harmonized and consequently, including intra-EU trade in our regression analysis 
while not being able to capture the level of harmonization between countries’ NTMs bias our 
AVE results downwards. However, when intra-EU trade is excluded, we still find 55.7% of all 
non-zero AVES for antidumping measures to lie at the lower bound of -100%. The share of 
non-zero AVEs at -100% for SPS measures is 4.2%, for TBTs it is similar at 4.1% and for other 
quantitative restrictions it is 18.5%. Computing the sum over all NTM types, we find 6.7% of 
all significant AVEs to feature at the lower bound. 
6.4.1. Average AVEs by Income Group 
Table 6.4 displays the mean of non-zero AVEs per income group of the importing country, the 
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by Sector and Income group
Non-zero AVEs of NTMs
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observations at the lower bound.70 Columns (1), (3) and (5) present the simple mean over non-
zero AVEs in total and for the manufacturing and agri-food sectors respectively. Import-
weighted71 results are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). 
As mentioned above, we find high negative AVEs for ADP which could be explained either by 
quality adjustments of the exporter following an antidumping filing (which was found in the 
third chapter) or by the possibility that we capture the preceding dumping effect and not the 
antidumping effect. For SPS measures, we find trade impeding effects for three income groups 
for the manufacturing sector, but trade promoting effects in the agricultural sector. Overall, this 
results in a simple average AVE of -1.73%. Unlike SPS measures, TBTs exhibit an overall 
positive average AVE of 1.10% and are on average trade restricting in the manufacturing sector 
for every income group, but again trade enhancing in the agricultural sector. In fact, standards 
and regulations within these core qualitative NTMs can improve the market efficiencies by 
increasing information available in the market, in addition to affirming the imports against 
health, environmental and safety concerns in the market. Hence, observing a trade promoting 
TBT or SPS does not seem to be surprising. This issue has been also stated in the literature, 
which is why WTO agreements allow for the legitimate application of these policy instruments. 
However, there are also measures restricting trade, which could potentially raise trade disputes, 
especially within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as discussed in the fourth chapter. 
For the last group of NTMs, which comprises safeguards, special safeguards, countervailing 
duties and quantitative restrictions, we find a trade promoting AVE of -2.88% on average. Yet, 
we find positive AVEs in the agricultural sector of high-income non-OECD countries, and trade 
impeding effects for lower middle-income countries for both sectors.  
                                                 
70 Table 6.10 in the Appendix additionally shows the results, when lower observations at -100% are included in 
the calculation of AVE means. 
71 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐺𝑛 =  
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝐺𝑛∗𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐺𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝐺
, ∀ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐺 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝑇𝑀 𝑛 
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Table 6.4 – Mean AVEs by NTM, Income Group and Sector; for AVEs > -100, excluding 
intra-EU trade 
 
Source: own calculation 
Although we find evidence for trade promoting effects of NTMs, it has to be kept in mind, that 
our computed AVEs are importer-product specific and not bilateral-product specific. Therefore, 
a negative AVE could imply, that the imposed NTM was trade promoting for the all exporting 
countries. However, it could also imply that the imposition of NTMs leads to some trade 
diversions, outweighing the trade reductions of the affected exporter. Considering an exporter 
whose domestic standards and regulations are closer to those of the NTM imposing country, 
the NTM should have trade promoting effects for this specific exporter, while for other 
exporters, it might reduce the trade flows to the imposing country. 
6.4.2. Average AVEs by Product Group 
As different NTM types target different product categories, we show the maximum and 
minimum non-zero AVEs calculated by product at the HS-2-digit level in Table 6.572; again 
excluding observations below the lower bound of -100%. 
                                                 
72 Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 in the Appendix report the results for mean and median non-zero AVEs for all 96 HS 
2-digit categories. 










High Income: OECD -25,12 -72,83 -25,84 -95,11 -24,00 -54,43
High Income: non OECD -25,62 -51,83 -28,45 -68,16 -18,42 -21,67
Upper Middle Income -19,52 -76,40 -21,85 -100,00 -16,18 -79,38
Lower Middle Income -23,49 -100,00 -24,48 -100,00 -5,75 -42,84
High Income: OECD -2,08 -1,62 -1,45 -1,30 -2,49 -2,84
High Income: non OECD 0,01 0,01 2,96 1,25 -0,58 -0,61
Upper Middle Income -1,29 -1,96 0,75 2,21 -1,93 -4,27
Lower Middle Income -2,08 -2,65 -2,00 -3,63 -2,11 -3,29
Low Income -0,45 -0,75 3,83 5,65 -0,72 -1,04
High Income: OECD 0,94 1,21 1,40 1,95 -0,45 -0,50
High Income: non OECD 1,29 0,70 2,90 1,76 -1,42 -0,96
Upper Middle Income 1,86 4,82 2,94 8,60 -1,18 -2,38
Lower Middle Income 0,22 0,36 1,31 2,54 -1,59 -2,06
Low Income 0,07 0,20 0,25 0,98 -0,43 -0,46
High Income: OECD -1,22 -5,69 -1,15 -5,50 -1,70 -4,92
High Income: non OECD -2,85 -25,26 -3,08 -26,03 4,11 14,59
Upper Middle Income -12,32 -18,17 -12,06 -14,14 -19,92 -100,00


















Table 6.5 – AVEs of NTMs by product (HS-2-digit) 
 
Source: own calculation 
Focusing on the sample excluding intra-EU trade (bottom half of Table 6.5) we find the lowest 
AVEs for antidumping measures for miscellaneous articles of base metal (HS 83). The highest 
average AVE of antidumping is reported for fertilisers (HS 31). Furniture, bedding and lamps 
(HS 94) face the lowest average and median AVEs of SPS measures, while ships, boats and 
floating structures (HS 89) show the highest AVEs. The lowest average and median AVEs of 
TBTs are reported for albuminoidal substances, modified starches, glues, and enzymes (HS 35) 
as well as for arms and ammunition (HS 93), respectively. Trade in works of art, collectors' 
pieces, and antiques (HS 97) in terms of the mean and trade in ships and boats (HS 89) in terms 
of the median seems to be restricted by TBTs. The group of other quantitative measures seems 
to have the greatest trade promoting effects on live trees and other plants (HS 6), while they 
appear as trade restrictive for works of art (HS 97). Including intra-EU trade (top half of 
Table 6.5) does not change the group of products facing the highest AVEs, but the focus shifts 
form works of arts to fertilisers, which show the highest mean and median AVEs for ADP and 
QNTM. 
Overall, NTMs seem to feature as restricting tools for trade in chemicals, metals, textiles and 
vegetable products, mainly due to quantitative restrictions and TBTs. However, the chemicals 
and metals sector are also among the HS-2-digit product groups showing the lowest mean 
AVEs, i.e. the highest trade promoting effects. These trade-promoting effects could be driven 
by scarcity of resources of the importing country. An example could be the European Union, 
whose dependency on imported metals has fast grown in recent decades. Its imports exceeded 
its exports by about a third in 2012, and 40% of the latter are attributable to Germany, the UK 
and Italy alone.73 If a country or region is dependent on imports of a product, the imposition of 
an NTM can only have an impact on (1) the exporter choice, (2) possibly the exporter product 
quality and (3) it increases the price of the imported product and thereby – keeping units 
constant – increases import values. Figure 6-2 summarizes these findings by counting the top 
20 HS-2-digit products (highest AVEs, positive values) and bottom 20 HS-2-digit products 
(lowest AVEs, negative values) per HS6 group and NTM type. 
                                                 
73 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/metals-minerals/non-ferrous-metals/competitiveness/index_en.htm 
ADP SPS TBT QNTM
simple average HS 31; 97.041 HS 97; 48.406 HS 89; 61.983 HS 31; 69.583
median HS 31; 97.041 HS 97; 48.406 HS 89; 68.356 HS 31; 69.583
simple average HS 74; -71.341 HS 69; -70.940 HS 5; -18.489 HS 88; -54.771
median HS 74; -71.341 HS 69; -80.404 HS 67; -7.602 HS 88; -68.916
simple average HS 31; 81.929 HS 89; 48.278 HS 97; 70.994 HS 97; 65.480
median HS 31; 81.186 HS 89; 45.490 HS 89; 79.773 HS 97; 64.648
simple average HS 83; -61.503 HS 94; -53.477 HS 35; -15.774 HS 6; -80.215





















Figure 6-2 – Number of HS-2-digit products per product group and NTM type 
excl. intra-EU trade 
 
6.4.3. Average AVEs by Importer 
Table 6.6 – Top 20 Mean AVEs by Importer (with corresponding median AVEs) 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
Popularity, effectiveness and the direction of the price effects of NTMs therefore also differ 
greatly among NTM imposing importers. Excluding intra-EU trade and AVEs at the lower 
bound, Table 6.6 lists the top 20 countries with the highest mean non-zero AVE per NTM type, 
and their corresponding median AVEs. We find 54 countries with non-zero AVEs on 
01-05  Animal & Animal Products
06-15  Vegetable Products
16-24  Foodstuffs
25-27  Mineral Products 
28-38  Chemicals & Allied Industries 
39-40  Plastics / Rubbers 
41-43  Raw Hides, Skins, Leather & Furs
44-49  Wood & Wood Products
50-63  Textiles 
64-67  Footwear / Headgear
68-71  Stone / Glass 
72-83  Metals 
84-85  Machinery / Electrical
86-89  Transportation 









ADP SPS TBT QNTM
ADP SPS TBT QNTM
Rank Imp. Mean Median Imp. Mean Median Imp. Mean Median Imp. Mean Median
1 JOR 73.64 73.64 HRV 17.60 8.80 ROM 22.13 20.46 TUR 62.14 62.14
2 ROM 36.35 58.10 ROM 14.40 19.02 IDN 19.80 11.94 MAR 55.61 55.61
3 KOR 17.73 11.70 MKD 11.97 2.58 BLZ 18.95 11.11 PAK 45.59 44.56
4 BEL 13.27 31.63 MNG 11.34 2.52 CAF 16.88 0.70 LVA 41.82 50.13
5 IDN 10.83 13.70 BEN 10.69 2.37 JOR 11.31 3.27 BRA 31.26 2.56
6 THA 10.15 3.86 MLT 8.60 2.74 MAR 8.62 2.72 EST 26.28 14.28
7 AUT 6.94 12.68 KEN 7.04 -0.07 SGP 7.53 4.86 MLT 22.16 25.58
8 JPN 5.68 5.68 TTO 7.00 7.00 MLT 7.27 2.98 LTU 22.07 16.80
9 CYP 5.37 11.13 BRN 6.51 6.46 LTU 7.12 1.96 CYP 20.05 20.45
10 EST 5.18 1.54 LTU 5.20 0.70 MNG 7.01 -1.40 ROM 18.56 35.83
11 NLD 2.04 5.70 SGP 4.19 0.59 HRV 6.35 0.72 IRL 16.60 16.83
12 LVA 1.65 10.34 BLZ 4.15 0.72 HUN 5.84 2.90 SVK 15.86 3.87
13 CZE 1.51 7.77 FJI 3.88 0.77 AUS 4.85 1.02 SVN 13.59 7.78
14 RUS 1.43 3.08 IDN 2.85 -0.02 NZL 4.74 0.65 LUX 12.36 11.22
15 DEU 1.06 4.02 JOR 2.81 1.51 ISR 3.98 0.95 AUT 10.82 9.82
16 ISR 0.87 -6.38 HUN 2.13 0.64 CYP 3.64 0.43 USA 10.47 12.41
17 SVN -0.58 7.64 BOL 1.99 0.94 USA 3.59 0.30 ISR 9.32 9.32
18 GRC -1.01 1.70 LVA 1.35 0.42 CZE 2.83 0.53 BEL 8.12 3.92
19 BGR -2.44 2.05 KWT 1.28 3.70 GHA 2.65 0.13 IND 8.02 1.91
20 EGY -2.59 -2.59 MDG 1.25 0.08 SVN 2.57 0.71 POL 7.40 2.95
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antidumping, 91 countries showing non-zero AVEs for SPS measures, 96 countries exhibiting 
non-zero AVEs for TBTs and 52 countries for which AVEs on other quantitative measures are 
non-zero. Thereof, 29.6%, 37.4%, 64.6% and 63.5%, respectively, show positive mean AVEs.  
Looking at magnitudes of mean AVEs by importer country, AVEs for SPS and TBT are found 
in a similar range, while positive AVEs for QNTM and ADP are about three to four times larger. 
Mean AVEs for ADP range from 74% for Jordan to -80% for Malaysia. The highest mean AVE 
for SPS measures is only as large as a fourth of the maximum mean AVE for ADP and is found 
for Croatia with 18%. The lowest mean AVE for SPS measures is reported for Mauritius with 
-17%. For TBTs, mean AVEs range from 22% for Romania to -10% for Barbados. Finally, the 
highest mean AVE for QNTM is 62% for Turkey, while the lowest mean AVE of -22% is 
attributable to Peru. 
Interestingly, seven EU member countries are among the top 40 of highest mean AVEs for all 
four NTM types. These are the two countries that acceded to the EU in 2007, namely Bulgaria 
and Romania, the three Baltic states, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and two countries that 
entered the EU in 2004, namely Hungary and Malta. One might want to highlight Romania, 
which is ranked second for ADP, second for SPS measures, and even first for TBTs. Including 
intra-EU trade decreases the prominence of EU member countries. Considering countries 
outside the EU, the geographical spread of the countries does not allow to draw conclusions on 
regional patterns. 
6.4.4. Average AVEs by BEC 
In order to assess the impact of AVEs along the production and supply chains, we further break 
down our results into the broad economic categories (BEC). We make use of a correspondence 
table from HS to BEC for WIOD74 that puts weights on HS-6-digit products given their use 
(1) as intermediate goods (INT), (2) for final consumption (FC), or (3) for gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF). Take the example from our sample of HS code 940540 comprising electric 
lamps and lighting fittings. Our correspondence table suggests a 50% use as intermediate 
product, a 25% use for final consumption, and a 25% contribution to gross capital formation. 
Table 6.7 reports our estimated AVEs per NTM type, split up by sector and the broad economic 
categories. 
Excluding intra-EU trade and AVEs smaller than -100%, we find the greatest trade impeding 
effects in the agricultural sector, for final consumption goods that are targeted by antidumping 
measures or other quantitative restrictions. SPS measures and TBTs by contrast, show negative 
AVEs. The picture seems to be reversed for the manufacturing sector. There, TBTs show the 
highest trade restricting effects for intermediate goods, followed by consumption goods and 
gross capital formation. Interestingly, SPS measures show on average trade promoting effects 
for intermediates, but trade restricting effects for final consumption goods and gross capital 
formation. The greatest trade promoting effect is observable for antidumping measures in the 
manufacturing sector, followed by SPS measures for final consumption goods of the agri-food 
                                                 
74 See www.wiod.org 
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sector. Including intra-EU trade increases the trade restricting effect of other quantitative 
measures on imports of agri-food products. However, the trade impeding effects of those 
measures on intermediate manufactured goods, as well as the trade reducing impact of SPS on 
manufactured consumption goods and of ADP on agricultural consumption goods disappears. 
Table 6.7 – Average AVEs by BEC/WIOD classification; excluding intra-EU trade and AVEs <-100% 
 
* INT = intermediates; FC = Final Consumption; GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
6.4.5. Relating AVEs of NTMs to Tariffs 
A frequently asked question concerning NTMs is whether they feature as policy instruments to 
substitute for tariff cuts. Table 6.8 summarizes the results of a first simple regression, where 
ad-valorem tariffs are related to our estimated AVEs for NTMs. Columns (1) and (4) show 
results, when product fixed effects (FE) are employed, i.e. they account for the fact that some 
products are facing higher levels of protection. Coefficients therefore capture the variation 
between countries. It can also be the case that countries exhibit lower/higher tariffs and apply 
NTMs less/more frequently due to specific trade agreements. We therefore also control for 
importer FE in columns (2) and (5), showing the variation between products. Columns 
(3) and (6) incorporate product and importer FE and therefore capture the essence of the 
question: the within country and product variation. Columns (4) to (6) are regressions on import 
weighted AVEs. 
Five out of six specifications point towards a tariff substitution effect for antidumping. For other 
quantitative measures, four specifications indicate a tariff substitution effect. Coefficients for 
SPS measures are negative (substitutes) and those for TBTs are positive (complements). 
However, none of the within country and product coefficients turn out to be significant. 
We continue elaborating the relationship between tariffs and NTMs along the BEC 
classification. For this purpose, we regress for each BEC category the import-weighted ad-
valorem tariffs on our estimated import weighted AVEs. We further include product and 
importer country dummies to capture the within industry and country variation. The results are 
summarized in Table 6.9. We run five OLS regressions per BEC category. In the first four 
regressions we considered only one NTM type as explaining variable, with the condition that 
we only consider non-zero AVEs. For example, column (1) shows the results when we regress 
import-weighted ad-valorem tariffs for intermediates on our non-zero AVE estimations for 














ADP -10.22% -4.98% -4.31% -0.94% 1537 7.20% -0.74% 7.93% 0.00% 804 ADP
SPS -0.21% -0.52% 0.18% 0.12% 8414 -1.22% -0.33% -0.88% -0.02% 18307 SPS
TBT 1.98% 0.87% 0.56% 0.55% 58595 -0.68% -0.26% -0.41% -0.02% 22735 TBT
QNTM -0.62% 0.11% -0.12% -0.60% 2351 3.15% 0.07% 3.08% 0.00% 220 QNTM
ADP -81.52% -45.80% -43.83% -2.19% 39.07% -1.30% 57.68% 0.00% ADP
SPS -0.46% -1.34% 0.53% 0.03% -2.55% -0.68% -1.84% -0.02% SPS
TBT 5.47% 2.56% 1.68% 1.10% -1.26% -0.49% -0.74% -0.01% TBT















condition that we consider only country-product pairs for which at least one non-zero AVE of 
any NTM type was estimated. 
Table 6.8 – Relation between tariffs and NTMs 
    Import weighted 
Dep. Variable 
Tariffs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











AVE(SPS) 0.0033 -0.0107 -0.0004 -0.0232 -0.0241 -0.0227 
 [0.0030] [0.0029] 
*** 
[0.0028] [0.0251] [0.0249] [0.0249] 





[0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] 
























N 103739 103739 103739 103739 103739 103739 
adj. R2 0.221 0.099 0.333 0.170 0.064 0.184 
Importer FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Product FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Our results strongly suggest a substitution effect between tariffs and antidumping measures for 
all BEC categories, with the lowest magnitude for intermediate products. They also show a 
substitution effect for other quantitative measures for intermediate products and a less 
significant substitution effect for SPS measures for gross fixed capital formation. Only TBTs 
appear as significantly complementary instruments to tariffs for final consumption goods.
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Table 6.9 – Complementary and Substitution Effects between Tariffs and NTMs 
by BEC classification, import weighted, excluding intra-EU trade 
Dep. Variable 
AVEBEC(Tariffs) 
Intermediates Final Consumption Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
AVEBEC(ADP) -0.0099    -0.0173 -0.0316    -0.0326 -0.0489    -0.0490 
 [0.0070]    [0.0029]*** [0.0085]***    [0.0087]*** [0.0043]***    [0.0039]*** 
AVEBEC (SPS)  -0.0129   -0.0112  -0.0621   -0.0499  -0.0129   -0.0172 
  [0.0236]   [0.0264]  [0.0737]   [0.0600]  [0.0067]*   [0.0319] 
AVEBEC (TBT)   0.0007  0.0003   0.0310  0.0299   -0.0099  -0.0099 
   [0.0006]  [0.0005]   [0.0151]**  [0.0157]*   [0.0071]  [0.0072] 
AVEBEC (QNTM)    -0.0159 -0.0215    -0.0305 -0.0216    -0.0879 -0.0776 
    [0.0038]*** [0.0035]***    [0.0268] [0.0203]    [0.0632] [0.0507] 










N 2938 13491 49574 2026 103739 2479 15599 34472 978 103739 335 390 11450 665 103739 
adj. R2 0.404 0.057 0.068 0.346 0.109 0.458 0.099 0.085 0.217 0.134 0.867 0.568 0.209 0.439 0.513 
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Condition AVEBEC ≠0 
AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 At least 
one NTM 
AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 At least 
one NTM 
AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 AVEBEC ≠0 At least 
one NTM 
Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
AVEBEC´ are import weighted AVEs per product and importer differentiated according to the BEC classification (intermediate good, final consumption, gross fixed capital formation). 




Breaking the results down to the sector level, we find that most of the effects are attributable to 
the manufacturing sector. In addition to what is presented in Table 8, the regression analysis 
for the manufacturing sector fosters the perception that SPS measures serve as substitutes for 
tariffs, not only for GFCF but also for final consumption goods. Considering the agri-food 
sector, we are left with five significant coefficients indicating a very strong substitution effect 
for antidumping for intermediate products. It further underlines a substitution effect for other 
quantitative measures for intermediates, observable for the manufacturing and agricultural 
sector, but also points to a complementary effect of other quantitative measures for final 
consumption products. Thus, the only group of products for which tariffs and AVEs of NTMs 
significantly go into the same direction are final consumption goods. Indeed, this is in line with 
the political debate on the two faces of NTMs: NTMs as possible means for consumers 
protection on the one hand and as industry protecting tools on the other. 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we calculate the ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
at the 6-digit product level of the Harmonized System for 149 importing countries over the 
period 2002-2011. We make use of the I-TIP database on NTM notifications of the WTO. Four 
different types of NTMs are considered in the analysis: antidumping (ADP), technical barriers 
to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and other quantitative measures 
(QNTMs). For this purpose, we further developed the methodology proposed by Kee et 
al. (2009). In addition, acknowledging the potential of NTMs to reduce information 
asymmetries, trade effects of NTMs are not restricted to be solely negative. When excluding 
intra-EU trade, our procedure results in 121,148 significant non-zero importer-product specific 
AVEs, of which less than 50% show a trade impeding effect. 69% of all computed non-zero 
AVEs correspond to TBTs, which is the only NTM type for which the number of positive – i.e. 
trade restricting – AVEs exceeds the number of negative AVEs. The highest trade restricting 
effects are found for chemicals, metals, textiles and vegetable products, due to TBT and QNTM 
measures. Distinguishing the effects of NTMs by the broad economic categories (BEC) 
classification, we find the overall highest trade impeding effects in the agricultural sector for 
final consumption goods affected by antidumping and other quantitative measures. TBTs and 
SPS measures seem to hamper trade in the manufacturing sector, but rather foster trade in the 
agri-food sector. Finally, TBTs are the only NTM type that is found to complement tariffs for 
final consumption goods, while SPS measures serve as substitutes to tariffs for gross fixed 
capital formation, other quantitative measures work as substitutes for intermediate products and 
ADP features prominently as substitute to tariffs for every BEC category. 
Although we find evidence for trade promoting effects of NTMs, it has to be kept in mind, that 
our computed AVEs are importer-product specific and not bilateral-product specific. On the 
one hand, a negative AVE could imply, that the imposed NTM was trade promoting for the all 
exporting countries. On the other hand, it could also imply that the imposition of NTMs leads 
to some trade diversions, outweighing the trade reductions of the affected exporter. Considering 
an exporter whose domestic standards and regulations are closer to those of the NTM imposing 
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country, the NTM should have trade promoting effects for this specific exporter, while for other 
exporters, it might reduce the trade flows to the imposing country. This argument will be tested 





Distribution of non-zero AVEs of NTMs 
Figure 6-3 – Including all AVEs, with AVEs smaller than -100% replaced by this lower bound 
 
















































































































Table 6.10 – Mean AVEs by NTM, Income Group and Sector; excluding intra-EU trade, 
including -100% AVEs 
(Extension to Table 6.5) 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
 










High Income: OECD -59.33 -100.00 -62.71 -100.00 -52.80 -100.00
High Income: non OECD -62.46 -98.25 -65.45 -100.00 -53.49 -48.17
Upper Middle Income -47.40 -100.00 -55.29 -100.00 -31.05 -100.00
Lower Middle Income -52.27 -100.00 -53.21 -100.00 -32.68 -100.00
High Income: OECD -4.64 -3.59 -4.99 -4.37 -4.42 -4.98
High Income: non OECD -6.14 -3.46 -3.17 -1.28 -6.74 -7.54
Upper Middle Income -4.69 -7.25 -3.66 -11.16 -5.01 -10.92
Lower Middle Income -6.55 -8.51 -10.13 -17.74 -5.19 -8.33
Low Income -3.11 -5.80 3.83 5.65 -3.54 -5.72
High Income: OECD -2.82 -3.58 -3.06 -4.22 -2.08 -2.27
High Income: non OECD -3.72 -2.23 -2.50 -1.61 -5.79 -4.79
Upper Middle Income -2.01 -5.15 -1.54 -4.43 -3.39 -6.86
Lower Middle Income -4.81 -7.97 -5.09 -10.06 -4.32 -5.92
Low Income -2.35 -7.18 -2.68 -10.21 -1.44 -1.56
High Income: OECD -10.85 -49.67 -10.92 -50.76 -10.32 -34.10
High Income: non OECD -30.20 -100.00 -30.39 -100.00 -24.28 -83.19
Upper Middle Income -24.23 -33.90 -24.36 -27.57 -19.92 -100.00


















Table 6.11 – Non-zero median AVEs by product (HS-2-digit level) sorted by HS 2002 sections 
Excluding intra-EU trade and AVEs smaller than -100% 
 
Source: own calculation 
HS2 ADP SPS TBT QNTM HS2 ADP SPS TBT QNTM
1 x -0.057 -0.202 -0.032 49 x x 0.373 22.340 X.
2 -13.614 0.021 -0.007 -4.416 50 x 0.331 0.600               
3 10.224 -0.003 0.005 0.005 51 x -0.015 -0.011 -0.425
4 -0.762 0.000 0.006 0.663 52 -3.365 0.018 0.009               
5 x 0.143 -0.079 -1.132 53 x 0.005 -1.555               
6 x -0.574 0.447 -80.215 54 -20.349 x 0.152 -0.303
7 3.999 0.000 0.002 0.279 55 77.494 x 0.101 -0.531
8 24.090 -0.067 0.038               56 x x 2.571 -48.547
9 1.039 -0.025 0.020               57 x x 0.933 10.812
10 -11.464 0.001 0.000 2.011 58 3.935 x 0.330 1.692
11 -1.943 0.004 -0.004 0.037 59 x x 0.789 8.632
12 15.491 0.011 0.007 25.677 60 x x 0.007               
13 x 1.059 -0.166               61 x x 0.273 0.262
14 x -0.050 0.615               62 x x 0.717 -5.325
III. 15 -4.233 -0.002 0.005 0.215 63 12.882 11.143 1.485 2.006
16 -3.793 0.009 0.052 40.893 64 -37.784 x 0.020 0.115
17 -0.589 -0.008 0.051 8.109 65 x x 4.211 21.074
18 33.468 0.071 0.000 5.350 66 x x 23.174 14.367
19 -0.424 -0.010 0.002 1.489 67 x 1.747 1.894               
20 22.503 0.006 0.061 31.515 68 4.003 0.088 0.826 21.971
21 -0.524 0.017 -0.010 8.607 69 3.050 0.089 0.868 5.485
22 -1.346 0.021 0.006 23.278 70 -19.217 2.866 1.217 9.363
23 -8.949 0.001 0.001 1.858 71 x x 67.797 31.780 XIV.
24 x 0.383 0.228               72 7.326 0.130 0.015 -0.017
25 x -0.002 0.016 -3.377 73 -41.142 -0.303 1.015 7.360
26 x 0.001 0.010 0.172 74 x x 1.006 1.330
27 2.912 0.000 -0.016 17.578 75 x x 0.052 0.322
28 -5.330 0.011 0.133 -0.068 76 15.989 -0.125 -0.003 13.466
29 13.485 0.082 0.242 -1.241 78 x x -2.691 58.899
30 x 0.250 0.006 -7.086 79 x 0.996 -3.168 14.138
31 81.186 18.670 52.253 61.568 80 x 8.254 -3.267               
32 -50.386 0.212 -0.710 -22.293 81 19.118 x 0.049 -2.012
33 -2.053 0.068 0.057               82 -32.300 1.571 3.469 22.782
34 19.527 0.645 0.574 1.683 83 -70.070 x 1.984 13.680
35 44.864 -0.023 0.070 -0.162 84 -14.073 0.299 1.367 -0.114
36 x 0.000 0.204 1.183 85 -29.326 -0.007 0.240 -5.948
37 -59.108 2.571 x 0.078 86 x x 0.178 15.011
38 5.596 0.196 -0.004 0.062 87 24.182 4.570 16.374 -21.373
39 25.547 8.547 35.410 19.513 88 x -5.869 24.093 47.608
40 -59.133 0.182 4.407 0.652 89 x 45.490 79.773 36.825
41 -3.443 0.019 1.218 0.513 90 8.087 2.725 0.640 -33.001
42 x -0.095 1.844 20.898 91 x x 0.232 1.244
43 x 0.368 4.290 2.780 92 x x 1.141 8.196
44 -44.034 0.003 0.936 17.866 93 x -24.689 -25.340 1.653 XIX.
45 x 0.118 x               94 x -69.737 3.796 13.912
46 x -0.988 x               95 x 4.736 4.776 43.973
47 x -0.204 x 0.174 96 -37.318 x 3.964 27.141





















Table 6.12 – Non-zero mean AVEs by product (HS-2-digit level) sorted by HS 2002 sections 
Excluding intra-EU trade and AVEs smaller than -100% 
 
Source: own calculation 
HS2 ADP SPS TBT QNTM HS2 ADP SPS TBT QNTM
1 x -1.495 -6.102 -3.037 49 x x 3.350 15.016 X.
2 -13.614 0.478 -2.315 -13.610 50 x 0.331 -0.134               
3 5.766 -0.836 -0.463 5.651 51 x -0.443 -3.159 -7.605
4 1.774 -2.006 -0.261 4.821 52 -9.159 1.735 -1.475               
5 x -2.272 2.161 -1.132 53 x 0.021 -8.637               
6 x -7.127 -3.250 -80.215 54 -21.903 x -3.466 -6.960
7 6.799 -1.831 0.043 1.132 55 32.675 x -1.983 12.415
8 18.833 -3.604 -0.402               56 x x 0.730 -48.547
9 -5.473 -1.594 -0.352               57 x x -0.500 -3.561
10 -33.337 -1.356 -0.580 3.194 58 3.355 x -0.319 9.767
11 -12.921 -0.191 0.188 -5.332 59 x x -1.253 8.632
12 9.818 1.239 0.006 -3.576 60 x x -2.000               
13 x 1.939 -5.009               61 x x 0.888 -7.463
14 x -3.708 -0.955               62 x x 0.720 -11.614
III. 15 -10.986 -1.032 -0.066 0.809 63 12.882 11.143 1.810 6.745
16 -11.183 -0.637 -0.072 24.176 64 -45.294 x -1.866 -3.827
17 -17.473 -2.580 0.700 10.474 65 x x 8.888 3.914
18 38.324 -2.162 1.688 5.350 66 x x 6.201 17.768
19 -9.930 -0.403 -1.580 6.820 67 x -8.697 5.363               
20 17.287 -0.305 -1.038 27.700 68 -5.086 -0.469 0.602 22.928
21 -6.164 -3.990 -3.763 16.257 69 -7.304 -3.557 1.910 10.114
22 -0.027 1.910 -0.199 28.393 70 -18.917 4.257 3.887 18.894
23 -9.233 -1.864 -3.251 0.810 71 x x 46.488 31.780 XIV.
24 x -1.376 3.503               72 9.104 -2.533 -2.695 -5.631
25 x -3.168 -0.266 -24.143 73 -32.204 -0.303 2.623 0.874
26 x -0.672 0.424 2.015 74 x x 4.814 -5.872
27 -2.029 -1.040 -4.787 21.861 75 x x -0.181 -6.953
28 -10.077 -1.906 0.054 -3.926 76 -5.100 -0.409 -3.716 21.733
29 6.251 -1.459 -0.508 -5.975 78 x x -11.162 32.098
30 x 2.731 -1.050 -13.545 79 x 0.996 -11.946 14.138
31 81.929 24.615 39.041 39.513 80 x 8.254 6.891               
32 -50.386 5.056 -5.552 -24.303 81 26.223 x -11.625 -6.687
33 -11.025 -6.594 0.155               82 -32.300 1.571 5.807 14.224
34 13.011 4.262 2.668 -2.520 83 -61.503 x -2.126 6.839
35 44.864 -9.905 -15.774 -1.803 84 -14.944 1.079 3.561 -3.052
36 x -2.332 -1.565 -15.436 85 -32.548 -0.342 2.266 -17.331
37 -59.108 5.528 x -6.438 86 x x 0.663 14.416
38 -3.814 2.947 -2.839 -4.275 87 -8.538 13.472 17.327 -23.780
39 19.545 14.339 28.901 16.294 88 x -5.869 22.007 51.046
40 -43.226 -0.030 7.568 0.245 89 x 48.278 64.907 18.202
41 -15.661 -1.596 -5.732 0.554 90 -2.950 2.942 -0.685 -26.125
42 x -5.637 5.293 22.036 91 x x 0.217 25.674
43 x 0.368 9.608 -10.016 92 x x -1.293 7.827
44 -37.023 -3.743 1.172 23.315 93 x -24.689 -13.386 -5.473 XIX.
45 x 0.521 x               94 x -53.477 3.344 16.547
46 x -14.796 x               95 x 5.557 8.581 42.740
47 x 1.639 x 0.174 96 -39.572 x 6.352 7.612






















Summary and Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have analyzed some specific issues of international trade. By studying the causes 
and implications of trade policies, I tried to contribute to the ongoing strand of the literature on 
international trade policy. I studied empirically specific determinants of trade protectionism and 
trade conflicts. In addition, I analyzed the implications of tariff and non-tariff measures on 
international trade. Moreover, I constructed a theoretical framework offering the cost-benefit 
analysis on the policy implications of prohibitive non-tariff measures (NTMs). 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I have analyzed some specific determinants of trade 
protectionism. Grossman and Helpman (1994) constructed a framework for “protection for 
sale.” Their main argument was that governments might impose trade policy restrictions in 
favor of special interest groups. These groups are mainly domestic producers benefitting more 
from higher prices and/or lack of competition. Hence, the government might assist them by 
limiting imports of products from their competitors. On the other hand, these groups will 
support the government (specifically political coalition and parties) on the election campaigns. 
The protectionism will hence increase frictions and restrictions in trade, which can frequently 
be in contradiction with commitments undertaken in international trade agreements. This 
process might intensify in a country with high corruption. In other words, a corrupted society 
can have additional incentives to implement protectionist measures. In the first chapter, such 
relationship is tested empirically during the period of 1996-2011. 
I analyzed the impact of corruption on trade protectionism and trade flows using a panel 
database of all countries in the world. To achieve robust results, I included control variables in 
the regressions applying Fixed Effect, Random Effect, and Generalized Method of Moments 
techniques. As a proxy of trade protectionism, I used customs and duties on imports, and taxes 
on trade. For trade flows, I used general openness indicator, which is calculated as a total trade 
to GDP ratio. In addition, I considered total imports, imports of goods, imports of services, and 
some other sub-categories of imports. Analyzing two measures of corruption from two different 
sources, I did not find any consistent and robust relationship between corruption and trade 
protectionism. The same result was concluded for the impact of corruption on trade flows. 
Overall, I concluded that I did not find that this institutional quality has significant impact on 
aggregate trade flows or overall trade protectionism. Special interest groups are usually 
lobbying the governments for their beneficial sectors of interest. The competition between 
corrupted special interest groups in different sectors is not identifiable in the measures used in 
the analysis. What observed in this chapter is actually the impact of average corruption on the 
aggregate trade protectionism. Hence, the summation of such effect on total protectionism is 
statistically zero. As a future avenue of research on this issue, the role of sectoral corruption in 
trade needs to be analyzed.  
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I establish a theoretical framework to investigate the 
implications of a specific trade policy. In fact, I provided a cost benefit analysis within a partial 
equilibrium framework to evaluate impact of a prohibitive NTMs. Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBTs) are one of the major sub-categories of NTMs, which have been used more frequently 
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since tariffs have been bounded by the WTO schedules of commitments. However, WTO 
regulations allow for specific, legitimate motivations behind impositions of such policy 
measures. Legitimate reasons behind such regulations can be for instance the pursuit of health 
and environmental issues or market efficiencies. Justifiable reasons related to concerns of the 
consumers’ health hampering the import of harmful products are the main components of my 
theoretical framework in the second chapter. 
The framework is established for a society in which two types of products are available: one is 
produced domestically without any harm to health, and the other is imported from abroad, with 
possible negative attributes. I assumed that there were two groups of consumers in the society 
imposing the prohibitive NTM. One group is completely indifferent about the harmful 
characteristics of the foreign product. The other group is very concerned about the possible 
harms of the foreign product receiving a disutility from its consumption. Moreover, I proposed 
two scenarios differing from each other in the sense that consumers can either or not distinguish 
between the two products in the home market. After utility maximization of consumers, and 
profit maximization of the two industries I calculated the quantity, price, and welfare of 
consumers and producers in the Cournot model of competition. Then, I analyzed welfare 
changes after the imposition of a prohibitive NTM banning the imports. 
The conclusions from theoretical framework were illustrated using data on consumption of 
shrimps within the EU-15. The results suggested that when consumers distinguish between the 
origins of products, a prohibitive NTM decreases their welfare less than when they have no 
information about the origin of products. In contrary, gains of domestic producer are smaller 
when there is incomplete information in the market. However, considering relative changes of 
welfare with respect to the ex-ante policy imposition, availability of information works more in 
favor of consumers than producers. Therefore, it can be stated that dispersing the information 
to consumers about the existing harmful products in the market can be treated as the good faith 
of government for imposition of NTM. 
The third chapter was analyzing the impact of NTMs on the quality of the imported products. 
International agreements classify NTMs based on the legal and procedural issues. However, 
scholars take one-step further and classify NTMs on their implications. Some NTMs contain 
regulations and standards to increase the quality of imported products. In the former chapter, I 
was also addressing various motivations and causes of NTM impositions. Prohibiting the import 
of low-quality products was addressed in the second chapter. Quality issues are frequently 
aimed by TBTs and SPS measures that are extensively used since 1995. Nevertheless, we still 
find some qualitative measures within other types of NTMs such as safeguards. Hence, the main 
focus of the third chapter was dedicated to analyze the quality improvement of products induced 
by different types of NTMs. 
Anti-dumping (ADP), TBT, SPS, Specific Trade Concerns raised on TBT and SPS, and all 
other quantitative measures (i.e. QNTM including countervailing measures (CV), safeguards 
(SG), quantitative restrictions (QR)) are the six types of NTMs analyzed in the fourth chapter. 
The data on these NTMs are gathered from the WTO Integrated Trade Portal (I-TIP), which 
was extensively improved by Ghodsi, Reiter, and Stehrer (2015). Lacking a good measurement 
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for quality of imports, previous studies were using imports unit-values as proxies for quality. 
However, using a theoretical framework proposed by Feenstra and Romalis (2014), we 
disentangle the quality and quality-adjusted cost of production within the unit-values. Then, the 
impact of NTMs on trade values (c.i.f. and f.o.b.), quantities, unit-values, quality, quality-
adjusted price, and quality-adjusted quantity was analyzed in the fourth chapter.  
The results of chapter three point at diverse impact of different types of NTMs on various 
sectors of products. Overall, TBTs are found to be trade enhancing, especially for chemicals, 
machineries, and other manufactures; and to be quality improving except for crude materials 
and inedible. We find that SPS and QNTM are trade restrictive and have diverse impact of SPS 
on quality of imported products is observed across different sectors. The surprising result refers 
to the ADP, which has trade enhancement in most of products and quality downgrade and 
increase in cost-related price. This result indicates that exporters dumping to the importing 
market with lower price, downgrade the quality of their products in order to comply with the 
lower prices petitioned by the anti-dumping. Moreover, quality-adjusted price is increased by 
the ADP to achieve its goal. 
The fourth chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to trade conflicts within the WTO involving 
TBTs. The main goal of this chapter is to find possible linkages between the TBT notifications 
and the Dispute Settlement (DS) cases of WTO citing TBT agreement. Specific Trade Concerns 
(STCs) on TBTs are the focus of the analysis. While WTO members can impose TBTs based 
on justifiable motivations, other countries are allowed to raise STCs on TBTs within a reverse 
notification system. The interesting issue behind these STCs is that they are raised because of 
perceived restrictions on trade. In this chapter, a descriptive analysis on TBT STC database is 
provided. Weaknesses of this data, provided by the WTO secretariat were elaborated in details. 
Various duplications of notifications within the databases can be mentioned as one of the major 
shortcomings of this data. 
In addition, a short description of DS cases citing TBT agreement is presented in the fourth 
chapter. European Union and the USA are the major countries responding to 20 and 11 Dispute 
cases respectively. Long and time-consuming disputes are discussed here. These long 
procedures not only impose costs on the DS bodies of the WTO, but also exporters incur high 
costs facing discriminative policy instruments. Another interesting feature is that only 5 out of 
45 DS cases during 1995-2011 are interpreted as violations of TBT agreement.  
The linkages between STC notifications and DS cases were analyzed statistically and 
econometrically. We find traces of DS cases in some of the TBT STC notifications. Moreover, 
we tested relationship empirically by merging the TBT STC data with compiled DS cases 
database covering the affected products. In a bilateral trade relationship model, the number of 
DS cases citing TBT agreement on products is thus considered as the dependent variable. The 
TBT STC raised on product is included in the regression as the main explanatory variable. 
According to the standard strand of literature, some control variables are also included in the 
regressions. Fixed effect Poisson estimation is applied in order to achieve unbiased and robust 
results for the regressions on count dependent variable. The outcomes show the significant 
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positive relationship between the TBT STCs and DS cases. In other words, we find that TBT 
Trade Concerns can be treated as early warnings for DS cases.  
The fifth chapter of the thesis focuses on trade in services. While many efforts have been made 
to increase the trade liberalization between the EU member states, we observe numerous trade 
restrictions in services. The first goal of the analysis is to evaluate the trade liberalization and 
its impact on trade of rail transportation services within the EU. In order to achieve this goal, 
bilateral trade in subsectors of rail transportation is analyzed within a gravity model. Four 
different liberalization indices are the main explanatory variables included in separate 
estimation specifications, in addition to some control variables. Only one of the indices, 
quantifying legal requirements for market entry and to the extent of the support of the regulatory 
to the external Railway Undertakings, is demonstrated to have statistically significant positive 
impact on trade flows of this service within the EU.  
Second goal of the fifth chapter is concentrated on the calculation of tariff equivalents of trade 
policy restrictiveness in the railway transportation sector within the EU and some other OECD 
countries. Following the approach used by various scholars (Park, 2002; Francois et al., 2005; 
Walsh, 2006), tariff equivalent is calculated within a cross sectional gravity framework during 
2003-2010. Including various control variables in the regressions, the country with the lowest 
difference between its predicted and actual average level of import in each year is considered 
as the benchmark country with highest level of trade liberalization. Thus, other countries’ trade 
restrictive can be listed based on their relative distance from the benchmark country.  
In spite of three rail liberalization packages adopted by the EU member states, there is no 
statistically significant decreasing trend of restrictiveness based on calculated tariff equivalents. 
However, for some countries such as Germany, liberalization has deepened during analyzed 
time span, while for some others such as Turkey or Poland the situation has been worsening. 
Moreover, an opposite relationship is observed between the liberalization indices and tariff 
equivalents. In fact, countries such as Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, or Germany with high 
liberalization indices have low estimated tariff equivalents. 
The last chapter of this dissertation is providing the ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs. 
Former chapters of this dissertation discussed various impacts of NTMs across countries, 
products, and times. This concluding chapter gives a detailed implication of NTM types 
maintained by WTO members on products at the six-digit of Harmonized System (HS) during 
the period 2002-2011. Kee et al. (2009), Beghin et al. (2014), and Bratt (2014) calculated AVEs 
of NTMs. The shortcomings in their studies are resolved in the analysis of the sixth chapter of 
this thesis. The shortcomings are as follows: (1) using a cross section for the period average 
2001-2003; (2) no differentiation between the types of NTMs; (3) no observed intensity of 
NTMs; and (4) no variation in the effect of NTMs on each product across countries. The 
empirical strategy applied in the last chapter is over a panel database covering bilateral trade 
flows between all WTO members as importers and all their trading partners in the world. ADP, 
TBT, SPS, and QNTM (elaborated above) are the four types of NTMs used in this analysis, 
which can differentiate the diverse effects of NTMs. Moreover, instead of a dummy variable 
(which was used in earlier studies), number of imposed NTM is used indicating the intensity of 
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trade policy on a given product. More importantly, the empirical strategy provides importer-
specific impact of NTMs that varies across countries.  
In the first stage of the empirical strategy, the impact of each type of NTM by its imposing 
country on the import values of the given product is estimated. Then, using the import demand 
elasticities, the effect is transformed in to price effects giving AVEs for each importer-specific 
NTM. The calculated AVEs show both impeding and enhancing behavior of different types of 
NTMs, by different countries, and by different sectors. The highest trade restricting effects are 
found for chemicals, metals, textiles and vegetable products, due to TBT and QNTM measures. 
Highest trade impeding effects are found in the agricultural sector for final consumption goods 
affected by antidumping and other quantitative measures. TBTs and SPS measures seem to 
hamper trade in the manufacturing sector, but rather foster trade in the agri-food sector. Finally, 
TBTs are the only NTM type that is found to complement tariffs for final consumption goods, 
while SPS measures serve as substitutes to tariffs for gross fixed capital formation, other 
quantitative measures work as substitutes for intermediate products and ADP features 
prominently as substitute to tariffs for every BEC category 
As an overall conclusion for this dissertation, I can state that protectionism is still important, 
especially in the form of NTMs and it is poorly explored in the case of services. Significant 
necessity of trade liberalization is emphasized in the economic literature. Governments and 
societies are aware of the benefits of open markets and trade liberalization. However, debates 
around the current negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
indicate that consumers fear lower quality of products in addition to unprecedented events 
induced by such partnership. On the one hand, there is an anxiety and fear for lowering the 
standards in the two large economies – the USA and the EU covering around 45% of world 
GDP – for freer trade. On the other hand, a big change like TTIP has its social anxieties whose 
consequences are not observable for consumers. Nevertheless, for some specific reasons, either 
economic or non-economic ones, governments impose restrictions on trade flows. Even the EU 
does not enjoy a complete liberalized trade – as observed in the fifth chapter. Yet, there is a 
downward trend in protectionism policy instruments, such as lowering tariffs since GATT and 
WTO establishment. However, variety of trade measures such as NTMs and restrictions on 
services trade, raise concerns on these constraints banning the liberalization in trade. Elevated 
conflicts between WTO members due to these restrictions inducing high international costs are 
other issues related to trade protectionism, which should be studied in more details in further 
researches. Combined further studies of legal and economic related issues in trade are required 
to pursue the ultimate goal of achieving trade liberalization globally not only trade in goods but 
also in keeping pace with supply chains. Although such an aim has currently many obstacles 
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